Press release prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

From September 20 to October 3, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative,  added a question about trust in V. Zelenskyi. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2004 respondents were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 2.9% for indicators close to 50%, 2.5% for indicators close to 25%, 1.7% for indicators close to 10%, 1.3% for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the results obtained still retain a high level of representativeness and allow for a fairly reliable analysis of public moods of the population.

Since the declaration of Independence in 1991, discussions about the “Ukrainian nation” have not subsided in Ukraine. Moreover, the discussions concern quite different aspects of the existence of the Ukrainian nation. For example, is it possible to talk about the existence of a single Ukrainian nation at all, especially in certain historical periods (let us recall that our enemies and not very well-informed world “opinion leaders” often spoke, and some still speak, about a “divided” Ukraine – a failed state)?

Since the 1990s, many related quantitative and qualitative researches have been conducted in Ukraine, but we first suggest recalling the results of Ukrainians' answers to the question "Who do you consider yourself to be first and foremost?" with options ranging from "a resident of a village, district, or city" to "a citizen of the world." This question has been asked by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine since the early 1990s (data for 2022-2024 were collected by KIIS). As can be seen, over the past 30 years, we can talk about the growth of self-awareness as part of the Ukrainian nation – if in the early 2000s only 40% primarily identified themselves as citizens of Ukraine (and a significant part of the population had a more local identity - such as a resident of their locality or region), then in the period until 2014 the average indicator was 51%, in the period until 2022 - 60%. Currently, after 2022, an average of 80% of Ukrainians identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine.

Graph 1. Who do you consider yourself to be first and foremost?

% chose the option “Citizen of Ukraine”

At the same time, it is important that in all regions - from the West to the East - the absolute majority identify themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine. Thus, according to KIIS surveys in 2022-2024, on average, 80% of residents of the West, 82% of residents of the Center, 80% of residents of the South, and 77% of residents of the East consider themselves primarily citizens of Ukraine. The same applies to other categories of the population: in particular, regardless of ethnic origin or language, the absolute majority consider themselves citizens of Ukraine. In particular, in the period 2022-2024, on average, 81% of Ukrainian-speaking and 75% of Russian-speaking respondents identified themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine.

In the context of the results, it is also worth adding that in addition to high civic identification, there is a clear awareness of Russia as an enemy (which contributes to a better delimitation of Ukraine as one's homeland): 96% in the West, 93% in the Center, 90% in the South, 88% in the East, 96% of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and 80% of Russian-speaking Ukrainians have a bad attitude towards Russia.

However, another important question is who Ukrainians themselves consider to be part of the Ukrainian nation. In the context of the geopolitical choice in favor of the Western liberal-democratic world, as well as against the backdrop of a full-scale war, Ukrainians should move towards an inclusive definition of the Ukrainian nation. The war should especially prove that love for the Motherland and subjective identification with Ukraine and its destiny are the main requirements for those who want to see themselves as part of the Ukrainian nation (regardless of ethnic origin, language of communication, religion, etc.). However, some people (especially those active on social media) are trying to promote a narrower or conflicting definition of who is a member of the Ukrainian nation.

Given the sensitivity of the question, in our survey we tried to take an experimental approach to assessing the subtleties of the perception of (non-)belonging to the Ukrainian nation. We implemented an experiment with a factorial design (another definition is the vignette method). We read out a description of a person to respondents and then asked the question “There are different opinions about who should be considered a member of the Ukrainian nation and who should not. Now I will read you a description of a person, and you tell me, in your opinion, such a person definitely belongs, rather belongs, 50/50 / it is difficult to say for sure, rather does not belong or definitely does not belong to the Ukrainian nation?” For each respondent, the description of the person we asked about always included “This person is a citizen of Ukraine, considers Ukraine to be his homeland, condemns Russian aggression”. At the same time, for each respondent, a description of the person's region of residence (either West or East of Ukraine), ethnic origin (either Ukrainian or Russian), and language of communication at home (either Ukrainian or Russian) was added (generated completely randomly). For example, "This person is a citizen of Ukraine, considers Ukraine to be his homeland, condemns Russian aggression. At the same time, this person mainly communicates in Russian, is ethnically Ukrainian, and lives in Eastern Ukraine.".

So, in each description we always point out the most obvious and important criteria for belonging to the Ukrainian nation – this person loves Ukraine, considers it his homeland and at the same time condemns Russian aggression. In the case of an inclusive vision of the Ukrainian nation, other additional characteristics should not have an impact and, for example, for both a “person from the West” and a “person from the East” there should be approximately the same proportion of those who consider them to be part of the Ukrainian nation. Below we will present the results of the survey on how additional information about the region of residence, ethnic origin and language affects the perception of belonging to the nation.

We would like to emphasize that the results obtained are primarily an invitation to Ukrainian and world experts and opinion leaders to discuss and further in-depth research. The results presented below illustrate the influence of individual factors, but cannot be considered an exhaustive list of criteria for determining belonging to the Ukrainian nation. In addition, additional methods of analysis are needed for a deeper processing of the results (and we are currently in the process of doing so).    

Graph 2 below shows the results of the difference in perception, for example, between residents of the West and the East (under the condition of “equality” of other descriptions – language and ethnic origin – since the descriptions of residents of the West and the East included Ukrainian/Russian ethnic origin to the same extent and communicated in Ukrainian/Russian at home). First of all, it should be noted that only a small number of respondents (no more than 7%) claimed that a person with such a description is more likely or definitely not a member of the Ukrainian nation. That is, neither the region, nor the ethnic origin, nor the language spoken at home are grounds for Ukrainians to be “excluded” from the Ukrainian nation if this person loves Ukraine and condemns Russia. Such results are quite optimistic about the development of an inclusive approach to the Ukrainian nation.

Graph 2. Belonging to the Ukrainian nation of a person who is a citizen of Ukraine, considers Ukraine to be his homeland, condemns Russian aggression, and at the same time…

At the same time, there are obvious subtleties of perception that still affect the perception of belonging to the Ukrainian nation. Thus, Ukrainians remain cautious and, regardless of the description, no more than half of them “unconditionally” consider a person to be a Ukrainian nation. If to talk about more or less unconditional inclusion, then 61-75%, regardless of region, ethnic origin or language, consider a person to be part of the Ukrainian nation. About a quarter chose the cautious option of “50/50”, that is, on the one hand, they did not exclude a person from the ranks of the Ukrainian nation, but, on the other hand, they needed additional information for a more definite answer.

If to talk about specific characteristics, then he region of residence actually does not play a role. For people who are "residents of the West", 69% generally consider them to be part of the Ukrainian nation, for "residents of the East" - 68% in total (of them 43% and 44% definitely consider them to be part of the Ukrainian nation, respectively).

More noticeable differences relate to ethnic origin and language of communication. Thus, for people who are “ethnic Ukrainians”, a total of 75% consider them to be part of the Ukrainian nation, for people who are “ethnic Russians” – a total of 61%. At the same time, if 53% of “ethnic Ukrainians” are definitely considered part of the Ukrainian nation, then 34% of “ethnic Russians” are definitely considered part of the Ukrainian nation. The difference is mainly due to the larger share of those who chose the “50/50” option. For example, the share of those who consider “ethnic Russians” not to belong to the Ukrainian nation is only 6%.

Similar trends (but with a smaller “gap”) are observed regarding the language of communication at home. For “Ukrainian-speaking” people, 71% consider them to be part of the Ukrainian nation, for “Russian-speaking” people – 65%. If to compare the share of those who definitely consider them to be part of the Ukrainian nation, the indicators are 48% and 39%, respectively. Again, the difference is mainly due to those who choose the “50/50” option, and, for example, only 7% do not consider “Russian-speaking” people to be part of the Ukrainian nation.

Graph 3 below shows the results for each complete description (there were 8 of them in total) (it should be taken into account that the respondent answered only 1 description, so there were 200-250 answers for each description and the error is, accordingly, higher). As can be seen, Regardless of the description of the region of residence, language, and ethnic origin, no more than 10% consider a person as not belonging to the Ukrainian nation. And in the case of all descriptions, no less than 56% consider a person to belong to the Ukrainian nation.

Graph 3. Belonging to the Ukrainian nation of a person who is a citizen of Ukraine, considers Ukraine to be his homeland, condemns Russian aggression, and at the same time…

Thus, the situation is relatively worst with Russian-speaking Russians in the West and East. 59% and 56% of them, respectively, generally consider themselves part of the Ukrainian nation (and of these, respectively, 26% and 32% definitely consider themselves as such). The situation is relatively best with Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in the West and East. Thus, 77% (regardless of region) generally consider themselves part of the Ukrainian nation, and 57% and 56% definitely consider themselves as such, respectively.

Thereby, we interpret the results as meaning that regardless of region, ethnicity, and language, respondents are open to including a person in the Ukrainian nation if they love Ukraine and condemn Russian aggression. At the same time, some categories (primarily ethnic Russians, to a lesser extent Russian-speakers) are expected to make somewhat more “efforts” to prove that they are indeed part of the Ukrainian nation. Or another interpretation – the presence of certain characteristics (Ukrainian ethnic origin, Ukrainian language) increases the likelihood that a person will be considered to belong to the Ukrainian nation “by default”.  

And finally, we would like to consider to what extent we have a symmetrical or not perception of the residents of the West towards the residents of the East (and vice versa), as well as what is the attitude of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians (and vice versa).

So, the graph below shows the results. First of all, it should be emphasized that there is in fact a “mutual recognition”: most Westerners consider Easterners (who love Ukraine and condemn Russia) to be part of the Ukrainian nation, and among Easterners, the majority consider the same about Westerners. Among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the majority consider Russian-speaking Ukrainians to be part of the Ukrainian nation, and vice versa.

However, there are still important differences in perception, especially regarding the language of communication and ethnic origin. Thus, among Russian-speaking Ukrainians, 73% in total, and of these, 49% definitely include Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in the Ukrainian nation. Among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the indicators are similar for Russian-speaking Ukrainians – 59% and 30%, respectively. The difference is mainly due to those who answered “50/50” (so, among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, only 9% believe that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are not part of the Ukrainian nation).

A similar trend is observed in the case of ethnicity (ethnic Ukrainians are more cautious in including ethnic Russians in the Ukrainian nation, although only 6% of them exclude ethnic Russians from the Ukrainian nation).

Graph 4. "Mutual" perception of certain categories of the population (whether they belong to the Ukrainian nation)

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Preserving the unity of the Ukrainian nation is a necessary condition for survival and success in the existential war against Russia. That is why the development of an inclusive concept of the Ukrainian nation is not only morally correct, but also a rational choice from the point of view of uniting all possible resources to repel the enemy (and further - the joint reconstruction of Ukraine and its accession to the Euro-Atlantic community).

We see that Ukrainians remain open-minded and have favorable views for a truly broad interpretation of the Ukrainian nation in all its diversity. It is important to use the existing favorable opportunities to build a truly inclusive civic Ukrainian nation.

However, we see the risks of both the poisonous influence of Russian propaganda (which poisons not only Ukrainians, but also world opinion leaders and the population of other countries), and the destructive influence of individual Ukrainian actors. In the case of the latter, we see the advancement of a conflict agenda, which at one pole is strengthened around “we must preserve the Russian imperial and Soviet heritage in Ukraine as an important part of our identity” (and from this position, for example, criticism of the restoration of justice in matters of historical memory and the necessary symbolic cleansing of public space). At the other pole, we see categoricality and an overly narrow (often purely ethnolinguistic) definition of the “correct” member of the Ukrainian nation. Promoting antagonism (hypocritically and deceptively presented as a “struggle for truth”) instead of strengthening a unifying platform only weakens Ukraine and makes our prospects more pessimistic.

Our surveys show that a minority of Ukrainians belong to these extreme clusters of ideas. The majority of Ukrainians we interview and who truly represent the population of Ukraine (and not those who demonstrate “activity” on social media): are quite moderate, quite tolerant, quite calm on complex issues and open to constructive reasoned discussion and interaction. It depends on all of us – whether we will use the current unifying potential or, in order to please the selfish short-term political ambitions of individual subjects, we will drive society towards division.

Annex 1. Formulation of questionnaire questions

There are different opinions about who should be considered a member of the Ukrainian nation and who should not. Now I will read you a description of a person, and you tell me whether, in your opinion, such a person definitely belongs, rather belongs, 50/50 / it is difficult to say for sure, rather does not belong or definitely does not belong to the Ukrainian nation?

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS: This person is a citizen of Ukraine, considers Ukraine to be his homeland, and condemns Russian aggression. At the same time, this person …

RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER: lives / is of ethnic origin / mainly communicates

RANDOMIZATION WITHIN A DIMENSION:

lives: in Western Ukraine / in Eastern Ukraine

is of ethnic origin: Ukrainian / Russian

mainly communicates at home: in Ukrainian / Russian

ONLY 1 DESCRIPTION IS READ TO EACH RESPONDENT. EXAMPLE:

This person is a citizen of Ukraine, considers Ukraine to be his homeland, condemns Russian aggression. At the same time, this person mainly communicates in Russian, is of ethnic Ukrainian origin, and lives in Eastern Ukraine.

Scale: