The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From February 14 to March 4, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a monitoring question about readiness for territorial concessions, and also conducted an experiment to study how individual parameters of possible peace agreements can affect the readiness to accept an agreement. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2,029 respondents were surveyed (of which 1,029 respondents were asked the question about readiness for territorial concessions, and the experiment was conducted on all 2,029 respondents). The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error for a sample of 2,029 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account a design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 2.9%. The error for a sample of 1,029 respondents does not exceed 4.1%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

Since May 2022, KIIS has been regularly asking questions in its own surveys about the population's readiness to make territorial concessions in order to achieve peace and preserve independence as soon as possible. Prior to the current survey, KIIS last asked this question in December 2024[1]. As in our previous publication, we immediately draw attention to the following methodological aspects. Thus, the question was formulated as “With which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?”, and the respondent was asked to choose one of two such statements (the statements were read to different respondents in different orders to reduce the order effect):

• “In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories”
• “Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if this makes the war last longer and threatens the preservation of independence”

We separately emphasize that the first statement does not specify which territories may be the subject of concessions. It also does not refer to the official recognition of the belonging of certain territories to Russia (for example, some people are ready to postpone the liberation of certain territories to a more appropriate time in the future, but have not yet recognized their official belonging to Russia). Also, in no case is the first statement identical to “peace on any terms” or, even more so, readiness to surrender. The stated statement measures the extent to which Ukrainians in general are ready to discuss possible parameters of peace in the context of the issue of control of territories. (However, since the reality is more complex, the second part of the press release presents experimental data that better sheds light on the attitude of Ukrainians to the parameters of peace.)

Graph 1 shows the respondents' answers. Since a new US President took office on 20th January 2025, it is worth focusing on the dynamics of public moods between December 2024 and February-March 2025. It is worth recalling the context: the current survey was conducted between February 14 and March 4, 2025 – precisely against the backdrop of a sharp aggravation of relations between Ukraine and the United States and tangible pressure on Ukraine.  President Trump's phone call to Putin, initiating a sharp break with previous US policy, occurred on 12 February 2025.

As can be seen, compared to December 2024, there were practically no changes (and all differences are within the margin of statistical error). Thus, half of Ukrainians – 50% – believe that under no circumstances should Ukraine give up territories, even if this makes the war last longer (in December 2024 it was 51%). It is worth recalling the context: the current survey was conducted between February 14 and March 4, 2025 - precisely against the backdrop of a sharp aggravation of relations between Ukraine and the United States and tangible pressure on Ukraine.

At the same time, the minority believes that Ukraine may give up some territories in order to achieve peace as soon as possible – 39% (in December 2024 – 38%). The remaining 11% of respondents could not decide on their opinion.  

Graph 1. With which of these statements about possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?

In the graph below, the data are shown by the respondents' region of residence[2]. In all regions, the situation has practically not changed compared to December 2024. And the views of residents of different regions are also quite close.

The only region that stands out a little from the others is the East, where 42% are categorically against territorial concessions, while in other regions (West, Center, South) – 50-51%. At the same time, the share of those who are generally ready for certain concessions in the East is only marginally higher to that in other regions – 42% against 36-40% in the West, Center and South. That is, the differences in the views of the East are insignificant and we can rather talk about the closeness of the views of residents of all regions of Ukraine.

Graph 2. Readiness for territorial concessions in the regional dimension

In the same survey, we also asked what Ukrainians think Russia's current goal is in the war against Ukraine[3]. Thus, the vast majority of Ukrainians believe that Russia either wants to commit genocide against Ukrainians or destroy the Ukrainian nation and statehood. Significantly fewer respondents spoke about other (more limited) goals, although such opinions are also noticeably present among Ukrainians. In the current publication, it is important to note that there is a relationship between the readiness to make concessions and how Ukrainians see Russia's goal in this war.

Thus, the stronger the threat Ukrainians feel, the more they are against any concessions. If among those who feel an existential threat (Russia wants to commit physical genocide or destroy the nation) 57-58% are against any concessions, then the indicator drops to 20% among those who believe that Russia does not seek to occupy more Ukrainian territories. On the other hand, the share of those who believe that certain territorial concessions can be made increases from 28% to 78%.

Graph 3. Readiness to make territorial concessions depending on how Russia's goal in the war against Ukraine is perceived

On the issue of Russia's goal, some respondents also chose the pro-Russian option, that Russia supposedly simply wants to "denazify" and demilitarize Ukraine. Among them, 44% are ready for concessions, and 48% are categorically against it. Perhaps the higher share of those who are against concessions (than one might expect) is related to the specifics of this view. For example, some people may believe that if they to "denazify" and demilitarize, there is no need to make territorial concessions.

In our publications earlier, we noted that the readiness to accept or reject a certain package of peace agreements will depend on what exactly it will look like[4]. That is, if there are fundamental parameters for Ukraine, Ukrainians would be reluctant, but could accept some painful concessions. KIIS continues to study this issue and we are trying to use various methods to get a more complete picture. So, in February-March 2025, we used an experimental method - factorial design (or the method with vignettes).

Below is a brief description (and see Annex 1 with the question wording and instructions) and the main results. We emphasize that this method is experimental and with a specific interpretation of the results. Therefore, we urge media representatives to carefully familiarize themselves with the results further and to be cautious in their interpretation during coverage. If individual points are unclear, KIIS is always open to dialogue and is ready to provide additional information / explanations.

So, we formulated five dimensions-components of the “packages” of agreements (we understand that the list is not exhaustive): security guarantees; EU membership; control over territories; language policy; sovereignty of Ukraine. For each dimension, there were 2-4 options-levels (for example, for EU membership - Ukraine refuses to join the EU or, conversely, Ukraine becomes an EU member). For each dimension, one level was randomly selected for the respondent and this was read together as a possible package of peace agreements. The respondent had to answer whether this package could be acceptable or it was categorically unacceptable. That is, a package of five positions was read to each respondent (and the packages were, accordingly, different for different respondents). There were 96 different possible packages of agreements in total. In Annex 1, you can familiarize yourself with the wording of the question, as well as the wording of individual options-levels. 

Thus, to the respondent, for example, could have been read the following option:

• Ukraine's membership in NATO is postponed for 10-20 years and at the same time Ukraine receives all weapons in large quantities: air defense, aircraft, tanks, etc.;
• Ukraine becomes a member of the EU;
• Russia retains control over all occupied territories;
• Ukrainian remains the only state and official language;
• In the future, Ukraine can make any decisions without control from Russia.

This approach allows to find out during the analysis how important a certain option-level within the dimension is (with the “equal” composition of other parameters in the package). For example, how much EU membership or refusal to do so makes the entire package more or less acceptable. The table below shows the corresponding results. Also in Annex 2 you can find the summarized results for each package. However, since few respondents answered each package (since there were only 96 different packages, we have 11-30 answers for each of them), the data for each package separately cannot be considered statistically reliable. However, for indicative information they may be useful.

So, we can talk about the following main conclusions:

v  Security guarantees: if the package includes a complete rejection of NATO membership and without peacekeepers and additional weapons, then there will be parity – 44% can generally accept the package against 44% who are categorically against it. At the same time, even these 44% who can generally accept rejection of NATO and the absence of peacekeepers/weapons are achieved only by presenting certain positive points in a number of packages, such as membership in the EU or the return of certain territories to Ukrainian control (because some of the packages that included such a rejection also included membership in the EU and/or the return of territories). For example, if rejection of NATO and the absence of peacekeepers/weapons is accompanied by rejection of the EU, then support for the package will decrease to 37% and the share of categorical opponents will increase to 52%.

If the package includes certain security guarantees, then there will be more people who are ready to approve it. Moreover, the scenario that will have the greatest support is not even NATO membership, but increased military support for Ukraine. For example, if NATO membership is postponed for 10-20 years, but Ukraine receives all weapons in large quantities (air defense, aircraft, tanks, etc.), 54% are ready to accept the package, and 35% are categorically against it.

The NATO membership package will receive approval from 49% (38% categorically against), and the peacekeeping package will receive approval from 47% (43% categorically against).

v  Accession to the EU: if the package includes withdrawal from the EU, 42% would be ready to accept it, compared to 45% for whom such a package would be unacceptable.

In the event of EU membership as part of the peace agreements, 55% are ready to support the package against 34% who would be categorically against it.

v  Control over territories: if the package includes the return of control over the territories, then it becomes much more attractive. So, if Russia retains control over all occupied territories, then 38% are ready to accept such a package versus 51% who are categorically against it. Although, of course, if the packages include, for example, serious security guarantees and EU membership, then the readiness to accept territorial losses will be higher. Territorial losses (i.e., Russia de facto retains control of certain occupied areas that is particularly part of Trump’s peace plan) seem meaningless to Ukrainians unless Ukraine receives firm security guarantees and prospects of future safe and prosperous development.

If the package includes the return of Southern Ukraine, then its attractiveness will increase to 50% (categorically against – 38%), and if it includes the return of the entire territory with Donbas and Crimea – 57% (categorically against – 30%). Let us remind you once again that in addition to the territorial dimension, the packages also include others, so those who are categorically against it are those who have largely found other unacceptable things included in the relevant package.

v  Language policy: requirement to grant the Russian language state status significantly worsens the perception of the package and in this case 41% may support it overall against 48% who will be categorically against it.

If the Ukrainian language retains a single state and official status, then 55% will support such a package, while 32% will be categorically against it.

v  Sovereignty of Ukraine: Among all dimensions, the preservation of sovereignty in decision-making has the relatively greatest impact. If the package includes a requirement for Ukraine to coordinate all important decisions with Russia, 37% will be ready to accept this package, and 50% will be categorically against it.

If Ukraine can make any decisions without control from Russia, then 59% will support the package, while 30% will be categorically against it.

Table 1. Would a peace agreement package that includes the relevant item be acceptable (with equal representation of all other possible items)

* The sum is less than 100% because the rest are those who are undecided.

Few respondents responded to each scenario, so we cannot provide statistically reliable calculations for them. However, it is worth noting, as an illustration, how respondents reacted to the conditionally worst-case scenario of surrender and to the conditionally acceptable scenario (which is based on public statements by Ukrainian officials).

Thus, the vast majority is ready to support a conditionally acceptable scenario (which is, of course, not entirely fair, but at least has the appearance of a compromise).

At the same time, the vast majority of respondents reject the surrender scenario. At the same time, the surrender outlined here is not even “complete”. Yes, we did not talk about the reduction of the Defense Forces, the official recognition of the occupied territories as part of Russia, or even the transfer to Russia of territories currently under the control of the Government of Ukraine (such as Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia), the issue of reparations. We can be sure that if these parameters were added, the package would be acceptable to even fewer Ukrainians.

Therefore, Russia's current demands, which have been voiced publicly, are categorically unacceptable and will be rejected by the absolute majority of Ukrainians. Ukrainians remain flexible and ready for compromises, but against "peace on any terms.".

Graph 4. Will a suitable package of peace agreements be acceptable

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

In various surveys with different approaches, we study the question of how ready or not Ukrainians are for various concessions to end the war. On the one hand, Ukrainians are indeed flexible and open to negotiations and even painful concessions. Ukrainians are definitely not those who hinder peace, but, on the contrary, they really want it.

 At the same time, on the other hand, regardless of the wording of the question, the approach used, or the survey method, the majority of Ukrainians are against “peace on any terms.” That is, although Ukrainians are open to negotiations and painful concessions, there are certainly red lines and Ukrainians will reject unacceptable options. The will of the Ukrainian nation to resist is not broken, and despite all the difficulties, Ukrainians are ready to continue the struggle.

In the context of this survey, we would like to draw attention to the following three points. First, despite the difficult situation with partners (read: the USA), in the second half of February and early March we do not see a sharp decline in moods and greater readiness for concessions (especially “any concessions”).

Secondly, one can see critical requirements for agreements or red lines. Yes, there must be adequate security guarantees, Ukraine must maintain sovereignty in decision-making (as well as on issues such as language policy), Ukraine must become a member of the EU. Although this was not directly explored here (but it can be seen indirectly), it can be clearly said that there can be no question of legal recognition of the occupied territories as part of Russia.

Third, there are preliminary signs that, among security guarantees, Ukrainians trust their own Defense Forces more, with more sufficient reinforcement of weapons from Western partners (or from their own production) (than, for example, peacekeepers or NATO membership).

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from questionnaire

There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would feel about it. Use the scale "I easily agree with this option", "it would be a difficult option, but generally acceptable" or "this option is completely unacceptable". So this option includes:

IN THE TABLE, 1 LEVEL IS RANDOMLY SELECTED FOR EACH DIMENSION. THE DIMENSIONS ARE READ IN A DIFFERENT ORDER TO DIFFERENT RESPONDENTS. THE NAMES OF THE DIMENSIONS THEMSELVES ARE NOT READ, ONLY THE SELECTED LEVELS

Example:

So, this option includes:

1. 1.       Ukrainian remains the only state and official language
2. 2.       Ukraine becomes a member of the European Union
3. 3.       Ukraine's membership in NATO is postponed for 10-20 years. At the same time, Ukraine receives all weapons in large quantities: air defense, aircraft, tanks, etc.
4. 4.       Russia retains control over all occupied territories
5. 5.       In the future, Ukraine can make any decisions without control from Russia

Scale:

Annex 2. Answers for each package

The number of respondents who responded to each package, as well as the share of those who are generally likely to accept it (“easily” or “it would be a difficult option, but generally acceptable”) and those who are completely against it

! We remind that the number of respondents for each package is small, so the data cannot be considered statistically reliable. The data below is indicative for illustrative purposes