The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From December 2 to 17, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about the attitude towards territorial concessions, in particular, within the framework of possible packages of peace agreements. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2,000 respondents were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

The question about the general readiness for territorial concessions was asked to 985 respondents. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 4.1%. In the case of the question about the peace agreement packages, respondents were asked one of three packages, so for each of these packages we received answers from 630-706 respondents. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 5%. 

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

Since May 2022, KIIS has been regularly asking questions in its own surveys about the population's readiness to make territorial concessions in order to achieve peace and preserve independence as soon as possible. Prior to the current survey, KIIS last asked this question in early October 2024[1]. As in our previous publication, we immediately draw attention to the following methodological aspects. Thus, the question was formulated as “With which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?”, and the respondent was asked to choose one of two such statements (the statements were read to different respondents in different orders to reduce the order effect):

• “In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories”
• “Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if this makes the war last longer and threatens the preservation of independence”

We separately emphasize that the first statement does not specify which territories may be the subject of concessions. It also does not refer to the official recognition of the belonging of certain territories to Russia (for example, some people are ready to postpone the liberation of certain territories to a more appropriate time in the future, but have not yet recognized their official belonging to Russia). Also, in no case is the first statement identical to “peace on any terms” or, even more so, readiness to surrender. The stated statement measures the extent to which Ukrainians in general are ready to discuss possible parameters of peace in the context of the issue of control of territories. (However, since the reality is more complex, the second part of the press release presents experimental data that better sheds light on the attitude of Ukrainians to the parameters of peace.)

Graph 1 shows the respondents' answers. If the situation did not actually change between May and early October 2024, then between early October and December there was an increase from 32% to 38% in the share of those who are generally ready for certain territorial concessions.

At the same time, the share of those who are categorically against any concessions has decreased. However, despite all the difficult circumstances, as of December, 51% of Ukrainians were against any territorial concessions (up from 58% in early October).

Graph 1. With which of these statements about possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?

The graph below shows the data by region of residence of the respondents[2]. If to analyze the trends compared to the beginning of October, then in all regions there is a tendency towards some increase in readiness for concessions. At the same time, in all regions there is a tendency towards the predominance of those who are categorically against concessions.

Also, as before, the situation in the West, Center and South is quite similar. Only the East (Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts) stands out a little against the others, where there are slightly fewer people who are categorically against any concessions. However, even in this frontline region - a zone of active hostilities, 43% of residents are categorically against any concessions (and in general, 41% are ready for some concessions).

Graph2. Readiness for territorial concessions in the regional dimension

In our publication based on the results of the survey in early October, we showed that the readiness for territorial concessions is related to self-esteem, how much more war they are ready to endure, as well as to the attitude towards the President and the perception of Western policy towards Ukraine. These trends also persist. At the same time, in this publication we want to show the connection between the level of optimism and the readiness for concessions. KIIS previously published the results of a survey on how optimistic Ukrainians are about the future and how they assess unity in society[3]. 

According to one classification, 50% of Ukrainians can be classified as consistent or rather consistent optimists, and 23% as consistent or rather consistent pessimists. The remaining 27% have conflicting or uncertain views on the future and unity of Ukrainians. Graph 3 shows how these categories of the population perceive the possibility of territorial concessions.

As can be seen, among pessimists, 59% believe that it is worth making certain territorial concessions, while 27% are categorically against it. Among optimists, the situation is the exact opposite – 60% are categorically against any concessions, and 31% are generally ready to make certain concessions. It is important to pay attention to the category of those who have contradictory or uncertain opinions – their views on concessions are almost identical to optimists.

Graph3. Readiness for territorial concessions in terms of optimism level

Besides Ukrainians' own opinions about the (in)expediency of territorial concessions It is also necessary to understand what the “climate of opinion” is – how, in the opinion of Ukrainians, other people in Ukraine feel about territorial concessions. This is especially important in the context of the actual revolution in information sources among Ukrainians, when Ukrainians mainly began to consume it from digital sources (primarily from thousands of Telegram and YouTube channels), which contribute to the formation of “information bubbles” and a generally distorted understanding of public moods.

Therefore, in another study, instead of asking about their personal opinion, we asked respondents how many people in Ukraine, in their opinion, agree with the statement about the expediency of territorial concessions. Among the respondents, 78% were able to give a definite answer (the remaining 22% said that it was difficult for them to answer) and among them on average response was 43% (i.e., Ukrainians “on average” believe that 43% of Ukrainians in the controlled territories are ready to make concessions). This is actually only slightly more than the actual 38%, meaning that overall, “on average,” Ukrainians call the result quite close to reality. Even more – in all regions, the estimates are almost identical (42-45% depending on the region).

However, this “precision” is deceptive and actually conceals a significant tendency towards polarization. So, the graph below shows the distribution of how many respondents named a certain % in a certain range. In terms of content, the ranges of responses can be classified from “no one” (respondents who believe that 0% of Ukrainians are ready to make concessions) to “the absolute majority or almost all” (respondents believe that 80-100% of Ukrainians are ready to make concessions). As can be seen, we get fairly evenly matched population categories in terms of their assessments. If we had a consensus view among the public, a certain range would definitely dominate (for example, if the majority of respondents named assessments within 33-43%).

And now we see, for example, that 25% of Ukrainians believe that no one or a small minority of Ukrainians consider it advisable to make territorial concessions. In contrast, 26% feel that the majority of Ukrainians are ready for territorial concessions. In addition to these conditionally extreme categories, 15% feel that the situation is conditionally “50/50”, and 12% feel that although those who support concessions are a minority, this minority is quite significant. Moreover, a similar situation occurs in all regions.

Graph 4. In your opinion, what % of people currently living in the territories controlled by Ukraine agree with the following statement: "In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories"?

The respondent was not offered options, the interviewer marked the answer from 0% to 100% - what the respondent said (or hard to say)

Of course, we cannot draw deep and, moreover, unambiguous conclusions from one question, but these results already illustrate certain important trends. Thus, in such questions, respondents take into account both their personal communication experience and their observations after, for example, reading news on Telegram, listening to “experts” on YouTube, etc. Since we emphasized that we were talking about the entire population in the controlled territories, the “weight” of information from the media should have been particularly significant for respondents in order to make an assessment.

The fact that we see such a dispersion of assessments may indicate the formation of “information bubbles”. That is, people, having been given the opportunity to “choose” Telegram channels, “experts” on YouTube, etc., further limit the variety of opinions that they consume. These “information bubbles” can also be correlated with their own networks of relatives and friends. That is, a person sees the dominance of certain opinions among their relatives, and then “confirms” this when they read the news in their favorite Telegram channel or comments on them. This reinforces the feeling that “this opinion is not only mine, but also typical of the majority of Ukrainians”. As a result, we initially get a very fragmented public opinion, which can then turn into a sharply polarized one, since each “bubble” only cements “its” views.

At the same time, another important trend for Ukraine is that, at least on this issue that we are discussing here (readiness for territorial concessions), “information bubbles” do not have a pronounced regional specificity (at least not yet). Previously, it was typical for Ukraine to consume information with largely regional characteristics (for example, watching certain TV channels or reading certain regional printed publications), which further produced noticeable differences on a number of issues depending on the region of residence. Now, apparently, modern technologies allow us to overcome great distances and “unite” people according to their views, regardless of the region. Therefore, for example, both in the West and in the East the situation with the distribution of assessments is practically the same and we cannot say that residents of one region significantly overestimate Ukrainians for their readiness to make concessions, while residents of the other underestimate them. Residents of each of these regions are fragmented in their views and have a dangerous potential for polarization.

Thus, modern technologies both contain risks and the potential for great danger for Ukraine, and, on the other hand, demonstrate the potential to overcome long-standing lines along which there were tangible differences among Ukrainians.

After the start of the full-scale invasion, it became common to ask in surveys whether Ukrainians were ready or not to make specific possible concessions (for example, refusing to join NATO). The results obtained are certainly valuable for understanding both the general readiness to make concessions and determining a conditional “acceptability rating” of concessions.

However, this approach (when we ask a separate question for each possible concession) has its drawbacks. First of all, the problem is that in reality any agreements are package deals and are, in fact, carrots and sticks. A person may reject a certain concession, but if it is “packaged” with other, more important aspects, then such a package may, albeit without enthusiasm, receive approval.

In June of this year, we conducted our own KIIS experiment, where we researched attitudes towards possible "packages" of peace agreements[4]. The above experiment was primarily illustrative, since there can be many more dimensions of peace agreements (as well as possible variants of each dimension). We limited ourselves to a few particularly important points with their more salient descriptions (for example, due to the expressed caution regarding security agreements, we talk about membership or prohibition of membership in NATO, since “NATO membership” has a more salient and understandable perception by the population). In December, that is, in the current survey, we completely repeated the experiment to assess the changes that have occurred over six months.

So, we will recall that we formulated three possible packages that include both positive and negative aspects for Ukraine. For each respondent, one package was randomly selected (split-sample). The question was as follows: “There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “it will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”. So, this option includes…” (“within” the package, to reduce the effect of order, some respondents read the components in one order, some respondents read them in another). We specifically added the option “it will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable”, because it allows a person to express their agreement to a certain compromise in a more socially acceptable form.

The packages themselves sounded as follows:

Package №1:

• Russia retains control over all currently occupied territories
• Ukraine refuses to join NATO
• Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives all the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction

Package №2:

• Although Ukraine does not officially recognize this, Russia retains control over the occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts and Crimea
• Ukraine becomes a member of NATO and has real security guarantees
• Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives all the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction

Package №3:

• Although Ukraine does not officially recognize it, Russia retains control over the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea
• Ukraine regains full control over Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts
• Ukraine becomes a member of NATO and has real security guarantees
• Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives all the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction

The graph below shows the results for each package. As can be seen, the option with the postponement of the liberation of the currently occupied territories and the ban on joining NATO, but with accession to the EU, is supported by 41%, while for 47% this option is categorically unacceptable. (It is worth noting that one of the KIIS polls previously showed that the value of EU membership is perceived not only as socio-economic progress, but also as a security issue.) In June, 38% were ready to accept this option, while 54% were categorically against it. That is, the readiness to accept such a package has increased, but in reality we see that now a minority of the population supports it.

At the same time if Ukraine becomes a member of NATO (in addition to EU membership), then even with the postponement of the liberation of the currently occupied territories, 64% are ready to support this option, while 21% will be categorically against it. In June, 47% were ready to support this option, while 38% were categorically against it. That is, in half a year, readiness for the option of postponing the liberation of all currently occupied territories in exchange for NATO has significantly increased.

In the case of the third package, 60% would generally accept the option of membership in NATO and the EU and the liberation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and the postponement of the liberation of Donbas and Crimea. 26% would be categorically against it. In June, 57% were ready to support this option, and 33% were categorically against it. That is, there is also an increase in support over half a year, although to a lesser extent than for package №2.

These illustrative results help to better understand how Ukrainians evaluate different approaches to peace. It is important to consider the following points:

• Although Ukrainians remain flexible and open to discussions on the parameters of peace agreements, they clearly do not agree to “peace on any terms.” The attitude towards the packages under consideration shows that if the packages included Russia’s current demands (which regularly appear in the media), the absolute majority would categorically reject them;
  • The priority remains the issue of ensuring security and protection from future invasions. For example, from previously published results we see that the majority of Ukrainians support the restoration of nuclear weapons[5]. We usually ask about NATO membership as a security guarantee. Given the current situation and the discussion of the option of “postponing NATO membership for 10-15-20 years”, there may be a need to provide guarantees for a certain period before future NATO membership. These guarantees should be truly reliable and such that Ukrainians will believe;
  • The issue of returning all territories is a painful one for the population. Of course, the absolute majority would like to see the full restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The fact that some Ukrainians are now ready for difficult agreements is more evidence of their pragmatic approach in the current situation (rather than “treasonous” moods).

Graph5. There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would react to it.

The graph below shows the data broken down by region (it should be noted that there were not many respondents in each region, which results in a higher margin of error at the level of individual regions). In general, the trends are similar among the population of all regions, and it is more appropriate to talk about similarities than differences among residents of different Ukrainian territories. Yes, in all regions there is no enthusiasm, but the majority is ready to accept a peace agreement that would include membership in NATO and the EU in exchange for the surrender of liberated territories.  

At the same time, residents of the West and Center are more likely to be against the scenario of EU membership but NATO withdrawal (where, respectively, 52% and 50% categorically reject this option, while 34% and 40% are ready to support it). At the same time, in the South there is conditional parity (46% are ready to accept and 43% are categorically rejecting it), and in the East 47% are ready to accept and 34% are categorically rejecting it. That is, in the South and East the readiness to accept is somewhat higher, although in reality we cannot speak of cardinal views of residents of different territories.

Graph6. Attitude towards possible peace agreement packages in the regional dimension

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Despite an extremely difficult year and almost three years of full-scale invasion, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate high resilience. Perhaps someone, after reading the information in their “bubble” (with specific presentation and accents even from reputable media), extrapolates it to the entire population and believes in the “decadent” mood of Ukrainians. However, this is not true and our polls, on the contrary, show that the majority of Ukrainians remain surprisingly resilient.

Ukrainians understand that the war is existential, and the enemy seeks the destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainians as a nation. Therefore, the space of options is very limited if we want to survive.

At the same time, Ukrainians are sending an important signal to both the military-political leadership and our Western partners. We, Ukrainians, understand geopolitical and internal difficulties and limitations, so we are ready to demonstrate a pragmatic position and discuss possible even difficult options for the development of events. At the same time, we, Ukrainians, reject the erroneous idea that we want anything but peace. Yes, we dream of peace, but we do not need “peace under any conditions”. Therefore, we, Ukrainians, emphasize that now our priority is security guarantees that will make future Russian aggression impossible. We, Ukrainians, are a constructive side. However, our constructive position ends where they want to make our physical lives and physical protection the bargaining chip of a deceptive “peace”.

And traditionally, we, as KIIS, call on all Ukrainian subjects to unite. Strong Defense Forces are an unconditional guarantee of any stable and secure peace. At the same time, a strong united society is a necessary condition for this. Therefore, both the government and the opposition, journalists, public activists, and ordinary citizens should realize that their, for example, dislike for some public figure in Ukraine should not overshadow their love for Ukraine. And public actions or statements of Ukrainian subjects should not be an instrument of thoughtless realization of selfish interests (material or recognition), but should at least take into account the requirement of “do no harm”.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from questionnaire

SAMPLE A (ONE HALF OF RESPONDENTS): With which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER

SAMPLE Б (OTHER HALF OF RESPONDENTS): In your opinion, what % of people currently living in the territories controlled by Ukraine agree with the following statement:

"In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories"

0%-100%

There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would feel about it. Use the scale "I easily agree with this option", "it would be a difficult option, but generally acceptable" or "this option is completely unacceptable". So this option includes: HALF OF RESPONDENTS WERE READ THE POINTS IN RED AT THE BEGINNING, HALF AT THE END

Scenario А:

• Russia retains control over all currently occupied territories
• Ukraine refuses to join NATO
• Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives all the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction

Scenario Б:

• Although Ukraine does not officially recognize it, Russia retains control over the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea
• Ukraine regains full control over Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts
• Ukraine becomes a member of NATO and has real security guarantees
• Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives all the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction

Scenario В:

• Although Ukraine does not officially recognize this, Russia retains control over the occupied territories of Zapori`hzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts and Crimea
• Ukraine becomes a member of NATO and has real security guarantees
• Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union and receives all the necessary funding from the West for reconstruction