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Acceptance of the proposal of Ukraine and the USA for a 30-day temporary ceasefire

The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

During March 12-22, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about the perception of the proposal for a temporary cessation of hostilities with Russia. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,326 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 3.5% for indicators close to 50%, 3.1% for indicators close to 25%, 2.1% for indicators close to 10%, 1.6% for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

On March 11, 2025, Ukraine and the United States, after a joint meeting, announced a proposal to Russia for a temporary, unconditional ceasefire for 30 days. KIIS launched its own survey on March 12, 2025, where we asked respondents various questions related to this event.

In this press release, we will present the results of the survey, how Ukrainians generally perceive this proposal and how they relate to Russia's demands, how they assess various possible security guarantees, and how Ukraine should act in the event of a negative scenario for us of the termination of USA support.

 

Acceptance of the proposal for a 30-day temporary ceasefire

 

The field phase of the survey lasted from March 12 to 22, 2025. In the period up to March 18, 2025 (inclusive), that is, until the day of the telephone talks between D. Trump and V. Putin, we asked respondents how they primarily perceive such talks. We offered six interpretations, among which three were conditionally positive for Ukraine, three were conditionally negative for Ukraine. The respondent had to choose one answer.

The absolute majority of Ukrainians – 77% – have a positive interpretation of this proposal. Most often, respondents (47% out of 77%) said that this is a way to show that Russia does not want peace or that Russia is violating the agreements. In addition, 12% talk about a way to unblock military aid. The remaining 18% call it primarily a step towards ending the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine. That is, the perception of the proposal is positive, but few believe that it is a real start to the path to peace on acceptable terms.

Only 17% chose one of the three negative options. Thus, 8% consider it a wrong step that will weaken Ukraine, 7% – a step of despair by the Ukrainian authorities due to the difficult situation at the front. Perceive it primarily as a step towards Ukraine's surrender – 2%.

 

Graph 1. Ukraine and the USA have made a joint proposal to Russia for a temporary 30-day ceasefire. What is your first perception of this proposal?

The respondent could choose only one answer

 

 

 

In all regions of Ukraine[1] the absolute majority (from 72% in the East to 85% in the West) rather positively perceive the proposal for a temporary ceasefire.

           

Table 1. Perception of the proposal for a temporary ceasefire in the regional dimension

100% in the column West‎ Center South East
A way to show that Russia does not want peace or that Russia always violates agreements 55 46 41 46
A step towards a real end to the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine 20 16 22 16
A way to unblock military aid from the USA 10 15 10 10
A wrong step that will weaken Ukraine 4 9 12 5
A step of despair of the Ukrainian authorities due to the difficult situation on the front 7 7 7 10
A step towards the surrender of Ukraine 3 1 2 3
Hard to say 1 7 6 10

 


 

Acceptability of Russia's demands

 

Between March 19 and 21, 2025 (i.e., after the phone call between D. Trump and V. Putin), we asked a different question. For example, Russia publicly stated that its demands for a ceasefire included an end to mobilization, an end to the West’s supply of weapons to Ukraine, and an end to the provision of intelligence data to Ukraine. Therefore, we asked how acceptable these demands were to Ukrainians for a temporary truce.

For the absolute majority of Ukrainians – 79% – Russian demands for a ceasefire are categorically unacceptable. Ready to accept them – 16% (of which 14% find it a difficult option).

 

Graph 2. For a temporary 30-day ceasefire, Russia is demanding, among other things:

- that Ukraine stop mobilizing,

- that the West stop giving Ukraine intelligence data, and

- that the West stop supplying weapons to Ukraine

You...?

 

 


At the same time, the absolute majority rejects these requirements in all regions of Ukraine (80-81% in the West, Center and South and 64% in the East).

 

Graph 3. Attitude to Russia's demands in the regional dimension

 

 


Acceptance of different options for security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire

 

A separate important issue is security guarantees if a ceasefire occurs behind the current front line. We conducted an experiment and read different options for security guarantees to different respondents (randomly selected). There were a total of three options for security guarantees, as well as a ceasefire option with no security guarantees at all.

As can be seen, if the ceasefire is not accompanied by any security guarantees, 62% of Ukrainians will categorically not support it. Overall (although mostly without enthusiasm) would be ready to support – 32%.

If Ukraine receives at least some security guarantees, more than half of Ukrainians will (albeit reluctantly) support a ceasefire. At the same time, the difference between different guarantee options (in terms of support from the Ukrainian public) is quite insignificant.

Thus, the option with the deployment of Western peacekeepers will be supported (for a ceasefire) by 60%, while 34% will be categorically against it. In the case of NATO membership as a security guarantee, 58% will support a ceasefire, while 32% will be categorically against it. In the case of the option of increased support for the Ukrainian Defense Forces (more air defense, aircraft, etc.), 56% support a ceasefire, compared to 35%, who will be categorically against it.

 

Graph 4. "Imagine, please, that a ceasefire is being discussed along the current front line. Russia retains control over all occupied territories. And at the same time... . You..."

 

 

The same trend is observed in all regions – if a ceasefire is not accompanied by security guarantees, the majority will be against it. If there are reliable security guarantees, this option is unenthusiastic, but may be acceptable.

 

            Graph 5. Perception of different security guarantees in a regional dimension

 

 


Acceptability of Russia's demands

 

In early March 2025, the USA suspended military support. Although it was resumed, we still asked how Ukraine would best respond if the USA were to permanently stop supporting Ukraine. We wanted to know whether Ukrainians in general would be ready to continue the fight with limited support (from Europe only), or whether they would be more inclined to accept all of Russia’s demands (i.e., effectively surrender).

There is a clear consensus among Ukrainians that Ukraine must continue the fight despite everything – 82%. Only 8% of respondents said that in such conditions they would be more inclined to accept surrender.

 

Graph 6. And if the USA finally stops all support for Ukraine, what option would be best for Ukraine?

 

 


In all regions, an absolute majority – from 78% in the East to 83% in the West – believe that, despite everything, Ukraine should continue to resist and not surrender.

 

Graph 7. Actions in the event of termination of USA assistance in the regional dimension

 

 


 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

Our various surveys consistently show that Ukrainians generally maintain the same views on issues of war and peace. Ukrainians do demonstrate a sincere desire for peace and remain flexible to discuss even painful compromises, such as postponing the liberation of certain occupied territories.

However, at the same time, there is an unequivocal consensus among Ukrainians against peace on any terms (and, of course, against surrender). The priority at the moment is reliable security guarantees. And Ukrainians are ready to continue nationwide resistance until Ukraine receives an acceptable peace.

 

 

 


           

Appendix 1. Formulation questions from the questionnaire

And if the USA finally stops all support for Ukraine, what option would be best for Ukraine? RANDOMIZATION OF STATEMENTS

1 Still, continue the struggle with the support of European allies to achieve a perhaps not entirely fair, but acceptable peace
2 Go to negotiations with Russia and agree to any Russian demands
3 DIFFICULT TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
4 REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

Please imagine that a ceasefire is being discussed along the current front line. Russia retains control over all occupied territories.

RANDOMLY ONE OF THE OPTIONS:

À – At the same time, Ukraine becomes a member of NATO

 – At the same time, Ukraine receives all weapons in large quantities: air defense, aircraft, tanks, etc.

Ñ – At the same time, Western peacekeepers are stationed in Ukraine

D – At the same time, Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO, nor does it receive additional Western weapons and no peacekeepers are stationed on the territory of Ukraine

You

1 Easily agree to this option
2 This will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable
3 This option is completely unacceptable
4 DIFFICULT TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
5 REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

Ukraine and the USA have made a joint proposal to Russia for a temporary 30-day ceasefire. What is your first perception of this proposal? RANDOMIZATION

1 A step towards a real end to the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine
2 A way to show that Russia does not want peace or that Russia always violates agreements
3 A way to unblock military aid from the USA
4 A wrong step that will weaken Ukraine
5 A step of despair of the Ukrainian authorities due to the difficult situation on the front
6 A step towards the surrender of Ukraine
7 DIFFICULT TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
8 REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

For a temporary 30-day ceasefire, Russia is demanding, among other things:

- that Ukraine stop mobilizing,

- that the West stop giving Ukraine intelligence data, and

- that the West stop supplying weapons to Ukraine

You...

1 Easily agree to this option
2 This will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable
3 This option is completely unacceptable
4 DIFFICULT TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
5 REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 



[1] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: Western macroregion - Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Central macroregion - Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv oblasts, Kyiv city, Southern macroregion - Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa oblasts, Eastern macroregion - Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts.


25.3.2025
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