The press release was prepared by the Executive Director of KIIS, Anton Hrushetskyi

During February 14-22, 2023 and during February 22-March 6, 2023, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted two waves of its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus". Bythemethodofcomputer-assistedtelephoneinterviews(CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 2,007 and 985 respondents (in the first and second waves, respectively) living in all regions of Ukraine (except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine (within the boundaries controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022). The sample did not include residents of territories that were not temporarily controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022 (AR of  Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left the country after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 985 respondents (first wave) (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account a design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 3.4% for indicators close to 50%, 3.0% for indicators , close to 25%, 2.1% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 5%.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 2,007 respondents (second wave) (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 2.4% for indicators close to 50%, 2.1% for indicators , close to 25%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.1% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. In particular, if back in May, among all the respondents we interviewed, 2.5-4% lived in the territories occupied after February 24 (and this corresponded to the percentage of those who live there, because the generation of telephone numbers was random), now, due to the occupiers turning off the telephone communication, we managed to interview only 1 respondent in the first wave (out of 985) and 3 respondents in the second wave (out of 2007), who currently live in occupied settlements. It is important to note that although the views of the respondents who lived in the occupation were somewhat different, the general tendencies were quite similar. That is, the impossibility of interviewing such respondents does not significantly affect the quality of the results. There are other factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions (see Annex 2).

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of public moods of the population.

Since the 1990s, support for joining the European Union has grown in Ukraine. Russia's large-scale invasion in 2022 strengthened support for European integration and largely erased regional disparities. As of January 2022, 92% of Ukrainians want Ukraine to become a member of the EU, and depending on the region, the indicator is 88-94% (in particular, in the East, 88% support EU membership)[1].

At the same time, relations between Ukraine and the EU and the West in general can be manifested and evaluated in different contexts. Therefore, we asked respondents several questions about various aspects of relations between Ukraine and the EU/West.

The questions below was suggested to us by the famous British scientist Timothy Garton Ash. According to the results of the survey 82% of respondents agree that the future of Ukraine as a prosperous free country depends on whether it becomes a member of the EU (including fully agree - 50%). Do not agree with this – 14%.

Graph 1. Do you agree or disagree with such statement?: “Ukraine’s future as a prosperous free country depends on becoming member of EU”?

In the graph below, the data are shown in regional dimension. In all regions of Ukraine, the absolute majority of the population believes that Ukraine's future prosperity depends on joining the EU. In particular, among residents of the East and South[2] 78% and 81% think so (against, respectively, 17% and 14% who disagree with this statement).

Graph2. Dependence of a prosperous future on EU membership in the regional dimension

81% of Ukrainians believe that cooperation between Ukraine and the West to repel Russian aggression is a "win-win" situation, where both Ukraine and the West benefit. Among them, 45% believe that Ukraine and the West will win equally, 29% believe that it is mostly a win for Ukraine, but there is also a win for the West. The remaining 7%, on the contrary, see an overwhelming win for the West, although Ukraine will also win.

Only 9% believe that this cooperation is only in the interests of Ukraine and only 4% believe that it is only in the interests of the West.

Graph3. From the cooperation of Ukraine and Western countries in terms of repelling Russian aggression, will primarily win...?

In the graph below, the data are shown in regional dimension. We can also see that for all residents, cooperation is a win-win for both Ukraine and the West.

Graph4. Gain from cooperation between Ukraine and the West to repel Russian aggression in the regional dimension

The question below was inspired by P. Kazarin's article on the UP "The next day after the war"[3]. Earlier, we saw that the absolute majority of Ukrainians aspire to EU membership, believe that the successful future of Ukraine depends on it, and at the same time held the opinion that our cooperation with the West is beneficial for everyone.

Another important aspect of relations that P. Kazarin draws attention to is "owe us" or "we must". We formulated the same question in the context of providing post-war aid to Ukraine: should the aid be without conditions or restrictions, or should it be accompanied by demands for reform? As can be seen, now 54% of Ukrainians are rather in the "we must" category, as they believe that financial assistance should be accompanied by demands for reform, which we should listen to and which we should fulfill. However, the category "owe us", which implies the expectation of help without special conditions or restrictions (since Ukraine also protects Europe), is quite significant - 36%.

Graph5. What do you think about the financial aid and support of the West after the war? Some people believe that since Ukraine also protects Europe, aid should be provided without any conditions or restrictions. Others believe that financial aid from the West should be accompanied by recommendations and demands for reform, which we should listen to and implement, because this will contribute to building a better country.

In the graph below, the data are shown in regional dimension. So far, the situation is quite similar in all regions, although in the West and the Center there are slightly more people who believe that "we must".

Graph6. "We must" or "owe us" in the regional dimension

And the last question was also proposed by Timothy Garton Ash. One of the expectations of Ukrainians is a fair retribution when the perpetrators of the war are brought to justice. At the same time, it is an element of communication between Ukraine and the West. The proposed question was designed to understand how important Ukrainians feel (regardless of the actual possibility of putting Putin and others standing before an international court) to document the whole truth about the war. In fact, we are talking about a conditional "truth commission", which should forever preserve an objective picture of events. As can be seen, 88% of Ukrainians support the opinion about the need to document and preserve the true history of the war, even if it will be difficult to achieve full justice with Putin standing before an international court.

Graph7. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: “If we can’t have full justice after this war, with Vladimir Putin standing before an international court, let us at least have truth, with an international truth commission documenting the true history of the war so it cannot be denied”?

In the graph below, the data are shown in regional dimension. In all regions, the absolute majority agrees with this opinion.

Graph8. Documenting the true history of the war in the regional dimension

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

The survey results show that Ukrainians understand the dream goal of EU membership as a necessary condition for Ukraine's prosperity in the future. Ukrainians understand that the desired transformation of society is possible only within the circle of the European family.

At the same time, Ukrainians demonstrate openness in the fact that the current experience of war and repelling aggression is a win for both Ukraine and the West. We do not monopolize experience, but as a full member of the European family (and the Western family in general) emphasize the common goal of repelling aggression. The slogan "Together to Victory" for Ukrainians is not only intra-Ukrainian unity, but also unity with our foreign friends.

At the same time, it should be noted that a significant part of Ukrainians, with an optimistic view of European integration, considers it less important to heed the recommendations regarding reforms. This is a dangerous moment, because overcoming the external enemy does not eliminate the need for internal institutional and value transformations. We hope that the authorities, the public and Western partners will continue to work effectively as a team in the sphere of fair internal transformation of Ukraine.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

From the cooperation of Ukraine and Western countries in terms of repelling Russian aggression, will primarily win... (first wave)

 (% among all respondents)

What do you think about the financial aid and support of the West after the war? Some people believe that since Ukraine also protects Europe, aid should be provided without any conditions or restrictions. Others believe that financial aid from the West should be accompanied by recommendations and demands for reform, which we should listen to and implement, because this will contribute to building a better country. RANDOMIZATION OF READING (second wave)

 (% among all respondents)

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: “If we can’t have full justice after this war, with Vladimir Putin standing before an international court, let us at least have truth, with an international truth commission documenting the true history of the war so it cannot be denied” (second wave)

 (% among all respondents)

“Ukraine’s future as a prosperous free country depends on becoming member of EU” (second wave)

 (% among all respondents)

Annex 2. Methodological comments on the representativeness of telephone surveys conducted during the war

Even before the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, there were a number of factors that negatively affected the representativeness of the polls (for example, the absence of a census for more than 20 years). A full-scale war, of course, greatly affects representativeness and complicates the work of sociologists, but does not make it impossible. Access to reliable data on the state of public moods remains relevant both for Ukrainians themselves and for our foreign partners (who, as the events of recent months have shown, often underestimated and did not understand Ukraine and Ukrainians).

At the same time, in order to maintain objectivity, it is necessary to understand what limitations the war imposes on the conduct of sociological surveys. First of all, we pay attention to large-scale population movements. As of December, the UN estimates the number of Ukrainian refugees at almost 7.9 million. Obviously, due to various reasons, it is difficult to consider these data unequivocally accurate, but in general, the quite significant scale of departure from the country is understandable. There is no exact data on how many of them are adult citizens, but, most likely, it is about half. Among about 30 million adult citizens (estimated at the time of the full-scale invasion), it can be roughly estimated that about 15-20% have left the country, and it is impossible to reliably survey these citizens using telephone interviews. Even more citizens have become internally displaced persons, but they have a much smaller impact on the quality of telephone surveys, since almost all of these citizens have mobile phones and are reachable to participate in the survey (in fact, 12% of the respondents of this survey are IDPs).

Another important problem is the accessibility for the survey of the population of the territories that were occupied after February 24, 2022, due to the conduct of intensive military operations or due to interruptions in telephone communication. Now there is practically no connection. In May, 2.5-4% of respondents lived in these territories, now in the sample of residents of these territories – only 1 respondent out of 985 surveyed in the first wave and 3 respondents out of 2007 surveyed in the second wave. According to our estimates, the territory occupied by Russia as of the beginning of September (occupied after February 24, 2022) accounted for about 9% of the entire adult population. Taking into account the mass exodus of the population from these territories (most likely, we are talking about at least half of the population), as well as the fact that significant territories of Kharkiv and Kherson regions were liberated from this period, we estimate that no more than 3-5% of the total adult population of Ukraine were unavailable due to communication problems.

In our opinion, a more significant impact on representativeness can be either a generally lower willingness of citizens with "pro-Russian" attitudes to participate in surveys, or the insincerity of those who did take part in the survey (taking into account the obvious facts and prevailing opinions in the media regarding the Russian invasion , some citizens will not want to say what they really think "in public"). If to talk about the general willingness of respondents to participate in the survey, then in recent surveys we see either the same indicators or somewhat lower (although it should be borne in mind that the lower willingness to participate of "pro-Russian" citizens can be compensated by the higher willingness to participate of "pro-Ukrainian"-minded citizens).

We conducted a methodical experiment in May, which shows that the citizens who are currently participating in the surveys in terms of demographic characteristics and meaningful attitudes are close to those who participated in the surveys until February 24, 2022. Preliminarily, we see some shift in the direction of "pro-Ukrainian"-minded citizens, which is reflected in up to 4-6% deviations for individual questions (in the direction of more frequent selection of answers that correspond to the "pro-Ukrainian" interpretation of events). In our opinion, in the current conditions, this is a rather optimistic indicator.

However, this experiment does not give an answer as to how sincere the respondents are now in their answers. To assess the sincerity of responses to sensitive questions, in July we conducted another experiment using the "imagined acquaintance" method. The results showed that the respondents generally answered the survey questions honestly. That is, we have reason to say that during the interview, the respondents really answer our questions sincerely.