The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From December 2 to 17, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative,  added a question about the restoration of nuclear weapons by Ukraine. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2,000 respondents were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 2.9% for indicators close to 50%, 2.5% for indicators close to 25%, 1.7% for indicators close to 10%, 1.3% for indicators close to 5%.

In wartime, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

In 1994, Ukraine finally renounced nuclear weapons and signed the infamous Budapest Memorandum. After the full-scale invasion, there have been occasional (and recently even stronger) calls for the restoration of nuclear weapons if the Western allies are unable to provide Ukraine with effective security guarantees.

In our own survey in December 2024, we decided to find out how Ukrainians currently feel about the restoration of nuclear weapons.

Before moving on to current public moods, it is worth recalling how Ukrainians felt about nuclear weapons 30 years ago, in 1994. The graph below shows the results of a KIIS poll conducted in mid-1994.

As can be seen, in mid-1994, 50% of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine should become a nuclear-free state, while 30% were in favor of possessing nuclear weapons. The remaining 20% had undecided views. Later that year, in the fall, we asked the question in a slightly different wording, but in which 29% were in favor of retaining nuclear weapons, 42% supported the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine, and 29% had undecided views. Importantly, attitudes toward nuclear weapons did not vary much by region: depending on the region, approximately 25-35% wanted to retain nuclear weapons versus 45-55% who were in favor of a nuclear-free status.

Moreover, at that time (1994), the issue of nuclear weapons in the minds of Ukrainians was significantly inferior in relevance to other issues. When asked what problems worried Ukrainians the most, only 5% included the issue of nuclear weapons among the top problems.

Graph 1. 1994 (summer): "Should Ukraine adopt nuclear weapons?"

For context, it is also worth recalling that Ukraine was only in its fourth year of independence. Despite the almost unanimous support for independence, by 2014, 80-90% of the population of Ukraine had a positive attitude towards Russia, and Russians, according to the Bogardus scale (for assessing social distance), were the closest friends of Ukrainians. Just three years ago (from the perspective of Ukrainians in 1994), Ukrainians and Russians lived in the same state, and perhaps the readiness of the majority to abandon nuclear weapons was explained by the belief that Russia would protect Ukraine if necessary.

The issue of nuclear weapons restoration is complex and sensitive to wording. We approached it experimentally and formulated three different questions about nuclear weapons restoration. The respondent was asked only one of the three formulations (split-sample procedure). Our formulations described scenario:

• Overall attitude towards Ukraine’s restoration of nuclear weapons, without additional positive or negative information;
• Attitude towards restoration of nuclear weapons subject to loss of support and imposition of sanctions from the West;
• Previous scenario (i.e. with loss of Western support), but with the condition that Ukraine has enough resources to hold out until nuclear weapons are developed.

So, as can be seen in Graph 2, overall, 73% favor the idea of restoring nuclear weapons. Do not support – 20% (and another 7% have undecided views).

If we talk about the loss of support and sanctions from the West, then the favorable attitude towards the restoration of nuclear weapons drops to 46%, and the share of those who would not support such an initiative would increase to 44% (and the remaining 10% have undecided views).

However, if Ukraine has enough resources to hold out until it obtains nuclear weapons, then 58% would be willing to lose Western support in order to obtain nuclear weapons. Would not support the decision to acquire nuclear weapons under such a scenario – 33% (and the remaining 8% have undecided views).

Graph 2. 2024: Attitude towards Ukraine's restoration of nuclear weapons

In the graph below, the data are shown in a regional dimension[1]. If to talk about attitudes in general, then in the South and (to a slightly greater extent) in the East, there is a slightly more skeptical attitude towards the restoration of nuclear weapons. However, in reality, even despite these nuances in all regions, majorities – from 61% in the East to 77% in the West – are generally in favor of restoring nuclear weapons.

In the case of a scenario with the loss of Western support, the share of those who support the restoration of nuclear weapons decreases in all regions, and as a result, approximately the same share is for and against (only in the East can we see slightly more those who are against).

At the same time, for the scenario of the loss of Western support, but with the resources and the opportunity to develop weapons in time, the majority in all regions (63% in the West, 54% in the Center, 58% in the South and 61% in the East) would support the restoration of nuclear weapons (and from a quarter to a third would oppose).

Graph 3. Attitude towards Ukraine's restoration of nuclear weapons by region of residence

In this survey, we also asked whether Ukrainians trust NATO (with membership in which most Ukrainians associate hopes of finally receiving effective security guarantees and preventing future Russian aggression). Therefore, we can analyze how the desire to restore nuclear weapons is related to trust in NATO.

As can be seen, trust in NATO does not contradict the desire to restore nuclear weapons. Moreover, if to talk about the desire to restore nuclear weapons in general, those who trust NATO are most eager to do so.

Graph 4. Attitude towards Ukraine's restoration of nuclear weapons in terms of NATO trust

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Looking back on the 1990s, one can hear a lot of criticism and accusations, for example, of the infantilism of the population and the short-sightedness of the authorities at that time. However, it is worth understanding that it is not entirely correct to assess past public moods and decisions, given our current knowledge and experience of tragic events.  

Public moods in the 1990s (apart from some naivety and inexperience) is actually important to characterize as peace-loving and responsible. Ukrainians demonstrated their desire to live and develop in a safe, peaceful world and were ready for responsible actions, in particular, on the issue of nuclear weapons. Therefore, when Russia treacherously violated all agreements, and other signatories failed to fulfill their obligations to prevent war, the moral correctness of peace-loving Ukrainians in their desire to resolutely repel the aggressor and demand proper support from the West was (and remains) unconditional.

The current high level of support for the restoration of nuclear weapons (and the readiness to risk relations with the West) is an emotional manifestation and an existential need to obtain reliable security guarantees and finally create conditions where Russia and Russians will not threaten Ukraine and Ukrainians. Our polls show that Ukrainians can agree to painful compromises, but a compelling security configuration is a categorical requirement. In the minds of Ukrainians, nuclear weapons are one of the options “on the table”. We hope that our Western allies will demonstrate the necessary will and Ukraine will eventually receive effective security guarantees, without the need for Ukraine to consider other difficult solutions for itself, how to protect itself from Russia.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from questionnaire

TO THE RESPONDENT ONE OF THREE OPTIONS IS READ

Option №1: Do you generally support or do you not support Ukraine restoring its nuclear weapons?

Option №2: Do you generally support or do you not support Ukraine restoring nuclear weapons, provided that the West imposes sanctions against Ukraine and stops aid?

Option №3: Imagine, please, that Ukraine decided to restore nuclear weapons and is able to do so within a few months. The West imposes sanctions against Ukraine and stops aid. However, Ukraine has sufficient resources to do without aid for the time of developing nuclear weapons.

Would you then generally support or not support Ukraine restoring nuclear weapons?