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Dynamics of readiness for territorial concessions and attitudes towards separate packages of peace agreements
The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS
During May 16-22, 2024 and June 20-25, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted two separate all-Ukrainian surveys of public opinion “Omnibus”, to which, on its own initiative, added its own monitoring question about readiness for territorial concessions for end the war and about the perception of certain possible peace agreements. By the method of computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 1,067 respondents were interviewed in all regions of Ukraine (territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine) during May 16-22 and 2,008 respondents during June 20-25. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine (at the same time, in each sample, about 2% are Ukrainians who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for the results of the survey conducted in May. In the June survey, an experiment was conducted and 2,008 respondents were randomly divided into three equivalent subsamples (644-694 respondents each) (see details below). The results were analyzed for each sample separately and for each subsample the error is about 5%. Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by the KIIS. In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of public moods of the population.
Readiness for territorial concessions
Since May 2022, KIIS regularly asks question about the population's readiness for territorial concessions in order to achieve peace and maintain independence as soon as possible in its own surveys. The last time KIIS published relevant results in December 2023. After that, we asked question again in February and May 2024 (it is important to remind that in May the survey coincided with the active offensive actions of the Russians in the Kharkiv region). Given the intensity of the previous discussions, it is worth immediately paying attention to the following methodological aspects. Thus, the wording of the question reads “Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?”, and the respondent was asked to choose one of two such statements (at the same time, the statements were read to different respondents in a different order to reduce the order effect ):
We emphasize separately that the first statement does not specify which territories can be the subject of concessions. Also, we are not talking about the official recognition of certain territories as belonging to Russia (for example, some people are ready to postpone the liberation of certain territories for the future at a more suitable time for this, but at the moment did not recognize the official belonging to Russia). Also, in no case is the first statement the same as “peace on any terms” or even less readiness to surrender. This statement measures the extent to which Ukrainians in general are ready to discuss the possible parameters of peace in the context of the issue of territorial control. (However, at the same time, since the reality is more complex, the second part of the press release presents experimental data that better shed light on the attitude of Ukrainians to the parameters of peace.)
Graph 1 shows the respondents’ answers. In the period from May 2022 to May 2023, the situation was relatively stable: about 8-10% of respondents were ready for territorial concessions, and the absolute majority – 82-87% – consistently opposed any concessions. After May 2023, a gradual increase in the share of those ready for territorial concessions can be observed. Thus, by the end of 2023, the readiness to make concessions increased to 19%, in February 2024 – to 26%, in May 2024 – to 32%. The share of those who oppose no territorial concessions, accordingly, steadily decreased in the specified period. At the same time, despite everything, as of May 2024, the majority of Ukrainians – 55% – opposed any territorial concessions.
Graph 1. With which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?
The graph below shows the data in terms of the respondents' region of residence. Although in all regions, compared to May 2023, there were noticeably more people who are ready for territorial concessions, but at the same time, in all regions, no more than a third of those are. And also in all regions (in particular, in the South and East) there are more people who oppose no concessions than those who support concessions.
Graph 2. Readiness for territorial concessions in the regional dimension
To avoid false identification of those who chose the option “In order to achieve peace and preserve independence as soon as possible, Ukraine can give up some of its territories” with “pro-Russian moods”, the table below shows data on how these people see relations with Russia and how they see Russia's goal in the war against Ukraine. So, and among those who are generally ready for concessions, 73% want to be fenced off from Russia – that borders, visas, and customs should be closed between Ukraine and Russia (a similar indicator among those who are against any concessions is 79%). As for Russia’s goal, these people feel the existential threat a little less, but even among them 46% believe that Russia seeks to destroy the Ukrainian nation or carry out physical genocide (among those who are against no concessions – 68%). At the same time, only the same 5% share the truly pro-Russian narrative that Russia “seeks to carry out denazification and demilitarization without encroaching on the independence of Ukraine”.
Table 1. How do those who are ready / categorically against concessions see relations with Russia and how do they see Russia's goal in the war against Ukraine
Attitude towards individual packages of peace agreements
After the start of the full-scale invasion, it became common in surveys to ask how Ukrainians are ready or not for specific possible concessions (for example, refusing to join NATO). The obtained results are definitely valuable for understanding both general readiness for concessions, and for determining the relative “acceptability rating” of concessions. However, this approach (when we ask a separate question for a separate possible concession) has its drawbacks. First of all, the problem is that in reality any agreements are package and are, in fact, whips and gingerbread. A person can reject a certain concession, but if it is “packaged” in a package with other, more important aspects, then such a package can, albeit without enthusiasm, receive approval. Further, the results of KIIS’ own experiment are given in the press release. The mentioned experiment is primarily illustrative, since there can be many more dimensions of peace agreements (as well as possible levels of each dimension). We limit ourselves to a few particularly important points with their more descriptive descriptions (for example, due to the obvious caution regarding security agreements, we talk about NATO membership or the ban on NATO membership, since “NATO membership” has a more relief and understandable perception by the population). Perhaps, in the future, one of our Ukrainian or foreign partners, who get acquainted with these results, will have interest and resources for a larger and more detailed study of this issue. So, we have developed three possible packages that include both positive and negative aspects for Ukraine. One package (split-sample) was randomly selected for each respondent. The question sounded like this: “There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read one option to you, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “It is easy to compromise on this item”, “It would be difficult, but it would be acceptable” or “It is completely unacceptable”. So, this option includes...” (“inside” the package to reduce the order effect, to some respondents the components were read in one order, to some respondents – in another). We specifically added the option “It would be difficult, but it would be acceptable” because it allows a person to agree to a certain compromise in a more socially acceptable form. The packages themselves sounded as follows: Package ¹1:
Package ¹2:
Package ¹3:
The graph below shows the results for each package. As can be seen, the option with the postponement of the liberation of the currently occupied territories and the ban on joining NATO, but with joining the EU, is supported by 38%, and for the majority – 54% – this option is categorically unacceptable. (It is worth noting that one of the KIIS surveys previously showed that the value of EU membership is perceived not only as socio-economic progress, but also as a security issue.) At the same time, if Ukraine gets membership in NATO (in addition to membership in the EU), even with the postponement of the liberation of the currently occupied territories, 47% are ready to support this option, while 38% will be categorically against it. And if Ukraine, in addition to membership in NATO and the EU, can also liberate at least Kherson oblast and Zaporizhzhia, then 57% will agree to such an option (although mostly as a “difficult compromise”, since other territories will remain under Russian control). This option will be categorically unacceptable for 33%. These illustrative results help to better understand how Ukrainians evaluate different approaches to peace. It is important to consider such points:
Graph 3. There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read one option to you, and you tell me how you would react to it.
Below in the graph, the data are shown in the section of individual regions (it should be taken into account that there were not so many respondents in each region, which causes a higher error at the level of individual regions). In general, the trends are similar among the population of all regions. The majority in all regions (in particular, in the South and East) reject the option without membership in NATO, but with membership in the EU. At the same time, in the case of membership in NATO, there are more people who (albeit without enthusiasm), but could accept such an agreement (especially in the case of the liberation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts).
Graph 4. Attitudes towards possible packages of peace agreements in the regional dimension
A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:
We are once again in a situation where the results of the survey can be interpreted either as a “half full” or as a “half empty” glass. For a correct interpretation, it is necessary to take into account the context. In May, when we once again asked about readiness for territorial concessions, the full-scale invasion lasted for more than two years, the Russians launched a large-scale offensive in the Kharkiv region, delays in the supply of the necessary weapons continued to take place, they tried to destabilize Ukraine by questioning the legitimacy of the President, the Law about mobilization came into force, etc. Therefore, the fact that despite all the complexities of modern realities, the majority of Ukrainians continue to reject territorial concessions, says that the glass is "half full". Undoubtedly, there are alarming trends and it is necessary to respond to them in a balanced and constructive manner, but the situation should not be over-dramatized. It is also important that in the context of possible "concessions" Ukrainians are against "peace on any terms". Although there is ambivalence in the views of Ukrainians (and this is a completely normal situation for democratic societies), it is not as striking as try to present it, and the results of the survey show the flexibility of Ukrainians within the framework of a possible dialogue. The priority requirement is safety and really convincing guarantees. If there is no convincing security configuration, Ukrainians will not accept such an option. We hope that Western friends of Ukraine and other "commentators" will more intensively supplement their humanistic calls for peace with realistic proposals to ensure the real security of Ukrainians against further Russian aggression. At the same time, we, Ukrainians, need to adhere to the framework of a civilized dialogue within the country regarding possible scenarios of the development of the situation. As the results of the survey show, those who are generally ready to make certain concessions also want to be fenced off from Russia, actually hate it and understand the existential threat. You should not write such people down as "traitors" and raise the level of already too emotional conversations. However, we also call on citizens, who for certain reasons are ready to make concessions, to take a civilized approach to communication. Currently, many Ukrainians equate their position with the scandalous statements of some Ukrainian bloggers. Obviously, bloggers with dubious reputations and lack of expertise cannot be the voice of these people. In the surveys, we see many points of contact and the presence of a common foundation for the absolute majority of Ukrainians. We should all conduct a calm dialogue with each other, exchange reasoned opinions and preserve the unity of the Ukrainian civil nation.
Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire
May 2024:
With which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF READING
June 2024:
SPLIT-SAMPLE, ONLY ONE OF THE THREE OPTIONS IS READ TO THE RESPONDENT (RANDOMLY SELECTED):
There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read one option to you, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale "I easily agree to this option", "this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable" or "this option is completely unacceptable". So, this option includes:
À:
Á:
Â:
23.7.2024
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