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Dynamics of trust in social institutions in 2021-2024

The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

From December 2 to 17, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in public institutions. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 985 respondents were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

In wartime, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 


 

Dynamics of trust in individual institutions in 2021-2024

 

One of the most important, marker indicators of the state of society and public opinion is the level of trust in individual institutions. Earlier this week, we published the results of a survey on trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyi[1], and in this publication we want to show trust to other institutions as well.

At the end of each year, KIIS asks the question “Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name.” The respondent was offered the following options: “completely trust”, “rather trust”, “hard to say”, “rather do not trust”, “completely do not trust” (i.e. the respondent immediately heard and knew that he could choose the option “hard to say” among the possible options). This year, we asked about trust in eleven institutions (and additionally – about trust in the EU, NATO and the USA, but this will be a separate publication later).

Graph 1 shows the dynamics of trust in state authorities (the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Government), the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the National Police. Graph 2 shows trust in institutions in the field of ensuring justice – prosecutors and courts. Finally, Grph 3 shows trust in the church, Ukrainian media and volunteers.

The dynamics of trust in the President were examined in more detail in our previous publication, so now we will focus on other institutions. So, if to talk about other state authorities (Verkhovna Rada, Government), we see that the trend of decreasing support continues. In the case of the Verkhovna Rada, the level of trust has hardly changed over the past year (13% now versus 15% in December 2023), but the share of those who do not trust the parliament has increased from 61% to 68%. If in December 2023 the balance of trust-distrust was -46%, now it is -55%. At the same time, more than half of Ukrainians can name at least one faction whose activities they approve of, that is, high distrust of the parliament does not mean distrust of all parliamentarians[2]. Moreover, even among those who do not trust the parliament, 47% named at least one faction whose activities they approve (for those who trust the parliament – 69%, among those who are undecided – 56%).

Trust in the Government is slightly higher, but also low: now 20% trust it (in December 2023 – 26%), 53% do not trust it (in December 2023 – 44%). The balance of trust has decreased from -18% to -33% over the past year. However, in the context of trust in the parliament and the government, we note that despite the low trust, the majority of Ukrainians are against holding elections now.

In the case of the Defense Forces, support remains consistently very high – 92% trust and only 2% do not trust (a year ago the indicators were 96% and 1%, respectively). Trust-distrust balance – +90%.

Another important security institution – the SBU – also maintains a fairly high level of trust (despite a slight decrease compared to last year). Thus, 54% of Ukrainians trust the SBU, 21% do not trust it (in December 2023 the figures were 58% to 16%). The balance of trust-distrust is +33% (last year it was +42%).

Trust in the police has decreased slightly – from 41% to 37%, fewer people trust the police, while from 29% to 38%, more people do not. Accordingly, the balance of trust-distrust has decreased from +12% in December 2023 to -1% now.

                                                                

Graph 1. Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name.

 

 


Trust in courts and prosecutors remains critically low. Only 12% of Ukrainians trust the courts and only 9% trust prosecutors. 63% and 67% do not trust them, respectively. The situation has not changed compared to last year.

 

Graph 2. Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name.

 

 

 

Although formally, the level of trust in courts and prosecutors has not significantly deteriorated over the past year, other data show that the perception of the situation with justice is becoming more acute. For example, in September 2023, KIIS asked questions about the perception of corruption and 59% answered that “in Ukraine there are really attempts to fight corruption, there are positive developments”, and 36% answered that “Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt, there are no positive changes”[3].

In September 2024, according to new data (which we have not yet published), 48% already believed that there were attempts to combat corruption in Ukraine, and the share of those who rather agree with hopeless corruption increased to 47%.

Already in December 2023, 55% of Ukrainians believed that corrupt officials should be punished as soon as possible, even if it violates the law [4].


Trust in volunteers remains high in Ukraine – 81% trust them and only 5% do not trust (in December 2023 the indicatorss were 84% and 3% respectively).

The Church used to be a leading institution in terms of trust, but in recent years it has significantly lost trust, in particular, the downward trend has steadily taken place in the period 2021-2023. Over the past year, the situation with trust in the Church has improved slightly - now 40% trust the Church and 26% do not trust it. In 2023, the ratio was 38% to 31%, so over the past year the balance of trust-distrust has increased from +7% to +14%.

Trust in Ukrainian media remains quite low with a slight but downward trend over the past year. So, now 27% trust the Ukrainian media, 42% do not trust them (the remaining 32% have an uncertain attitude). In December 2023, 29% trusted them, 40% did not trust them. Therefore, if last year the balance of trust-distrust was -11%, now it is -15%.

             

Graph 3. Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name.

 

 


Dynamics of trust in individual institutions during 2022-2024 in terms of regions

 

Criticism of the authorities has increased in all regions, although in all regions the majority trusts the President.

In addition, in all regions, the absolute majority trusts the Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteers.

 

Table 1. Trust in institutions in the regional dimension

 

% trust

 

% in a row West Center South East
2022 2023 2024 2022 2023 2024 2022 2023 2024 2022 2023 2024
President of Ukraine 85 58 39 86 68 50 84 60 46 78 54 42
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 34 13 12 40 17 12 34 15 13 25 13 13
Government of Ukraine 50 22 17 55 29 18 50 27 24 49 26 23
Armed Forces of Ukraine 98 98 96 97 97 92 95 92 89 94 96 88
SBU 62 56 49 63 63 58 67 52 51 52 58 57
National Police 57 42 46 60 44 34 61 38 33 52 41 34
Courts 26 14 10 28 10 12 24 15 12 16 12 13
Prosecutors 22 10 10 24 7 9 19 10 9 14 14 10
Church 54 50 51 40 37 34 38 32 36 42 24 35
Ukrainian Media 61 26 25 58 31 30 55 31 23 47 21 32
Volunteers 86 86 77 82 85 81 87 79 82 82 88 88

 


A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

The situation with trust in public institutions shows worrying trends. Since the issue with state authorities is quite clear, it is worth highlighting another potentially destructive problem - with institutions in the field of ensuring justice, such as courts and prosecutors.

In Ukraine, despite all the difficulties, the majority of the population is ready to endure the war as long as necessary[5]. However, many Ukrainians have a tangible demand for a fair distribution of this burden. And if Ukrainians do indeed see a lot of information in the media about arrests or suspicions of corrupt officials, at the same time, Ukrainians mostly do not see cases being brought to their logical conclusion - severe punishment of corrupt officials. On the contrary, many have the impression of a "circular bail". This is what almost gives rise to despair, when the majority is ready to support extralegal and extrajudicial approaches to punishing corrupt officials as the only way to achieve justice (which, obviously, goes against the European integration aspirations of Ukrainians). Ukrainian prosecutors and judges are expected to simply do their job - punish scoundrels. Currently, Ukrainians, as we see from the trust indicators, include prosecutors along with judges in the category of scoundrels.

Moreover, these problems have broader negative consequences. They sow despair among a part of the population that reforms are possible in Ukraine at all. And despair and pessimism, as we have shown earlier, lead many people to feel that there is no point in continuing the struggle[6]. That is, in the minds of the population, problems in the courts and the prosecutor's office undermine the moral and psychological readiness to continue resisting the aggressor.

Another factor further exacerbates the situation – low trust in Ukrainian media. At the same time, most Ukrainians consume information from Telegram and YouTube channels, and we see a significant fragmentation of the media space with the formation of “information bubbles” (and about 80% believe that they can mostly distinguish between disinformation and fakes). That is, Ukrainians trust less “classic” media that have staff, editors, adhere to certain standards (at least they try). However, they trust Telegram and YouTube channels and “experts”. Given the desire for hype and speculation on emotions, many of our problems in the minds of the population are only getting worse. Therefore, in addition to the certainly necessary in the courts, prosecutor's office (and other institutions), work with the media sphere should also be an important direction.

At the same time, in this whole, sometimes gloomy, situation, it is gratifying that the Defense Forces and volunteers maintain a high level of trust in society. This trust unites almost all Ukrainians, regardless of their region of residence, language of communication, age, occupation, etc.

 


           

Annex 1. Formulation of questionnaire questions

 

Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name.

  Completely trust Rather trust Hard to say Rather do not trust Completely do not  trust
President of Ukraine / Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of Ukraine 1 2 3 4 5
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 1 2 3 4 5
Government of Ukraine 1 2 3 4 5
Armed Forces of Ukraine 1 2 3 4 5
SBU 1 2 3 4 5
National Police 1 2 3 4 5
Church 1 2 3 4 5
Ukrainian Media 1 2 3 4 5
Prosecutors 1 2 3 4 5
Courts 1 2 3 4 5
Volunteers 1 2 3 4 5

 



[1] https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1466&page=1

[2] https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1459&page=1

[3] https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1306&page=1&t=6

[4] https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1337&page=1

[5] https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1464&page=1

[6] https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1465&page=1


9.1.2025
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