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Press releases and reports
Dynamics of Ukrainians' attitude towards Stalin (1991-2026)
Press release prepared by KIIS President Volodymyr Paniotto and Executive Director Anton Grushetskyi
From June 17 to 23, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey, to which, on its own initiative, added a question about the attitude towards the figure of Stalin. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,005 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%. Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS. In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population. We also note that the calculations in the press release are rounded to integer values. In some cases, the % sum may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding.
Attitude towards the figure of Stalin is one of the indicators characterizing the level of decommunization in society. KIIS from time to time asks question about attitude towards Stalin in various formulations. In June 2026, we repeated two questions that were asked in previous studies, which makes it possible to trace the dynamics of Ukrainians' attitudes towards Stalin.
Was Stalin a "great leader"Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement: “ Was Stalin a great leader”? The following answer options were read to respondents: “completely disagree”, “rather disagree”, “somewhat agree, somewhat disagree”, “rather agree”, “completely agree” (in addition, on their own initiative, respondents could say “hard to say” or refuse to answer). In June 2026, 7% of respondents rather or completely agree with the statement that Stalin was a great leader, 62% rather or completely disagree. The remaining 31% do not have a clear position on this issue (of which 21% answered "somewhat agree, somewhat disagree", 8% could not decide and 2% refused to answer).
Graph 1. Do you agree or disagree with the statement: "Stalin was a great leader", %
For comparison, in 2023, 9% considered Stalin a great leader, 72% disagreed, and 19% held an undecided position.
Graph2. Dynamics of the number of Ukrainians who consider Stalin a great leader, %
Graph 2 shows the dynamics of the percentage of Ukrainians who consider Stalin a great leader since 1991. As we can see, after the proclamation of Ukraine’s Independence, the share of those who considered Stalin a great leader initially increased – from 27% in 1991 to 39% in 2002. Subsequently, a gradual decline in this indicator began, which has especially accelerated in recent years: from 26% in 2019 to 16% in 2021, to 9% in 2023 and finally to 7% in 2026. Thus, 2026 data does not indicate a rise in support for Stalin as the "great leader". The share of those who agree with this definition remains very low and has even decreased slightly compared to 2023. At the same time, there was a certain change in the nature of Stalin's rejection. The share of those who disagree with the statement about the "great leader" decreased from 72% to 62%, while the share of those who take an undecided position increased from 19% to 31% (primarily, from 13% to 21%, there were more of those who "somewhat agree, somewhat disagree"). So, we are not talking about an increase in the number of Stalin's supporters, but rather about a certain weakening of the categorical nature of his denial and an increase in the share of undecided or ambivalent assessments.
Personal attitude towards StalinRespondents were also asked the question: “How do you personally, in general, feel about Stalin?” They could choose one of the answers: “with admiration”, “with respect”, “with sympathy”, “indifferent”, “with hostility, irritation”, “with fear”, “with disgust, hatred”. We combine the first three options into a positive attitude, the last three into a negative one. In June 2026 3% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards Stalin, 27% are indifferent, and 57% are negative. Another 2% said they did not know who Stalin was, while 10% could not decide and 1% refused to answer. In 2023, the corresponding indicators were 4% positive attitude, 26% indifferent and 61% negative. Graph 3 shows the dynamics of personal attitude towards Stalin for the period from 2012 to 2026.
Graph3. How do you personally feel about Stalin in general?, %
The dynamics demonstrate a very significant long-term change in Ukrainians' attitudes towards Stalin. In 2012, 23% had a positive attitude towards him, and in 2026 – only 3%. A particularly sharp change occurred after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion: in 2022, the share of positive attitudes decreased from 18% to 5%, while negative attitudes increased to 64%. In 2026, negative attitudes are slightly less prevalent than in 2022-2023: 57% compared to 64% in 2022 and 61% in 2023. However, this decrease is not accompanied by an increase in positive attitudes – on the contrary, it remains at a minimum level, 3%. The changes occurred primarily within negative attitudes. The share of those responding “with disgust, hatred” decreased from 47% in 2023 to 38% in 2026, while the share of those responding “with hostility, irritation” increased from 11% to 16%.
Comparison of attitudes towards Stalin in Ukraine and RussiaFor some years, there are results of a Levada Center study [1], which are representative of the Russian population and obtained using the same question. The results of the comparison are shown in gpaph 4.
Graph 4. Dynamics of the number of Ukrainians and Russians who consider Stalin a great leader, %
As we can see, in 1991-1992 there was practically no difference in the number of those who considered Stalin a great leader, in 2016 the difference was already statistically significant (5 percentage points), but not very large. Then the difference grew rapidly. In 2021, the difference was already 40% (percentage points), and in 2023 – 45%, and in 2026 – 49%. The share of Russians who somehow agree that Stalin is a great leader has practically not changed since 2021 - 56% in 2021, 54% in 2023 and again 56% in 2026. And the share of Ukrainians who agree that Stalin was a great leader is constantly falling, from 2021 it decreased from 16% to 7%. No less revealing is the difference in the dynamics of the personal attitude of Ukrainians and Russians towards Stalin. The graph below shows the percentage of those who have a positive attitude towards Stalin.
Graph 5. Comparison of positive attitudes towards Stalin in Ukraine and Russia, %
If in 2012 in Ukraine and Russia approximately the same share of the population had a positive attitude towards Stalin, then in Ukraine there were generally fewer sympathizers of the Soviet dictator, while in Russia, on the contrary, affection for him grew rapidly and now the majority of the population has a positive attitude. In Russia, the share of those who have a positive view of Stalin increased from 28% to almost 60% between 2012 and 2021. In Ukraine, it decreased from 23% to 3%.
V. Paniotto, comment on the survey results:
Attitudes towards Stalin are a sensitive indicator of the success of the decommunization processes in Ukraine and a particularly telling indicator of the difference between Ukrainian and Russian society. While 7% of Ukrainians now consider Stalin a great leader and 3% have a positive attitude towards him, in Russia 56% consider him to be one of the most cruel tyrants in human history, and almost 60% regard him with admiration, respect or sympathy. Moreover, according to the Levada Center data, since 2012 Stalin has consistently ranked first in the list of the most outstanding people of all times and peoples from the point of view of the Russian population (see Table A [2]). Table A. Please name the 10 most outstanding people of all times and peoples, % (fragment of the table from a survey in Russia)
In fact, Stalin became a national hero in Russia. In the last survey conducted in April 2025, Stalin was named by 42% of respondents. The second place was taken by V. Putin - 31%, the third - V. Lenin with 28%, the fourth - O. Pushkin with 24%. The first ten outstanding people, except for A. Einstein, are Russians (A. Einstein was in 9th place for all the years of observation since 1994 and was inferior to L. Brezhnev, but this year he caught up with him and now Einstein is as great as Brezhnev in the eyes of Russians). Compared to 2021, the share of those who named Stalin increased from 39% to 42%, and Putin - from 15% to 31%. Thus, despite the sharp increase in mentions of V. Putin, Stalin retains first place and remains the central figure of the historical pantheon in the mass consciousness of Russians. It is also interesting that in 2012 Putin (22%) was far behind Stalin (42%), the difference was 20% (20 percentage points), and in 2017, when the “Crimean euphoria” had not yet ended, Putin almost caught up with Stalin (Stalin 38%, Putin 34%, a difference of 4%), in 2021, before the start of a large-scale war, when the effect of the seizure of Crimea had worn off, there was again a large gap (Stalin 39%, Putin 15%, a difference of 24%), and in 2025, during the war, Putin’s indicator doubled from 15% to 31% (although Stalin, with 42%, was still first). This shows that war gives Putin greatness in the eyes of the Russian population. Yevhen Holovakha gave the following humorous definition of megalomania (I quote from memory): “Megalomania is a claim to greatness without the multimillion-dollar sacrifices necessary for true greatness.” It seems that this is how the Russian population and V. Putin himself understand greatness, and V. Putin is trying to catch up with Stalin in terms of the number of victims (now there are more than a million). In fact, Stalin has become one of the key symbols of modern Russian historical memory. In our view, it is important to consider this not only as an attitude towards a specific historical figure, but also as an indicator of a broader system of ideas about strong centralized power, the admissibility of state coercion for state purposes, and an imperial vision of history. At the same time, these data do not in themselves prove a causal connection with support for modern aggressive foreign policies; rather, they show the cultural and symbolic environment in which such policies can be legitimized.
Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire and results in terms of regions and age
Table D1.1 Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “Stalin was a great leader”? Results for Ukraine as a whole and individual regions
Table D1.2 Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “Stalin was a great leader”? Results for individual age categories
Table D1.3 How do you personally, in general, feel about Stalin? Results for Ukraine as a whole and individual regions
Table D1.4 How do you personally feel about Stalin in general? Results for individual age categories
Appendix 2. Dynamics of personal attitude towards Stalin during 2012-2026
Table D2.1 How do you personally, in general, feel about Stalin?
[1] The Russian independent non-governmental research organization Levada Center, which the Russian authorities forcibly added to the register of non-profit organizations in Russia that perform the functions of a foreign agent. [2] Source: https://www.levada.ru/2025/06/17/samye-vydayushhiesya-lyudi-vseh-vremyon-i-narodov/?utm_source=chatgpt.com [3] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: West – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Kyiv city – only Kyiv city (without the oblast); Center / North – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts; South – Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts; Lower Dnipro – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia oblasts; East – Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts (formally, the macroregion also includes the Luhansk oblast, but due to the almost complete occupation, none of the respondents currently live there, although there are respondents who lived in this oblast until 2022).
17.8.2026
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