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Perception of individual peace plans to end the war

The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

From July 23 to August 4, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions about the perception of individual peace plans to end the war. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,022 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 1022 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 4.1%. At the same time, for the peace plans considered in this press release, an experiment was implemented and we learned the opinion of respondents about one of three randomly selected peace plans (to avoid the effect of the order of responses). Each peace plan was evaluated by 324-351 respondents, which gives an error (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) of no more than 7.2%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.


 

Perception of peace plans from the USA, from Europe and Ukraine, and from Russia

 

In May 2025, KIIS researched the attitude of Ukrainians towards three options for peace plans[1]. Now, in July-August 2025, we have re-asked these questions to track the dynamics of public moods.

To begin with, we will recall the idea and methodological features of the questions we asked the respondents. Thus, in April 2025, information about the details of the peace plan from the USA appeared in the media and from public figures[2], and also about the details of another plan, which represented the joint position of Europe and Ukraine[3] (which was formed in response to the USA proposals). In addition, Russia continues to reiterate its demands for peace. In particular, later in Istanbul, Russia submitted the text of its Memorandum, which more formally reflected its demands[4].

As part of a regular survey (especially a telephone one), we cannot discuss the plans in detail with the respondents in full, because each plan includes many components. Therefore, we have prepared three shortened versions with, in our opinion, particularly important (from the point of view of public perception) elements. We are aware that the shortened versions cannot claim to be a complete reproduction of the proposed plans, but we believe that in our research version we have covered the important components and were able (as will be shown below) to clarify the differences in perception.

Only one of the three plan options was randomly selected and read to the respondent (to avoid the effect of the order of the questions). At the same time, we did not say that this plan was from the USA / from Europe with Ukraine / from Russia, since the “authorship” of the plan in the text of the question can significantly affect the perception by the respondents. That is, we only read the conditions (which were also read in different orders to different respondents) and asked to answer how acceptable this plan was overall. Below is what we read to the respondents.

Conditional plan of the USA:

  • A group of European states, but without the USA, give Ukraine security guarantees
  • Russia retains control over occupied territories
  • USA officially recognizes Crimea as part of Russia
  • Ukraine moves towards EU accession
  • USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia

Conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine:

  • Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the USA
  • Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
  • Ukraine moves towards EU accession
  • After establishing a lasting peace, the USA gradually eases its sanctions against Russia

Russia's conditional plan (we have retained the version used in May, but it should be noted that compared to the Russian Memorandum, we have a conditionally positive point - the move towards EU accession):

  • Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
  • Ukraine permanently renounces NATO membership
  • The cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and the entire territory of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts come under Russian control
  • Ukraine officially recognizes all occupied territories as part of Russia and renounces them permanently
  • Ukraine moves towards joining the EU
  • The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia

 

So, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, compared to May 2025, there is a tendency to increase the share of those who are ready (although mostly reluctantly) to support each of the proposed plans. However, secondly, the general picture remains the same and the peace plan from Russia (i.e. the surrender of Ukraine) is rejected by the absolute majority of the population, while the peace plan from the USA has more opponents than supporters. And as in May 2025, the only plan that can be the subject of discussions and approval by the Ukrainian public is a joint plan from Europe and Ukraine.

It is advisable to consider in more detail the perception of peace plans. So, 76% of Ukrainians categorically reject Russia's plan to establish peace (up from 82% in May).Can agree to Russia's demands – 17% (up from 10% in May).

39% of respondents would accept the USA conditional plan and this indicator has increased from 29% in May (at the same time, as before, respondents mostly emphasize that this option is difficult for them). At the same time, for a larger share of Ukrainians (49%) the plan is categorically unacceptable (in May it was 62%).

54% are ready to accept a joint plan of Europe and Ukraine (in May it was 51%). Consider this plan categorically unacceptable – 30% (in May – 35%).

 


Graph 1. There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would feel about it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “It would be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “This option is completely unacceptable”.

 

 

 


Below in the table, the data are also given in the regional dimension[5]. Since the survey sample was small, there are few respondents in each region (especially in the East), so the data are indicative for understanding the trends.

In all regions, the population is categorically against Russia's demands and only a small part is ready to accept its demands for peace. At the same time, regarding the other two plans, it is noticeable that the East stands out, where the majority is ready to accept them. In other regions, there are quite a lot of those who are ready to support and those who are categorically against them.

 

Table 1. Attitudes towards conditional peace plans in the regional dimension

% in the column West Center South East
Conditional plan of the USA        
Can accept 33 37 38 66
Categorically against 56 49 51 24
Conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine        
Can accept 55 57 43 70
Categorically against 38 35 37 28
Conditional plan of Russia        
Can accept 20 15 20 9
Categorically against 73 81 68 79

 


The table below also shows how those who trust/distrust President V. Zelenskyi feel about the peace plans. Those who distrust the President are somewhat more inclined to accept each of the peace plans. In the case of the Russian plan, although the share of those who are ready to accept it is also higher, the vast majority still speak out categorically against it.

 

Table 2. Attitudes towards conditional peace plans in terms of trust/distrust in President V. Zelenskyi

% in the column Trust the President Do not trust the President
Conditional plan of the USA    
Can accept 52 55
Categorically against 39 32
Conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine    
Can accept 39 46
Categorically against 51 41
Conditional plan of Russia    
Can accept 14 20
Categorically against 82 67

 

 

 


A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

Despite the aggressive actions of the Russians on the front and the brutal air attacks on civilian cities over the past few months, Ukrainian public opinion on issues of war and peace has not fundamentally changed. Ukrainians, as before, demonstrate openness to negotiations and the possibility, albeit reluctantly, of approving difficult decisions. However, the absolute majority continue to reject the demands for surrender (which is what the Russian Memorandum is).

Russia is the only real obstacle to lasting peace in Ukraine. Only pressure on Russia – by providing Ukraine with the necessary weapons, imposing effective sanctions, disrupting the normal functioning of Russian life, such as paralyzing air traffic (see, for example, the reasoning of the president of KIIS, Prof. V. Paniotto, “Close Moscow’s airports!”[6]) – able to force the Russians to move to constructive negotiations.  

 


Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

 

There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would feel about it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “It would be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “This option is completely unacceptable”.

 

ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS IS RANDOMLY READ TO THE RESPONDENT. WITHIN EACH OPTION, THE POINTS ARE READ IN A DIFFERENT ORDER

 

À:

  • Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the USA
  • Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
  • Ukraine moves towards joining the EU
  • After establishing a sustainable peace, the USA gradually eases its sanctions against Russia

 

 

Á:

  • A group of European states, but without the USA, give Ukraine security guarantees
  • Russia retains control over occupied territories
  • USA officially recognizes Crimea as part of Russia
  • Ukraine moves towards EU accession
  • USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia

 

 

Â:

  • Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
  • Ukraine permanently renounces NATO membership
  • The cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and the entire territory of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts come under Russian control
  • Ukraine officially recognizes all occupied territories as part of Russia and renounces them permanently
  • Ukraine moves towards joining the EU
  • The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia

 

Scale for responses:

1 I easily agree to this option
2 This will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable
3 This option is completely unacceptable
4 HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
5 REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 



[1] Perception of individual peace plans to end the war // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1530&page=1

[2] For example, at this link, Yevropeiska Pravda cites Reuters information about an alleged offer from the USA // https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2025/04/25/7210266/

[4] Russian media published the full version of the Kremlin's "memorandum" on the ceasefire // https://www.unian.ua/world/memorandum-pro-pripinennya-vognyu-z-yavivsya-povniy-spisok-umov-rosiji-13026576.html

[5] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: Western macroregion - Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Central macroregion - Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv oblasts, Kyiv city, Southern macroregion - Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa oblasts, Eastern macroregion - Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts.


7.8.2025
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