The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

During February 17-23 and May 16-22, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted two separate all-Ukrainian public opinion surveys "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions about how Ukrainians see relations with Russia, as well as what associations Ukrainians have about Russia and ordinary Russians. By the method of computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 1,052 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine)were interviewed  during February 17-23 and 1,067 respondents during May 16-22. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine (at the same time, in each sample, about 2% are Ukrainians who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

For more than 15 years, KIIS has been asking respondents a monitoring question about how Ukrainians see Ukraine's relations with Russia. In May 2024, KIIS again asked this question in its survey, and it is appropriate to consider the dynamics of views for the period from 2013 (that is, from the period before the Revolution of Dignity). To illustrate, we offer to see how Ukrainians responded in February 2013 (long before the Revolution of Dignity and the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas), in February 2022 (after the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas, but before the large-scale invasion), in July 2022 (after several months after a large-scale invasion), in May 2023 and in May 2024 (current moods).

As can be seen, before the Revolution of Dignity, the vast majority of Ukrainians (70%) wanted to see the countries as independent but friendly states. Only 15% insisted that relations should be like with other states - with closed borders, visas, and customs. Moreover, quite a significant share of respondents (12%) even wanted unification into one state. After the occupation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, the share of those who believed that relations should be the same as with other states increased significantly (from 15% to 44%), although 48% still believed that the countries should remain friendly (the share of those who advocated unification decreased to 5%).

Ultimately, immediately after the large-scale invasion, the share of those who want to have closed borders, visas and customs with Russia increased to 79%. By May 2024, the indicator remains virtually unchanged and actually only slightly decreased, but still stands at 75%. Only 12% would now like the countries to be friendly, and only 0.3% would like to unite the countries into one.

Graph 1. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia?

* For the correctness of the dynamics analysis, the AR Crimea is excluded from the calculations for 2013, and the ratio between macro-regions corresponds to the current situation.

In the graph below, the data is shown in a regional dimension, with comparisons with May 2023, February 2022 and February 2013. Until 2014, in all regions (including in the West and in the Center), the vast majority saw countries as friendly with open borders, without visas and customs. Even before a large-scale invasion in 2022, in the West alone, slightly more than half of the population favored closed borders, visas and customs (while 40% wanted the countries to be friendly). As of now, in all regions of Ukraine, the vast majority of the population wants to have closed borders, visas and customs with Russia. In particular, among residents of the East, 67% think so, and among residents of the South - 69%.

Graph 2. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia in the regional dimension

Graph 3 shows the data in terms of the language of communication at home. Among those who communicate mainly or only in Russian at home, 71% believe that with Russia should have closed borders, visas and customs

Graph 3. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia depending on the main language of communication at home

In addition to monitoring how Ukrainians see relations between Ukraine and Russia, KIIS also regularly asked questions about the attitude towards Russia and ordinary Russians. Back in February 2022, on the eve of the invasion, 34% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia, and in November 2021, 75% answered that they had a good attitude towards ordinary Russians living in Russia. After the full-scale invasion in May 2022, only 2% viewed Russia favorably and only 11% viewed ordinary Russians living in Russia favorably[1].

Given the clearly critical attitude towards Russia and Russians, KIIS stopped regularly asking relevant questions in its surveys due to the obviousness of the results that would be obtained. However, in February 2024, we decided to investigate the level of crystallization of negativity towards Russia and Russians. To do this, we asked the respondents in an open form to say, "the first two or three words that come to your mind when you hear the word / phrase Russia or ordinary residents of Russia" (some respondents were asked about "Russia", some - about "ordinary residents of Russia"). This format of the question is more flexible and the respondent has more ways to express a neutral or positive attitude towards Russia and ordinary Russians. So, if a person maintains a warm attitude towards ordinary Russians, then in an open form can either say "Don't know", "Don't have any" or say something neutral, for example, "Relatives". At the same time, it should be understood that neutral words are not evidence of a warm attitude, but are evidence of a lower crystallization of negativity. That is, if a person hates Russia with all his heart, then the first two or three words will be a variation of hatred, and not neutral considerations.

So, to begin with, graph 4 below shows the distribution of how many of the words spoken can be considered conditionally negative / critical of Russia / Russians, conditionally neutral or even positive, as well as the percentage of those who answered "Don't know or have no associations" . As can be seen, in 94% of cases statements about "Russia" are negative or critical and only in 5% of cases - neutral or positive (and another 1% could not answer). Regarding "ordinary Russians", the situation is only slightly better - in 80% of cases words and phrases are negative, and in 6% - neutral or positive (and another 14% said they had no association or could not answer).

Graph 4. What words / phrases come to mind first when Ukrainians hear "Russia" and "ordinary residents of Russia"

% among all the named words / phrases

Graph 5 below shows the actually received words and phrases (in orange – negative and critical, in blue – relatively neutral and positive).

Graph 5. Cloud of words / phrases

On the graph 6 word clouds are shown in a regional section for "ordinary citizens of Russia". Although in the South / East there are slightly more people who give neutral or positive or uncertain answers, nevertheless in this region 75% of words / expressions are negative or critical (in the West / in the Center - 83%).

Graph 6. Cloud of words / phrases about "ordinary residents of Russia"

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

In Ukrainian society, it is increasingly common to see emotionally colored discussions in the public media space about the expedient tactics and strategy of Ukraine in the conditions of a prolonged Russian invasion, especially after the terrible attacks, such as on Kyiv, Kryvyi Rih and other cities on July 8. Ukrainians have already broken a lot of spears and the further away we are, the less we can talk about thoughtful reasoned discussions, and, on the contrary, possible fault lines and lines of potential polarization are becoming more and more visible.

However, we must remember that our Russian enemy is only happy about this and will fuel mutual accusations, just to divide Ukrainians and turn them against each other. Russia's dream is to transform the Ukrainian discourse from "Russia is our existential enemy and our survival depends on the success of resisting the aggressor" to "Our main enemy is inside the country" (and here a wide palette - from "corrupt authorities" to "selfish public activists" and "unconscious citizens"). Surveys by KIIS (and other companies) show that Ukrainians are still aware of the existential threat from Russia (a recent survey showed that the majority do, in particular, 60% believe that Russia wants to destroy the Ukrainian nation or commit physical genocide[2]), although certain negative trends in public moods are also evident.

In our opinion, the authorities, journalists, public activists and ordinary citizens should focus on inclusive interpretations, which should be the foundation of the worldview of the modern Ukrainian civil nation (and not "fight" for narrow, limited definitions and superficial moralization of who is considered a "correct" Ukrainian in the current conditions is the way to fragmentation of society). A calm dialogue supported by facts and correct interpretations, and not emotional categorical and dramatized accusations, should be the basis of building the Ukrainian nation.

In addition to the above-mentioned understanding of the existential threat, among Ukrainians there is a clear unifying desire to integrate Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic space. And also a clear unifying awareness of the hostility of Russia and ordinary Russians. Ukrainians can debate about the (im)expediency of negotiations with Russia, about the current goals and strategic vector of actions, but the absolute majority of Ukrainians want to be fenced off from Russia and the Russians. In 2020, 57% of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine would be able to normalize relations with Russia in the future[3], but now we can confidently say that the absolute majority of Ukrainians (justifiably) do not want anything to do with Russia and Russians and will perceive them as enemies for many years to come.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

What are the first two or three words that come to your mind when you hear the word / phrase … INTERVIEWERS, ASK AND CHECK THAT THE RESPONDENT ACTUALLY EXPRESSES HIS OPINION IN TWO OR THREE WORDS

SPLIT-SAMPLE 1 – «Russia»

SPLIT-SAMPLE 2 – «ordinary residents of Russia»

How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia? ONE ANSWER.