The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

KIIS regularly monitors the attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia and Russians. This press release presents the results of two own surveys of KIIS "Omnibus", conducted in September-October 2024. In one survey, we investigated the attitude towards Russians living in Russia using the Bogardus scale (social distance research). In another survey, we asked a direct question about how Ukrainians feel about Russia and Russians, ordinary residents of Russia. KIIS previously asked similar questions, which allows us to correctly monitor the dynamics of public moods.

Both surveys were conducted by the method of telephone interviews(computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine). Also, in both cases, the survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine, which was controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine (at the same time, part of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022.

One survey (using the Bogardus scale) was conducted between September 10-16, 2024 and a total of 1,013 respondents were interviewed. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% - for indicators close to 5%.

The second survey (with a direct question about the attitude to Russia and Russians) was conducted in the period from September 20 to October 3, 2024. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 2.9% for indicators close to 50%, 2.5% for indicators close to 25%, 1.7% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.3% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by the KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

One of the monitoring questions of KIIS is as follows: "How do you generally feel about Russia now?". Respondents could choose one of the options: "very good", "mostly good", "mostly bad", "very bad" (or at their own insistence "difficult to say"). The graph below shows the dynamics of responses of Ukrainians during 2008-2024.

Until February 2014 (inclusive), that is, before the occupation of Crimea, the absolute majority of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia. In the period of 2008-2010, on average, 91% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia, in the period of 2011-2014 (up to February inclusive) – 82% (some decrease may be related to the peculiarities of the presidency of V. Yanukovych and the political and economic conditions at the time relations with Russia, although still the indicator of 82% shows that the absolute majority of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia). In February 2014, 78% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia and only 13% had a bad attitude (which once again proves that the Revolution of Dignity was not anti-Russian in its direction and content). A good attitude towards Russia prevailed in all regions of Ukraine - from the West to the East.

The occupation of Crimea, attempts to destabilize the South and East of Ukraine, and eventually Russia's resolution of the war in Donbas led to a significant decrease in the share of those who feel good about Russia. The indicator reached its lowest level (until 2022) in May 2015, when 30% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia. Then the indicator began to recover and in 2019-to the beginning of 2020, 54-57% had a good attitude towards Russia. At the beginning of 2020, the attitude towards Russia began to deteriorate again. On the eve of a full-scale invasion in 2022, in February, 34% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia, 50% had a bad attitude.

After the invasion, a stable absolute majority of Ukrainians have a bad attitude towards Russia. As of October 2024, 93% of Ukrainians have a bad attitude towards Russia, and only 3% have a good attitude.

It is important to emphasize that the deterioration of the attitude towards Russia followed the aggressive actions of Russia itself, and did not precede it. Russian authorities and propaganda claim that their aggressive actions are a response to rising anti-Russian moods (although even this cannot justify military action in any case). However, our data show that Ukrainians maintained a good attitude towards Russia, and only Russia, with its brutal measures, forced Ukrainians to reconsider their attitude.

We would also like to draw attention to the fact that there is often an argument that there are many cases of arrests of traitors in the media (for example, those who launch missile strikes or track the movements of the Ukrainian Defense Forces). Therefore, doubts arise as to how these situations of detention "correlate" with "only 3%" of those who have a positive attitude towards Russia now. First, there are another 4% who could not answer the question (and some of them may have been hiding their positive attitude). Secondly, if only these 3% are translated into the number of the population, then it is about 700,000 Ukrainians. We should immediately note that a positive attitude towards Russia is not unambiguously identical to hatred of Ukraine and Ukrainians and disposition to treasonous actions (a large part of these respondents, for example, are categorically against any concessions to Russia, trust the President, etc.). However, even if a small part of these 700,000 will commit treasonous actions, it will turn out to be thousands of Ukrainians - a lot of work for the SBU and materials for the Ukrainian media. And if you often see similar stories in the media (and do not take into account and emphasize for viewers and readers that we are talking about a marginal percentage of the population), this can create a false impression that Ukraine is completely permeated by traitors.

Graph 1. Dynamics of attitudes towards Russia, 2008-2024

Below on the graph, we compare how residents of different regions treated Russia[1] in February 2022 (on the eve of the invasion) and how treat now (in October 2024). On the eve of the invasion, even in the West and in the Center, quite a lot of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia - 21% and 31%, respectively. In the South and East, those who treated good even outnumbered those who treated badly - 45% in the South (versus 40% who treated badly) and 53% in the East (vs. 30% who treated badly).

In October 2024, the absolute majority of the population in all regions - from 96% in the West to 88% in the East - has a bad attitude towards Russia. The share of those who treat good varies from only 1% in the West to only 5% in the South.  

Graph 2. Attitudes towards Russia in the regional dimension

We also asked the question "How do you generally feel about Russians - residents of Russia?". In November 2021, 76% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russians – residents of Russia and only 14% had a bad attitude. That is, the conditional formula for the majority of Ukrainians was "we blame the Russian authorities for Crimea and the war in Donbas, and ordinary Russians are not responsible."

A simple full-scale invasion changed the picture completely. Currently, only 8% of Ukrainians have a good attitude towards Russians – residents of Russia, and 84%, on the contrary, have a bad attitude towards them. That is, now the formula is "both the Russian authorities and ordinary Russians are responsible".

Graph 3. Dynamics of attitudes towards Russians - residents of Russia

The graph below compares the changes between November 2021 and October 2024. On the eve of the invasion, in all regions of Ukraine (from 71% in the West to 82% in the South and East), the majority of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russians – residents of Russia.

Now the absolute majority of Ukrainians in all regions - from 90% in the West to 75% in the East - have a bad attitude towards Russians – residents of Russia. The share of those who continue to treat them well does not exceed 13% (as much in the South and East).

Graph 4. Attitudes towards Russians - residents of Russia in the regional dimension

In our other survey in September 2024, we investigated attitudes towards Russians using the Bogardus scale. For example, for a certain group (such as Russians – residents of Russia), respondents have to answer how close they are willing to allow relations with representatives of this group. This is called social distancing. The minimum social distance is 1 (agree to admit as a family member), the maximum is 7 (would not allow into Ukraine). You can calculate an index that will vary from 1 to 7, where 7 will correspond to the maximum distance to this group.

To understand the context: in 2013, we asked about the general attitude towards Russians, and then the value of the index was 2.7 (which indicated a high openness of Ukrainians towards Russians). Only Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (2.0) and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (2.3) had a better attitude. That is, the Russians were very close and immediately followed the Ukrainians.

As of October 2024, the value of the index for Russians - residents of Russia is 6.6. Moreover, the situation is almost similar in all regions - 6.6 in the West, 6.7 in the Center, 6.4 in the South, 6.5 in the East. In fact, 86% of all respondents (89% in the West and Center, 80% in the South and 78% in the East) answered that Russians – residents of Russia should not be allowed to enter Ukraine at all.

Graph 5. Social distance to Russians - residents of Russia (from 1 to 7, where 7 is the maximum distance)

And finally, we wanted to find out how Ukrainians in Ukraine treat Ukrainians – residents of  Russia. As can be seen, although the attitude towards Ukrainians in Russia is a little better, it is also clearly negative - the value of the index is 5.9 (and 55% of respondents answered that Ukrainians in Russia should not be allowed into Ukraine at all).

Graph 6. Social distance to Russians – residents of Russia and Ukrainians – residents of Russia (from 1 to 7, where 7 is the maximum distance)

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

As sociologists, we are often asked what major changes occurred in Ukrainian society after the full-scale invasion of 2022. Perhaps the most significant is the final delegitimization of Russia and Russians as a possible vector for Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Until 2014, Ukrainians sincerely believed in the friendly intentions of their neighbors and wanted to build good-neighborly relations, although talked about the independence of both states. Even after 2014, the majority of Ukrainians maintained a good attitude towards "ordinary Russians", which could become the basis for the normalization of interstate relations later (for example, when the government in Russia changes to a more democratic one). However, the mass killings and widespread destruction, the frankly genocidal rhetoric of the Russian authorities, and the support of the war by the majority of Russian society (whether in a more open or a more passive form) buried all these possibilities.

Currently, Ukraine has only one vector - European and Euro-Atlantic integration together with the development of a modern Ukrainian European civil nation. And we, perhaps not so quickly and with various obstacles inside and outside of us, but we are moving along this path. We often compare ourselves to Russia and Russians, discuss what remains of our "Russian heritage". And not only us, but the world in general. Who is Russia and Russians for us after all their criminal actions? They remain for us an eternal reminder of who we were not before and certainly are not now. However, in their own way, they also show what we should not become in the future.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

How do you feel about Russia in general now? 

And how do you generally feel about Russians - residents of Russia? 

And now I will read to you the names of some national groups. For each group, say whether you agree to admit its representatives. Choose all that apply.

Russians - residents of Russia