

KYIV / 2015

# CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE



## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEYS:

2007, 2009, 2011, AND 2015

KIEV  
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## **Corruption in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of National Surveys: 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2015**

This report was prepared by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in coordination with Lake Research Partners and Karakoyun Strategies in the framework of the USAID funded project «The Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER)» implemented by PACT, Inc. Ukraine. Presented in the report are comparative results of National sociological surveys on the state of corruption in Ukraine conducted in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2015. The survey was targeted at measuring public perception of the problem of corruption and its experience with it. This report is intended to reach a wide readership.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**T**hanks to the UNITER project (The Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms run by PACT, Inc. in Ukraine) and the USAID funding (the funds received from The United States Agency for International Development), in July – October 2015 we carried out a massive pan-Ukrainian survey on the state of corruption in Ukraine. In our research, we used the methodology tried and tested in 2007–2009 in the three preceding survey waves aimed, in particular, at studying people's perception of corruption and their experience of corruption encounters.

The goal set for this research was to monitor the changes in citizens' corruption perception and experiences in Ukraine over an extended period of time. The baseline research conducted in early 2007 formed the basis for further comparison of our findings of 2009 and 2011, as well as the latest data collected in 2015. All these studies were carried out by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), managed by the MSI (Management Systems International) in 2007–2009 and conducted for the UNITER project in 2011 and 2015. The last wave was also conducted in coordination with Lake Research Partners and Karakoyun Strategies.

Over the researched period of time, reforms and various measures targeting corruption in Ukraine have been planned and partly introduced by various branches of power, the donor community, NGOs and other organizations. Besides, this period has brought many important political and economic events that could influence people's perception of corruption and cause changes in corrupt behavior. In particular, there have been several reshuffles in governing teams. Multiple waves of financial crises also led to decreasing business activity and lowering life standards. Dramatic


events of Euromaidan raised the issue of corruption to a new level and have affected citizens' tolerance and expectations to the fight against it. In many cases, the findings of 2015 support the conclusions of the preceding years and prove the stability of peoples' ideas about corruption, but they also show some changes.

Corruption may include many forms of behavior. In this survey, we defined corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain. Therefore, corruption occurs when people who are paid from the state budget request or take bribes, gifts or favors; abuse their government position; use their influence for their own personal benefit; show favoritism; or practice nepotism. Sometimes, corruption involves the transfer of money or gifts, but it always includes attempts to seek or use influence beyond what is legal. This definition was also proposed to the respondents.

This research of the situation with corruption in Ukraine lets us evaluate people's actual experience of corruption from several standpoints.

Firstly, ***the subjective perception of frequency corruption is encountered with*** was measured with the help of the question ***"How frequently do you encounter any form of corruption?"*** We can state that **the general level of corruption in Ukraine remains very high. Nearly two thirds of respondents (65.6%) indicate that they have encountered corruption over the past 12 months – and one fifth (20.5%) experience it at least once a month (Graph A).** It should be noted that this may account for different sides of corrupt activities, such as personal participation or reports by other people and media or witnessing due to one's professional activity as an investigation officer, a journalist etc.

Secondly, detailed questions about extortion, voluntary bribing, and using personal connections




to reach one's goal let us calculate the *share of citizens involved in acts of corruption* one way or another over the year preceding the study. According to this detailed evaluation, we documented 72.4% respondents reporting their actual corruption experience in 2011. In 2015, 70.7% reported corruption experience in the observed sectors. This means that the share of people involved in corruption acts has somewhat decreased in the past 4 years (the difference being statistically significant on the level of  $p=0.01$ ). Such a high level of involvement in corruption could be explained by the fact that in the three sectors (healthcare services, secondary education and traffic police) it was studied with questions about particular actions, and not all suggested actions could be taken by some people as corruption-related (for instance, collecting money to buy flowers or gifts for teachers or buying disposable instruments for a medical examination).

Keeping in mind the fact that corruption always has two parties, let us review the same figure in particular types of corruption. **Analysis shows that its minor reduction was due to decreasing volun-**

**tary bribe offers from consumers of state services (Graph B).** Naturally, the crisis in the country may have caused certain impoverishment of the population – and now the latter can afford spending less in unofficial extra payments to state officers. However, our research findings in other parts of the study also indicate that Ukrainian citizens have grown more conscientious too.

Thirdly, the same questions are used to estimate *the spread of corruption in various sectors of state services*. With this purpose, we traditionally use indicators of corruption experiences calculated as an average number of sectors where people have encountered corruption among the overall number of the sectors offered for evaluation.

The study of intensity of particular forms of corruption shows some decrease in all the studied corruption manifestations. This refers to extortion (22.3% compared to 25.8% in 2011), voluntary bribes (7.0% compared to 10.0% in 2011), and using personal connections (12.8% compared to 15.3% in 2011). It is worth noting that **voluntary bribing is the only form of corruption in the Ukrainian soci-**



ety that has not been increasing during the studied period (Graph C). Even during the period of 2009–2011, when we documented growth in the other two forms of corruption (extortion and using personal connections), voluntary bribing remained on the same level.


Corruption is revealed unevenly in our society – its level indicators increase for some sectors and decrease for others, and this tendency is stable from the first waves of research. Nevertheless, leading practitioners of corruption (in particular, of such infamous ones like extortion) are the same – these are state healthcare institutions, secondary schools and militsiya. We have documented no statistically significant changes in the bribery levels in these sectors over the past period.

Along with the actual corruption experience, we also studied its perception by the whole population, including the less active part that had no contact with certain or any state institutions. The comparative analysis of the 2007 and 2009 research findings revealed a decrease in the actual corruption experiences but an increase in percep-

tion of corruption spread. In 2011, our study documented certain changes in the situation: the level of citizens' corruption perception was the same, while the actual corruption experiences grew more intense (though not more widespread). Foremost, it was caused by the growth in the number of state institutions where people were exposed to outspoken extortion practiced by state officials. The latest study of 2015 shows the return to the dynamics of the early stages: **people perceive corruption in the state sector as growing, though this conclusion is not backed by actual experiences (Graph D)**. We can say that info-coverage of corruption disclosures in media contributes to this growth.

A good example of an effective information policy is the militsiya reform, i.e. creation of the new police. About half of respondents (48.6%) have not formed their opinion of this unit yet, and this uncertainty can be explained by the fact that new patrol has started working in few regions only by the data collection time. However, this led to 30.7% of respondent's stating that there is no corruption at all among the policemen. Moreover, this rate is







the highest among all the listed sectors; the nearest one is applying and receiving social benefits (22.5%). The proportion of those aware of anticorruption actions in the police is also one of the highest (22.9%) and is smaller only compared to other legal and judicial system representatives (such policies in the traffic police, militsiya, the court system and the public prosecutor's office). Nevertheless, the efficiency of anticorruption actions is also considered one of the highest – 71% regard it as effective, which is the third result coming right after application for social benefits (81.0%) and providing communal services (73.8%).


The groups of people facing corruption most often remain the same as in the preceding years: these are representatives of younger age groups and people with high level of education and income. At the same time, representatives of these groups are usually also the most active fighters against corruption.

The study also reveals some progress on issues related to civic activity. On the one hand, the actual behavior of citizens is still rather passive: the share of those who submit complaints against corrupt officials, does not exceed 2% of victims; still only one third of the population declares their readiness to confront corrupt. However, on the other hand, the part of people placing major responsibility for addressing corruption on usual citizens is steadily growing (from 15.8% in 2007 to 18.0% in 2011 and up to 24.0% in 2015), and, in addition, those who declare their willingness to stand for their rights in various ways when facing extortion are becoming more active – and those unprepared to defend their rights in any way have become considerably less numerous (Graph E).

Therefore, we observe some changes in the citizens' minds, which, however, have not yet developed in their behavior.



# KEY FINDINGS



ther research findings concerning corruption trends are as follows:

## 1. ATTITUDE TO AUTHORITIES

1.1. After the events of 2014–2015, we can see decreasing levels of trust in authorities at all levels compared to 2011 which may be due to citizens' unmet expectations of drastic changes in the country. Similarly to all the preceding research stages, leading by the level of trust are local authorities that people usually have closer contact with (17.6% of respondents would rather trust local authorities compared to 20.1% in 2011). Next is the President with His Administration, though this governing institution is trusted by little more than 10% of respondents (in 2011, President Yanukovich was trusted by 14.0%).

1.2. Despite the generally low level of trust in the governmental institutions, the population of Ukraine still views national authorities as the most responsible for addressing corruption. Like in all the preceding years of monitoring this issue, in 2015 most respondents place major responsibility for anticorruption activity on the President of Ukraine (60.6%), the Parliament, i.e. Verkhovna Rada (41.7%) and the Government, i.e. the Cabinet of Ministers (37.7%).

1.3. The part of people placing major responsibility for addressing corruption on usual citizens is steadily growing (from 15.8% in 2007 to 18.0% in 2011 and up to 24.0% in 2015). A higher level of civic conscientiousness is seen in younger categories of the population (those under 45) and women are more conscientious even in the oldest age group, while aging men tend to place this responsibility on anyone but citizens themselves.

1.4. Not more than 14% of people believe that authority representatives are willing to fight cor-

ruption. Compared to 2011, this indicator is somewhat lower for every level and branch of power. First of all, people believe in the willingness of local authorities (13.2%) and the President (12.3%).

1.5. The most thematic of all the issues suggested for evaluation is the military operation in the east of Ukraine, which causes serious concern in 97% of respondents. Somewhat lower rated is the problem of high living costs (95%) traditionally seen as the most topical on the preceding stages of the study. The issue of corruption in everyday life is among the three leading ones (94.4%), though its particular case of corrupt authorities is nearly as serious (93.8%).

## 2. CHANGES IN PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION

2.1. Traditional non-printed mass media are still leading in providing information on corruption. Television and radio deliver such information to 28% of respondents. Print media go on losing their positions. Instead, the rate of people receiving information on corruption via the internet has grown nearly three times bigger (from 4.4% in 2011 to 12.4% in 2015). Predictably, different media have different user structures. Thus, print media are mostly supported by older readers, while younger people tend to rely on the Internet.

2.2. People's opinion about corruption main causes is rather deep-rooted. Corruption is seen as a result of joint influence of a number of factors. The major ones are officials willing to use their position for their own good (19.7%) supported by higher government's unwillingness to address corruption (12.9%) and people themselves being used to solving their problems this way (11.8%).

2.3. Half of the adult populations of Ukraine (49.8%) admit they may get involved in corrupt actions when it is better for them, while 37.4% of respondents declare it to be totally unacceptable



## ▼ KEY FINDINGS

for them. Unwillingness to accept corruption even for their own profit grows with age, but women are more tolerant to corruption compared to men. And, similarly to all the preceding years, young people are the most ready to use profitable corruption connections.

2.4. Among those who tend to find an excuse for corruption, there are more people convinced that most Ukrainian residents will use corruption connections when given the opportunity. They also believe more often that in Ukraine, one cannot get proper services without informal payment and they tend to explain their tolerance to corruption with striving to 'equality' among state officials and usual citizens – if the former may break the law, the latter should not be demanded that they stick to it. On the other hand, those who are strongly against corruption even for their own good agree more often than others that responsibility for corruption actions should be equal for both parties in such interactions and declare more willingness to uncover corruption actions.

2.5. The survey shows that 85.5% of the adult populations of Ukraine evaluate the general level of corruption in the society as above average. Only 1.8% of respondents believe that corruption is little spread or there is none at all.

2.6. This study confirms the tendency noticed on the preceding stages: supporters of political powers that are currently in office (Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, 'People's Front') tend to see positive changes in corruption levels and more rarely note that they are rising. At the same time, opposition supporters (the Opposition Bloc, left opposition powers) state that corruption is increasing much more often and they do not see any decrease in it.

2.7. Perception of corruption in all the branches of power and institutions of all levels has increased compared to 2011 but has not reached the level of 2009. And corruptors' hierarchy also remains unchanged: still leading is Verkhovna Rada (60.6% of respondents have noted considerable spread of corruption there); the second is the Cabinet of Ministers (54.8%); and the third is the President with his Administration (46.4%). Local authorities are traditionally less corrupt in people's perception (34.3%).

2.8. Similarly to earlier findings, top leaders in the rating of the most corrupt sectors (according to people's perception) are the State Automobile Inspection and the judicial system – both are named to be very corrupt by two thirds of respondents (66.0%). The top five of the rating have not changed since the last time measure. Besides the abovementioned SAI and the judicial system, militsiya (without the SAI), the state prosecutor's office and the health-care system are also included in the top five.

2.9. In the basic monitoring year 2007, the median index of citizens' corruption perception was 33. The next year it reached 37 and remained on the same level in 2011. At this stage, our last survey reveals that this index has grown again and now it's close to 41. Thus, 40.7% of all the major sectors and institutions in Ukraine are seen by its population as corrupt now.

2.10. *According to people's evaluation of the situation, the level of corruption perceived by the population has increased compared to 2011.* This is shown by the growth of the total citizens' corruption perception index for all population from 39.4 in 2011 to 42.8 in 2015.

## 3. CHANGES IN THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION

3.1. According to the survey findings, about 65.5% of respondents encounter corruption as participants or witnesses every year.

3.2. According to indirect estimates, over the past 12 months 70.7% of respondents have encountered extortion, offered a bribe or looked for connections to be used in settling issues in at least one of the 20 analyzed sectors, which is not considerably lower than the findings of 2011 (72.4%, the difference being statistically significant at the level of  $p=0.01$ ). This small decrease in the rate of the population involved in corruption relations over the past 4 years has become possible only due to the decrease of voluntary bribing initiated by state service consumers (from 40.5% to 35.6%).

3.3. Similarly to earlier findings, most frequently people are requested to pay unofficially when they turn to state healthcare institutions (69% of their us-

ers), in secondary schools (63.6%), when contacting militsiya (50.7%), in institutions of higher education (48.7%), when receiving permissions from authorities (44.1%), when dealing with the SAI (42.7%).

3.4. Compared to 2011, we have documented a statistically significant decrease in extortion in such spheres as going through customs or receiving customs papers (from 36.1% to 22.8%), getting connected to communal services or getting them repaired (from 28.2% to 21.7%), dealing with levy authorities (from 26.0% to 15.5%), getting registered for or receiving social aid (from 8.9% to 5.0%). *Instead, more frequent are cases of extortion to receive a loan in a state institution (from 6.7% to 21.5%), when addressing privatization issues or those connected with land ownership and use (from 32.0% to 39.4%), when turning to the court system (from 26.3% to 32.9%) and state notaries (from 11.1% to 16.4%).*

3.5. Receiving most frequent bribe offers are representatives of institutions of secondary education (56.9%), state health care (32.3%) and the SAI (23.0%).

3.6. Over the years of our research, *there has been a noticeable decrease in voluntary bribing frequency.* Compared to 2011, it has generally decreased by 5%, which is from 40.5% in 2011 to 35.6% in 2015. We can assume that this is caused by people's growing conscientiousness and not economic difficulties as the most noticeable decrease in voluntary bribing is demonstrated by non-pensioners (aged 18-59) with higher education and income that is above average.

3.7. *The most significant decrease in voluntary bribing has been documented in attempts to receive lodging from the state (from 29.5% to 10.3%), in contacts with representatives of higher education institutions (from 25.5% to 16.2%), tax services (from 14.0% to 5.6%), the SAI (from 30.4% to 23.0%) and militsiya (from 20.6% to 14.5%).* Though population groups contacting some state institutions may be small, all these differences are statistically significant.

3.8. The rate of voluntary bribes in state secondary schools, healthcare institutions, employment in state institutions, contacts with levy authorities, connection to and repairs of communal

services, applying and receiving social benefits are also decreased.

3.9. Compared to 2011, *voluntary bribing has shown statistically significant growth in one sector only – that is getting a loan from a state institution (from 2.2% to 7.9%).*

3.10. The spread of using personal connections as a 'mild' form of corruption is traditionally between extortion and voluntary bribing. Most often people resort to personal connections to get employment with a state institution (32.7%), in the field of entrepreneurship regulation (26.1%), to receive all sorts of permissions from authorities (23.1%), to register or privatize real estate objects (21.3%), in issues of land privatization, ownership or use (20.2%), and trying to receive lodging from the state (20.1%).

3.11. The overall part of people used to resort to personal connections to settle their private issues has somewhat decreased over the past 4 years. *Compared to 2011, the use of personal connections has significantly decreased in contacts with tax services (from 23.5% to 10.9%), levy authorities (from 22.5% to 13.0%), militsiya (from 25.2% to 18.0%), when receiving permissions from state authorities (from 30.3% to 23.1%), and when dealing with representatives of institutions of higher education (from 20.5% to 15.4%).*

3.12. Voluntary bribing is three times less frequent than extortion, while in 2009 the difference was 1 to 2. The change in this correlation has happened with simultaneous spread of extortion and decrease in voluntary bribing. Real extortion experiences happen in every fifth contact with an official (22% of the cases), while only in 7% of the cases do people initiate bribery themselves. People use personal connections more often than offer bribes, that is in about 13% of the cases.

3.13. The highest of all the corruption encounter indices in Ukraine is always the extortion index (CEI-E), while the lowest is the voluntary bribing index (CEI-B), the personal connections index (CEI-C) being between these two. Thus, most frequently a situation with corruption is provoked by a state official – and when there is no direct extortion, Ukrai-

## ▼ KEY FINDINGS

nians try to find a useful connection before offering a bribe directly.

3.14. Representatives of younger age groups and people with higher levels of education and income face extortion more often, but they resort to voluntary bribing more frequently too. Only pensioners enjoy lower extortion levels now.

3.15. More corruption of all the three forms is encountered by urban residents in comparison with villagers.

3.16. People with a higher index of extortion are more likely to believe that the state does not address corruption sufficiently.

## 4. CHANGES IN THE ACTUAL CORRUPTION EXPERIENCES IN THE THREE SECTORS

### 4.1. Corruption in the healthcare system:

- The state healthcare system has been leading by the number of people turning to it: its institutions are visited by over two thirds of adult Ukrainians or their family members. *In the years of monitoring, the situation with bribery in health care has seen virtually no change:* over a half of patients (57%) have to provide themselves with medicines and instruments at the doctor's – and 22% consider it to be their obligation even without being forced to do so; also, half of people (55%) are forced to make donations to hospital funds – and 14% of patients have done this voluntarily; one third (38%) were extorted unofficial payment for the provided services – and 13% offered such payment to a medical worker themselves.
- Similarly to the preceding research findings, people largely support combining motivation and punishment steps to address corruption in the sector; but compared to the preceding years, *preference for punishment is growing stronger, while support for extra funding is decreasing.* Thus, the first place is taken by placing greater responsibility for corruption actions on healthcare personnel meaning firing disclosed corruptors (44%), which is followed by providing extra budget money to healthcare

(43%), enforcing greater administrative and criminal responsibility for corruption (40%), providing better healthcare funding and increasing healthcare worker salaries (39.1%).

### 4.2. Corruption in schools:

- Among the 22.5% of respondents with school-going children, significant parts are involved in various acts of corruption.
- *The spread of corruption practices in this sector has enjoyed virtually no change in the years of our research.* The main form of corruption is still collecting money for class/school funds (56% extorted, 32% voluntary), paying for classroom repairs/remodeling (56% extorted, 31% voluntary) and collecting money to buy flowers or gifts for teachers (33% extorted, 44% voluntary). Some increase is seen in the rate of parents pushed towards dishonest means to get their children accepted to the school they have chosen, of those who agree to pay for better marks to be given to their kids, and those forced to buy tutor services in the school.
- Like in the healthcare sector, *most parents consider raising teacher salaries (54%) and better funding of the educational sector (48%) as effective means of addressing corruption in secondary schools.* However, similarly to the healthcare sector, compared to 2011, people have become more *supportive of introducing punishment for educationists caught in the act of corruption:* 44% of parents are for greater administrative and criminal responsibility for corruption and for firing those caught in corruption with further ban on their professional activity.

### 4.3. Corruption in the SAI:

- The situation with bribing in the SAI remains complicated. *The rate of people who encountered corruption in this sector has somewhat decreased compared to 2011 but it's still significant:* according to the findings of 2015, extorted or voluntarily bribing have been 60% (compared to 67% in 2011). And this decrease in corruption

cases is connected not so much with decreasing extortion as with fewer offers from drivers.

- The most widespread form of corruption acts in contacts with SAI workers is still unofficial payment for violating traffic rules. The rate of people who faced extortion is 44%, while 19% initiated the process themselves.
- Compared to 2011, corruption has decreased in the cases of issuing driving licenses (extortion has fallen from 20% to 17% and voluntary bribing has dropped from 11% to 7%) and technical inspection of vehicles (extortion changing from 29% to 20%, voluntary bribing going down from 19% to 9%). We accepted evaluation from the respondents who went through such procedures.
- Unlike representatives of health care and secondary education, SAI workers are not seen as 'involuntary' corruptors, so drivers recommend that punishment for corruption and abuse be made more severe to fight bribing on the road more efficiently.

## 5. REACTIONS TO CORRUPTION

*5.1. Only 2% of people have tried to stand up for their rights before officials.* The main reason for non-complaining about officials' actions is still being convinced that such an attempt will be useless anyway. However, compared to the preceding years, the proportion of those who deem complaining about corruption useless has decreased by nearly 20%; instead, now there are more people who failed to explain why they decided not to complain.

*5.2. The rate of people declaring their readiness to counteract corruptors is about one third of the Ukrainian population:* 33% in 2007, 36% in 2009, 34% in 2011 and 37% in 2015. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents confidently stating their unpreparedness to stand for their rights has decreased from 33%-34% in 2007–2011 to 22.8% in 2015. So, certain changes in people's minds are taking place, though it is happening rather slowly. Still more active are mostly men, young people, those with higher levels of education and wellbeing. This means that this group is still formed mainly by corruption victims. Readiness to stand up for one's

rights when officials are being unfair increases as a response to the growing feeling of corruption in social life, among other things.

5.3. Compared to the preceding years, significantly larger is the number of people who are ready to take certain action if a state official violates their rights in a big way. Thus, grown from 26.7% to 34.6% is the rate of people who are ready to demand in such cases that the official act according to their duties; increased from 22.9% to 30.7% is the rate of people who are ready to complain about the official to his/her superiors; grown from 17.6% to 22.2% is the rate of people who are ready to take this case to law enforcement or court; increased from 6.6% to 10.4% is the rate of people ready to seek protection at NGOs. The rate of people who are going to take no action when their rights are violated has decreased from 32.9% to 19.2%. Also, decreased from 7.1% to 4.1% is rate of people who are ready to 'find a compromise' with the official, that is initiate corruption in such cases. This means that compared to the preceding years, people are growing more conscious of the need to protect their rights and withstand officials' corruption.

*5.4. Over the past 12 months, the most heard of have been anticorruption actions and campaigns carried out by mass media* (38%). Of the government actions, the most noticed have been the anticorruption activities of the Lustration Committee (32% have heard of certain actions) and the President (32%). *But like it was before, most people do not tend to see this activity as very effective.* According to people's assessment, the most efficient are actions taken by mass media (27% say they are effective) and NGOs (28%). The efficiency of activities of other organizations is evaluated similarly to the preceding years, which is from 5% (the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) to 12% (the Lustration Committee) of the informed citizens.

5.5. The survey findings indicate that the idea of making anticorruption measures more severe is growing more and more popular with Ukrainians. But people still insist that in the first place MPs should be deprived of immunity as they see legal equality as the necessary condition for effective implementation of any anticorruption measures.



# INTRODUCTION

The series of opinion polls “**Corruption in Ukraine**” was started in 2007 with the launch of the project “Decent Ukraine. Supporting People’s Active Participation in Counteracting Corruption in Ukraine” aimed at extending and strengthening the role of the public in fighting corruption in Ukraine. Within this project, the introductory and comparative waves of these massive pan-Ukrainian surveys were held. In 2011 the UNITER Project supported the third wave of such research, and in 2015 the same project initiated the fourth survey wave. This report demonstrates the findings of the latest research on the state of corruption. Where possible, current results are compared to preceding survey waves held in 2007–2011.

The four pan-Ukrainian studies were conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The baseline research was held in February and March 2007 ( $n = 10\,580$ ) and the next one took place in February and March 2009 ( $n = 10\,577$ ). These studies were managed by the Management Systems International (MSI). The following two waves of the survey were carried out in March and April 2011 ( $n = 10\,639$ ) and August and September 2015 ( $n = 10\,173$ ) within the UNITER project (The Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms) implemented in Ukraine by PACT, Inc. with the USAID support. The last wave was also conducted in coordination with Lake Research Partners and Karakoyun Strategies.

## SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The main goal of the four surveys was to collect quantitative data on the following issues:

- attitudes of the adult population of Ukraine to the problem of corruption;
- people’s experiences of corruption;
- public evaluation of sufficiency and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures introduced by authorities and other participants;
- people’s willingness to join anticorruption activity.

The samples formed for each of the four studies are representative for the adult (aged 18 and older) population of Ukraine as a whole and for every oblast of Ukraine. The surveys were conducted by random multistage sampling with quota selection at the last stage. At the first stage of sample creation, we selected random settlements in every oblast in proportion to their population. The second stage involved random selection of postal districts (voting precincts in 2015) in the selected settlements. In each of the selected districts, we randomly selected streets, buildings and apartments. Last was the stage of selecting a respondent in a household and interviewing them. The received data were compared to the information of the national census of 2001 with corrections considering migration figures reported by the State Migration Service (2015).

See Table 1 for the main characteristics of the studies.

The surveys were conducted via individual interviews. Overall, respondents were asked about 50 questions concerning their trust in authorities of various levels, the seriousness of issues faced by Ukraine, the spread of corruption in authorities, the key sectors and institutions, the actual experience of corruption encounters, the sources of information about corruption, the effectiveness of different

**Table 1.** Main characteristics of the studies

Characteristics of the studies	Baseline research (2007)	Intermediate research (2009)	Intermediate research (2011)	Final research (2015)
Field stage	February 21 – March 21	February 19 – March 24	March 18 – April 26	August 15 – September 17
Sample size, individuals	10 580	10 577	10 639	10 173
Theoretical sample error (for Ukraine overall), %	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

ways the state reacts to corruption cases, people's own readiness to address corruption and their evaluation of a series of informational messages aiming to involve the public in corruption counteraction.

## THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2015 SURVEY SAMPLE

Survey respondent distribution by their main demographic characteristics corresponds to the population structure documented in the official statistics. Among our respondents, 55.0% were female and 45.0% were male. About 32% of the surveyed people were of retirement age (women aged 55 and older and men aged 60 and older). Our respondents represented all educational levels. The average household size of the interviewed individuals was three people. See Graphs 1–4 for the detailed respondent distribution by major demographic characteristics.

Working people comprised 44.9% of all the surveyed ones, including 3.0% of the self-employed and 1.7% of working pensioners. The structure of those employed according to their enterprise type is the following: 53.8% are involved in private companies, 27.1% are employed by state institutions, 9.0% have jobs with state enterprises, and 4.6% are working for mixed type enterprises. The unoccupied category (54.8% of the population overall) was formed by pensioners (30.5%), unemployed

people (9.9%), housewives (9.7%), students (3.5%) and those incapable of working (1.2%).

See Table 2 for respondent distribution by their total household income.

**Table 2.** Respondent distribution by their total household income

Total household income, Hryvnias	Total household income, %
Below 1000	2.3
1001 – 2000	17.4
2001 – 3000	21.4
3001 – 4000	14.5
4001 – 5000	9.6
5001 – 6000	6.4
6001 – 7000	2.4
Over 7001	2.8
Difficult to say / Refusal	23.3


Graphs 5–6 show the respondent distribution by regions and types of settlements they reside in.

A map below shows the oblasts' distribution among macroregions of Ukraine.


## OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS

"Corruption in Ukraine" has several characteristics that make this research unique among other corruption studies.







Graph 1. Respondents' Gender




Graph 2. Age Group of Respondents




Graph 3. Education Level of Respondents




Graph 4. Size of Respondents' Family



Graph 5. Regions



Graph 6. Type of Settlement



**The Western Region:** Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopil'ska, Khmelnytska and Chernivetska oblasts.

**The Central Region:** Kyiv city; Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Kyivska, Kirovohrad'ska, Poltav'ska, Sumska, Cherkaska and Chernihiv'ska oblasts.

**The Southern Region:** Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka, Mykolayiv'ska, Odeska and Kherson'ska oblasts.

**The Eastern Region:** Donetsk, Luhanska and Kharkiv'ska oblasts.

### Oblasts' Distribution among Macroregions of Ukraine

Firstly, the large sample size lets us study not only people's perception of the corruption issue but also their actual experience of corruption encounters.

Secondly, our survey sample is created in the way that it allows us to analyze the data not only on the level of Ukraine as a whole but also on the level of every single oblast and Kyiv city.

Thirdly, the use of comparative methodology and instruments helps us follow the changes or ten-

dencies in Ukrainians' perception or experience of corruption over the period of 2007–2015.

Considering the fact that in this research corruption was defined as a phenomenon characteristic of the public sector only and the fact that state institutions of Ukraine cannot function on the temporarily occupied territories today, the 2015 survey was conducted only on the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine.


# 1. PERCEPTIONS OF KEY PROBLEMS

Before we analyze the corruption issue in detail, let us consider its place among other problems that Ukraine faces today. Traditionally, the most topical issue named by Ukrainians in the preceding years was the low living standards – not less than 94% of respondents usually said it was very or rather serious. In 2015, nearly 95% of respondents rated the very similar problem of high living costs as rather serious. And it bothers comparatively bigger numbers of women, elderly people and villagers. But now the problem of high living costs has predictably ceded leadership to the war issue, which has touched almost everyone (97% of adults consider it serious) with no significant differences between socio-demographic groups (Graph 1.1). Taking into account the noticeable change in the environment compared to 2011, the list of suggested problems was also changed significantly, so we are not giving any comparative data here.

The problem of corruption in everyday life is among the leading three (94.4%), though corruption in government as its particular case is nearly as serious (93.8%). The other issues rated as rather serious by over 90% of respondents are the following:

- high cost of medical services (94.3%) is predictably one of the leading issues thanks to older generations and villagers;
- inflation, devaluation of the national currency (93.4%) is ranked similarly in various population groups,
- unemployment (93.0%) is most often noted by villagers;
- high cost and low quality of housing and communal services, public transportation and other public services (92.8%) bother the whole country in the same way.

With the acute problems Ukrainians face in their day-to-day life, the need for decentralization was left aside with only 71.9% of respondents ranking it as serious.



Q: How serious are the following problems in Ukraine today?

Graph 1.1. Severity of Problems

## 2. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT

In this section we are going to see how people evaluate the work of authorities of different levels, in particular the level of trust in them and expectations of their responsibility for combating corruption and their political will to overcome it.

### TRUST IN GOVERNMENT


Trust in authorities forms the basis for any reforms. In its turn, this trust itself depends on many

factors: perception of government efficiency, evidence of economic growth, governing effectiveness, how open and transparent officials' activity is and, among other things, perception of corruption and the actual experience of corruption encounters.

After the events of 2014–2015, we can see decreasing levels of trust in authorities at all levels compared to 2011 which may be due to citizens' unmet expectations of drastic changes in the country (Graph 2.1).



Graph 2.1. Trust in Government



Graph 2.2. Trust in Government (by region)

The Ukrainian public does not tend to trust government institutions. Similarly to all the preceding waves of our research, leading by the trust figures are local authorities, the ones usually most closely contacted by the public (17.6% of respondents rather trust local authorities compared to 20.1% in 2011). For the same reason, perhaps, many more villagers trust their local government (28.3% compared to 11.8% of urban residents) and more elderly women have trust in their local authorities.

Second is the President with his administration, but this power is trusted by little more than 10% of respondents (President Yanukovich was trusted by 14.0% in 2011). The President is supported by

people over 60 (12.5% have trust in him), who tend to trust all traditional bodies of power.

Also at the top is the Security Service of Ukraine (7.7% of trust), which has lead a more public activity over the past year. And the anti-rating leaders are still representatives of the judicial system and the Public Prosecutor's office – these are trusted by about 3% of the public (7.0% in 2011). Top officials of Verkhovna Rada have not gone too far from them (5.0% compared to 7.7% in 2011) – and neither have those from the Cabinet of Ministers (5.9% compared to 9.2% in 2011).

Unfortunately, the newly made bodies like the Lustration Committee and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau have not become leaders in this public





trust rating (they are trusted by 7.0%). However, it is comforting that – unlike traditional bodies of power – all these new structures enjoy more trust from younger generations (those under 30). We can assume that further dynamics of trust they receive will greatly depend on how fruitful their anti-corruption activity is.


Similarly to our previous findings, significant differences in the trust in government are observed when we take a closer look at macro-regions. Local authorities invariably enjoy the most trust in western oblasts. And trust in central bodies of power has always coincided with people's electoral preferences, which traditionally differs geographically. So, today public trust in the President and the Cabinet of Ministers is the lowest in the eastern region – in contrast to 2011, when V. Yanukovych was President (Graph 2.2).

## RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

Graph 2.3 shows that, despite the generally low level of trust in governmental institutions, the

Ukrainian public still sees the highest bodies of power as the ones most responsible for addressing corruption. Like in all the monitoring years, most respondents of 2015 place the main responsibility for combating corruption on the President of Ukraine (60.6%), Verkhovna Rada (41.7%) and the Cabinet of Ministers (37.7%). Among the law enforcement bodies and specialized agencies, people name militsiya and special law enforcement structures (29.7%) placing much less responsibility on the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (16.0%), the Committee for Prevention of Corruption (13.0%), the Public Prosecutor's office (10.8%), the Security Service of Ukraine (9.7%), courts (8.3%) etc.

It is remarkable that the rate of the public placing the responsibility for combating corruption on simple people is steadily growing (from 15.8% in 2007 to 18.0% in 2011 and 24.0% in 2015) but this combat seems rather spontaneous as non-governmental and public organizations and volunteer movements popular nowadays are at the bottom of the list (1.4% and 0.5% respectively). Higher levels



of public awareness is seen in younger generations (under 45) and women show a more conscious position even in the oldest age group, while aging men tend to place responsibility on someone else but not citizens themselves (Graph 2.4).

## THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION


Considering the main branches of power in Ukraine, it is worth noting in the first place that not more than 14% of the population notice government representatives' political will to overcome corruption – and this proportion is somewhat smaller for each suggested level and branch of power than back in 2011. The strongest willingness to combat corruption is demonstrated by local authorities (13.2%) and the President (12.3%). Such willingness of representatives of Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, and oblast government bodies is seen by 6–8% of people. Similarly to our earlier findings, the judicial system is trailing behind – its anti-corruption activity is visible only to 3.8% of respondents (Graph 2.5).

Besides the main government institutions, respondents were offered to estimate if representatives of budget institutions that are the most corrupt in their traditional perception are willing to combat corruption. As we can see, of the entire suggested list, the most willing to overcome corruption are military privates – 59.4% of respondents observe such a will in them. Interestingly, only 10.2% of respondents see the willingness to change the situation in military authorities. It should be noted that the issue of corruption in the Ukrainian army is rather topical now due to the military operation in Donbas. Among the other sectors suggested for evaluation, people note the new police with 37.9% of adults believing in their willingness to combat corruption. And, as we see, little trusted is the willingness of representatives of the other sectors we named to overcome corruption in their fields – with education receiving 11.3%, health care getting 9.7%, the Public Prosecutor's office trusted by 4.3% and the traditional militsiya left with 3.9% (Graph 2.6)



Q: Do you think [NAME THE BODY OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT] is willing to overcome corruption in Ukraine?

**Graph 2.5. Willingness to Overcome Corruption**



Q: Do you think [NAME THE BODY OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT] is willing to overcome corruption in Ukraine?


**Graph 2.6. Willingness to Overcome Corruption**

# 3. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

The overwhelming majority of people have their own view on the situation in various sectors whether they personally have contact with those sectors or not because their perception is formed not only by their own experience but also based on the information spread by the media or people's family or friends. Thus, even with no factual proof, such information largely forms people's perception of how serious the corruption issue is and how effectively the government addresses it.

## SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON CASES OF CORRUPTION

Over the years of our research, there have been stable trends in the structure of corruption-related information sources Ukrainians use. Similarly to our earlier findings, the leading supplier of information about corruption is mass media with traditional broadcast media leading in the sector – up to 30% of respondents receive information about corruption from television and radio. Another major source of such information is still informal communication –



Q: From what sources do you mostly receive information about cases of corruption?

Graph 3.1. Major Sources of Information about Corruption

## ▼ PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

about one quarter of respondents (23.8%) learn about cases of bribery from their family or friends. Print media continue losing their impact – their audience comprising a quarter (25.2%) of the population in 2007 decreased to one fifth (21.6%) in 2011 and then to one sixth (16.0%) in 2015 (Graph 3.1).

The only source of information about corruptors' activity that has significantly gained audience over the period of our research is the Internet. Though the proportion of Ukrainians learning about corruption encounters from the worldwide web had been growing before, it has nearly tripled since 2011 increasing from 4.4% to 12.4% (of which 7.2% are readers of news sites and blogs and the remaining 5.2% are users of social networks like Vkontakte, Facebook, Twitter etc.). Predictably, different media have different user structures. Thus,


print media are mostly supported by older readers, while younger people tend to rely on the Internet.

Government representatives are failing to win more attention with speeches devoted directly to the problem of corruption. Their audience does not exceed 8% of adults.

## LEADING CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

People's views on the leading causes of corruption have proved to be stable over the years. It is difficult to single out one deciding factor leading to corruption in Ukraine. Instead, it rather results from a cumulative influence of a series of factors – and the leading ones are shown in Graph 3.2.

Most often, rated as leading in corruption development was officials' desire to use public office for personal gain (19.7%). There they are helped by the



## ▼ CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE

top governing officials of the country unwilling to address corruption (12.9%) and people themselves being used to solving their problems in such a way (11.8%).

Insufficient inner control in the bodies of power was noted by 11.7% of respondents and about 10% believe that corruption is caused by too complicated and imperfect legislation of Ukraine. The rest of the listed causes were named by less than 9% of respondents.

### CAN CORRUPTION BE JUSTIFIED?


One half (49.8%) of adult Ukrainians admit that they may get involved in corrupt actions for their own gain, that is when it helps them solve their own problem. The proportion of those declaring that corruption practice is totally unacceptable for them equals 37.4% of respondents (Graph 3.3).

Let us take a closer look at the portraits of these two population groups. The tendency to reject corruption even in one's own interest strengthens with age. Women are relatively more tolerant to corrup-

tion – the biggest difference between males and females is seen in the oldest age group (aged 60 and older). In this group, corruption is seen as unacceptable by 42.4% of men and 38.1% of women. Graph 3.4 shows that, similarly to the preceding years, young people tend to make use of corruption contacts for their gain more often.

Corruption is more often justified by those who encounter it most frequently: 55.8% of this year's bribers admit the use of corruption, while among those who have not had such experience over the past year there are 45.3% of such people. Urban residents are more tolerant to corruption relations (51.3% compared to 46.9% of villagers), perhaps, due to wider possibilities of their use.


We also offered our respondents a series of questions helping describe their value orientations (Table 3.1). The most supported by the whole population was the statement about the need to fire corrupt officials from public offices – 94.3% of respondents agree with it.



Q: Do you believe that giving bribery, unofficial services, or gifts can be justified if it is necessary for solving the problem which is important for you?

**Graph 3.3. Can Corruption be Justified If It is Necessary for Solving the Problem Which is Important for You?**





**Graph 3.4. Believe that Corruption is Never Justified**

It is worth noting that within different socio-demographic groups men are significantly more ready for active resistance to corruption. Thus, more men are ready to report corruption encounters that they learn about (48.0% compared to 43.5% of women), and more men are prepared to join collective protests against local corruptors (47.8% compared to 42.1% of women). Similar differences are also seen within age groups: the oldest people are considerably less ready to act as mentioned above. Besides, they are less prone to believe that most people in Ukraine will use corruption contacts when they get a chance.

Let us also consider the abovementioned factors in terms of tolerating corruption (Graph 3.5).

There are several questions that separate people who tolerate corruption practices from those who do not. Thus, among of people who tend to justify corruption, there are more people believing that most Ukrainians will use corruption contacts if they get a chance. Secondly, they more often believe that one cannot get proper services without extra payment in Ukraine.

Thirdly, they tend to explain their tolerance to corruption by striving for “equality” among public officers and simple people: if the former may break the law, it should not be demanded that the latter observe it either.

In contrast, the ones who are strongly against corruption even for their own gain agree more often than others that responsibility for corrupt actions should be equal for both parties of the deal. They also declare better willingness to uncover corruption actions.

Having compared the response to the last of the questions we mentioned with the actual practice of reporting corruption encounters, we can see that overall only 1.8% of the whole population filed a complaint about corruption, while there are 1.5 times more appellants (2.7%) among those declaring their readiness to complain.

## CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION


The study of 2015 helps evaluate the general perception of how corrupt the society is because some factors and spheres of life may not be equally


**Table 3.1.** People's value orientations concerning corruption: age and gender differences,%

Suggested statements	Gender		Age groups			
	male	female	18–29	30–44	45–59	60+
If state employees' wages are significantly increased, they will not take bribes	36.3	38.5	40.1	37.8	36.1	36.2
Bribery is an integral part of the Ukrainian mentality	67.9	65.6	65.4	67.0	69.3	65.1
All people must follow even those laws that they consider unjust	69.0	69.5	69.2	68.8	68.2	70.6
If you can resolve the issue with the officials, most people in Ukraine try to take advantage of this	73.5	72.1	73.7	74.7	73.9	68.9
I am ready to report cases of corruption that became known to me	48.0	43.5	49.2	49.9	44.8	38.8
Ordinary citizens also have a right not to follow the law, as public officials do	32.3	31.7	31.3	33.0	32.9	30.6
Salaries of public sector employees are so low that they are forced to take informal payments for their services	43.3	43.4	44.6	44.1	44.4	41.0
Anyone who offers a bribe, must bear the same responsibility as the one who takes	68.0	68.0	67.8	69.2	66.5	68.3
I am ready to join collective protests against local people who involved in corruption	47.8	42.1	49.6	50.1	45.7	34.4
I will get nothing I want, like access to medical care or higher education, if I don't pay a bribe for it	59.9	60.4	58.1	61.6	62.8	58.3
Corrupt officials should be voted out of office	94.3	94.3	94.1	94.4	94.2	94.5

important for different people and thus will have different influence on their perception of the situation as a whole. The survey shows that 85.5% of adult Ukrainians estimate the spread of corruption in the society as above average. Only 1.8% of respondents believe that corruption is little spread or that there is none at all (Graph 3.6).

In every research wave, we asked our respondents to evaluate their subjective perception of how corruption spread in Ukraine had changed over the two years preceding the survey. Of course, analyzing their response we cannot claim that it indicates the efficiency of the government's anti-corruption programs – especially considering the circumstanc-






es around the changes in power in the recent period. But we can observe a certain tendency in this perception (Graph 3.7). Thus, since 2009 the rate of people who noted decreasing corruption in the society and those who noticed no change in the situation has been growing. Overall, in 2015 over a half of respondents say that the level of corruption

in the society is not higher than before the Euro-maidan of 2013. At the same time, one third of respondents (34.0%) have noticed an increase in corruption, though they are less numerous than they were in 2009 or 2011.

Besides, in our earlier studies we noticed that there was a reverse relation between the trust in





**Graph 3.8. Perceived Change in Level of Corruption in Ukraine Depending on the Respondents' Political Preferences**


## ▼ CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE

authorities and perception of corruption in the society and that such perception depended on respondents' political preferences (Graph 3.8). Our current research also backs this finding: supporters of the political powers that are currently in office (Petro Poroshenko Bloc, The People's Front) tend to see a positive change in corruption levels more often and note its increase less frequently. At the same time, opposition supporters (The Opposition Bloc, the left-wing powers in opposition) note increasing corruption more often and do not see any decrease in it. Between them is the electorate of other political parties including other participants of the current parliamentary coalition.

## SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

According to our survey findings, perceived corruption in all the branches and bodies of power of all levels has increased compared to 2011 but has not reached the level of 2009 (Graph 3.9). Besides, the hierarchy of corruptors also remains the same: Verkhovna Rada is still leading here (60.6% of respondents note considerable spread of corruption in the parliament); second on the list is the Cabinet of Ministers (54.8%); third is the President with his Administration (46.4%).


Local authorities are traditionally the least corrupt in people's perception (34.3%).



Q: How widespread is corruption in the following levels of government?

**Graph 3.9. Spread of Corruption by Level of Government**





Q: In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in the [NAME THE FIELD]?

Graph 3.10. Spread of Corruption

Similarly to the preceding years, we suggested that respondents evaluate the spread of corruption in various sectors of social life.

The rating of the most corrupt sectors (as seen by the public) is still led by the State Automobile Inspection and the judicial system – both are rated as very corrupt by two thirds of respondents (66.0%). The top five positions of this rating are formed by the same sectors as in the preceding study, but health care is now rated the fifth giving way to militsiya (excluding the SAI) and the Public Prosecutor's office. Another sector that has passed the 50% line is the customs. And the rest of the sectors were ranked as very corrupt by less than a half of respondents.

Only in three sectors out of 20 have we documented a small but statistically significant at the level of  $p = 0.05$  decrease in perceived corruption – these are the abovementioned medical services (from 60.3% to 58.0%), social benefits (from 20.4% to 19.2%) and communal services provided to the public (from 21.4% to 20.2%). This small decrease has helped the last two sectors we mentioned to reach the bottom of the rating.

In most (twelve) sectors we have documented an increase in perceived corruption (Graph 3.10). And there is no sector where corruption has been decreasing over the years of research. Instead, it increased at least in two sectors every time: business regulations (from 27.6% in 2007 to 37.5% in 2015) and getting loans from state banks (from 15.5% to 22.2%).

The most significant increase in corruption is observed in such sectors as the Public Prosecutor's office (from 51.1% to 62.4%) and customs (from 42.1% to 53.0%). Considering the fact that these sectors are traditionally contacted by a very small rate of people (under 3.5% – see the next section), we can assume that such an image was formed by information sources packing their daily digests in

July and August with corruption scandals involving the Public Prosecutor's office and customs.

Deserving special attention is the situation with military enlistment bodies. The negative changes in their image are apparently connected with the situation in the east of Ukraine. Numerous enlistment waves and continuous media reports about attempts and ways to avoid the draft may have led to over one third of the population (36.6% compared to 27.2% in 2011) being convinced of extreme corruption in military registration and enlistment offices today.

Besides the abovementioned sectors, higher levels perceived corruption are observed among school principals and teachers (26.8% compared to 18.7% in 2011), institutions responsible for registration and privatization of real estate (38.7% compared to 33.5%), the tax service (47.2% compared to 42.0%), and state notaries (30.5% compared to 26.8%).

Perceived corruption in the remaining five sectors that we have studied is on the same level as it was in 2011.

Our latest research shows that people who were usually critical of anti-corruption activity of the government still notice and value its efforts in addressing corruption. The greatest intensification in anti-corruption measures is observed in military registration and enlistment offices (7.9 p.p.<sup>1</sup>). Overall, despite the increase in perceived corruption in the six sectors including the State Automobile Inspection, the judicial system, militsiya (excluding the SAI), the Public Prosecutor's office, customs and military enlistment bodies, people also note more active anti-corruption work of the government there. On the other hand, this work has become more effective in the SAI only, while at the Public Prosecutor's office and customs it has become significantly less efficient.

The rate of people noticing the anti-corruption activity of the government remains quite

1 Percentage points (p.p.) demonstrate the difference between the percentage figures of the same index measured in different periods of time.

## ▼ PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

**Table 3.2.** Dynamics of perceived corruption and the government's preventive measures with their perceived efficiency\*  
(negative changes are highlighted with blue, positive ones are green)

Life sectors	Corruption spread	The government takes action to prevent corruption	The government's measures are effective**
State Auto Inspection (SAI)	(+1.6)	(+2.8)	(+4.4)
Court System	(+5.7)	(+5.7)	(−2.6)
Militsiya (Without SAI)	(+4.0)	(+7.1)	(+0.2)
Prosecutors' Office	(+11.3)	(+7.7)	(−8.2)
Health Care	(−2.3)	(−1.9)	(−2.1)
Bringing Goods Through Customs or Obtaining Customs Permission to Bring Goods	(+10.9)	(+2.7)	(−7.2)
Tax Authorities	(+5.2)	(−0.1)	(+1.5)
Universities and Their Educators	(−0.1)	(−5.9)	(−1.2)
Land Privatization, Ownership, and Use	(−0.7)	(−3.0)	(−9.4)
Governmental Permits (Including Building Permit)	(+0.1)	(−2.6)	(−8.3)
Getting Government Subsidized Housing	(+0.6)	(−2.7)	(−4.3)
Register or Privatize Real Estate (House, Apartment)	(+5.2)	(−3.3)	(−15.0)
Business Regulations and Inspections	(+3.5)	(−1.2)	(+4.4)
Drafting into Army Bodies	(+9.4)	(+7.9)	(+2.8)
Getting a Job at a State or Government Institution	(−0.1)	(−2.1)	(+1.8)
State Notaries	(+3.7)	(−1.1)	(−5.1)
Schools Administration and Teachers	(+8.1)	(−5.0)	(−7.3)
Applying for a Loan to the State Institution	(+4.1)	(−1.8)	(+2.8)
Utilities Installed or Repaired (Phone, Gas, Electricity or Water)	(−1.2)	(−4.2)	(−0.7)
Obtaining Unemployment Aid and Other Social Aid (Pensions, etc.)	(−1.2)	(−1.6)	(+4.1)

\* The table demonstrates the change (with "+" standing for increase and "−" showing decrease) of corresponding figures in 2015 compared to 2011 (only the changes over 2 percentage points are given here; all these changes are statistically significant at the level of  $p = 0.05$ ). The sectors are listed according to perceived corruption as it decreases.

\*\* The proportion of those who believe that the government takes action in the corresponding sector.

small: according to our research findings of 2015, it generally comprises from 4.8% to 30.8% depending on the sector (it was from 6.6% to 28% in 2011, from 7.4% to 29.1% in 2009, and from 8.8% to 27.3% in 2007). The majority of people who heard of such measures (from 45.6% to 81% in 2011) believe that those are effective to a certain extent, which coincides with the findings of our preceding studies. However, its dynamics are very low: we have documented some increase in perceived efficiency within three sectors only (the SAI, business regulation and inspection, and registering for / receiving unemployment benefits and other social payments). Instead, effectiveness has declined in eight cases – and the worst decrease is seen in institutions responsible for registration or privatization of real estate (by 15.0 p.p.). This sector and secondary schools are the only spheres where we have documented significant negative changes in all the three indicators.

Thus, though respondents note some increase in the government's anti-corruption activity, they find it difficult to describe it as generally effective.

The earlier list of major public services was added with the new police. As there is no data for this body to compare, we will analyze it separately. First of all, we should note the high level of uncertainty in people's response to our questions about the police, which can naturally be explained by the fact that it has not started working in all the regions yet. But 11.8% of respondents consider this body very corrupt. It will be fair to mark this group as pessimists because there, the rate of people believing that corruption is widespread in all the other sectors is much higher than the average in the country. At the same time, 30.7% of respondents say there is no corruption in police at all – and this value is the highest in the list of sectors: the closest is applying for or receiving social benefits (22.5%). Nearly a half of respondents (48.6%) have given no answer to this question.

The rate of people aware of anti-corruption measures in police is also one of the biggest (22.9%) and is only smaller than those of the other law enforcement and judiciary representatives (the SAI, militsiya, the judicial system and the State Prosecutor's office). The efficiency of anti-corruption policies in this sector is also seen as one of the highest with 71% considering it effective, which is the third result after applying for social benefits (81.0%) and getting public utilities (73.8%).

In general, we can say that the spread of corruption is not seen uniquely as a result of government inaction, but the lack of government's active public proceedings aimed at overcoming corruption in various sectors contributes to the perception of its spread.


## OVERALL CITIZENS' CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX BY REGION

Citizens' corruption perception indices (CCPI) were calculated based on respondents' answers to the question of how widespread corruption seemed in Ukrainian government bodies and among public officers. The more respondents believed it was widespread in the 20 different services and sectors, the higher mean CCPI was set (with 100 being the highest and 0 standing for the lowest).

The mean CCPI for Ukraine was 39.4 in 2011 and reached 42.8 in 2015. Thus, over 40% of the major sectors and institutions in Ukraine are perceived by its people as too corrupt.

In regions, the most dramatic positive changes are observed in Kirovohradska oblast, which has moved from the first rating position to the last but one since 2011. In four regions (Odeska, Cherkaska, Kyivska oblasts and the Kyiv city) perceived as very corrupt are over a half of the sectors – and all of them demonstrate a negative tendency in time. To estimate the general regional differences, we have used the median<sup>2</sup> indices by oblasts.

2 The median is the middle of a sorted list of values.



Graph 3.11. Citizens' Corruption Perception Index

Overall, the citizens' corruption perception index has increased in sixteen oblasts and in thirteen of them it has grown by 5 points and more. Its decrease has been documented in eight oblasts.

The latest survey findings generally prove the relationships discovered in our earlier studies. They show that perceived corruption (measured with the CCPI) is closely related to a number of factors:

- perceived corruption of the society brings about distrust in the bodies of power of all levels;
- perceived corruption is higher in the eyes of people believing that authorities do not take sufficient measures to overcome corruption;
- those who tend to justify corruption for their own gain are convinced that they are living in a very corrupt society;
- CCPI is higher where people have felt corruption increase since Yanukovich's presidency;
- people's willingness to defend their rights when officials are being unjust strengthens in response to perceived corruption increase in various sectors of social life, among other things;
- people who admit their own corruption experience are more convinced that it is widespread in various sectors meaning that perception of corruption in the society generally depends on people's own experience of corruption – even if they received it in a different sphere;
- perceived corruption is somewhat higher in urban communities, among middle-aged people, and people with higher level of education and income. This is partly explained by the fact that representatives of these socio-demographic groups face corruption relatively more often.

# 4. CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

Unlike perceived corruption, the real spread of this phenomenon is estimated by particular cases of bribery and abuse of power that our respondents report. There are studies<sup>3</sup> demonstrating that perceived corruption is not always connected with actual experience but mostly depends on the informational environment, people's trust in the government or perception of the economic conditions in the country. These findings also show that perceived corruption correlates more with people's trust in the government than their actual experience. Unlike perceived corruption spread, actual experience does not depend on political views or attitudes. So, we have concluded that assessing actual experience of corruption encounters is a more reliable indicator helping reveal the nature, level and dynamics of this phenomenon.

## CITIZENS' TRANSACTIONS WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND SERVICES

Over the whole period of monitoring corruption, there have been no significant changes in peo-


ple's practices related to contacts with authorities or state institutions (Graph 4.1). Traditionally the largest rate of the population deals with state-run health care institutions (67.9%). Also, like it was before, a considerable part of people contact state institutions to apply for or receive social benefits (23.4%), secondary schools (22.5%), organizations providing connection to or repairs of public utilities (18.9%), and the SAI (16.8%).

Each of the remaining institutions has been contacted by not more than 10% of respondents. The rate of households with no need to turn to any of these institutions during a year is also stable amounting to 16%.

Compared to 2011, there has been a considerable increase in the rate of people who turned to state institutions to apply for or receive social benefits – and contacts with military enlistment services have also become more frequent. In contrast, people less rarely turn to the SAI and state institutions dealing with real estate registration / privatization or land privatization / ownership than they used to.

Other institutions are contacted with the same frequency as before.

<sup>3</sup> For example, see Rose, Richard and Mishler, William, *Explaining the Gap between the Experience and Perception of Corruption* (October 25, 2007). Centre for the Study of Public Policy, U. of Aberdeen: Studies in Public Policy No. 432. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2559710>; Nicholas Charron. *Do corruption measures have a perception problem? Assessing the relationship between experiences and perceptions of corruption among citizens and experts.* *European Political Science Review*, available on CJO2015. doi:10.1017/S1755773914000447 and other publications.



Q: Over the past 12 months, have you or your family member dealt with government authorities or with any of the following state institutions, to get the following services?

**Graph 4.1. Citizen Interaction with Government Agencies and Services**




## CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION ENCOUNTERS

It is often more difficult to estimate the spread of corrupt practices because people have no common understanding of what should be considered corruption instances and what is not corruption. So, the rate of people who will report corruption encounters largely depends on how we ask the questions. In our previous studies (in 2007, 2009 and 2011), the rate of people involved in corruption contacts was calculated based on their response to the question “Over the past 12 months, have you or your family members encountered any corruption instances from representatives of state institutions, including educational, health care and other organizations?” and it changed from 67.0% in 2007 to 60.1% in 2011. Instead, in the research of 2015, we measured people’s own perception of corruption encounter frequency with the question “How frequently do you encounter any form of corruption?”


We can state that the general level of corruption in Ukraine remains very high (Graph 4.2). Nearly 2/3 of respondents (65.6%) note that they have had corruption encounters over the past 12 months with one fifth (20.5%) encounter corruption at least every month. As the question did not specify the respondents’ role in such situations (directly participating in them either giving or receiving, witnessing them or dealing with them because of professional activity as an investigator, a journalist etc), the daily encounter estimates may be somewhat exaggerated.

Though we cannot compare these data with our earlier findings directly as the question wording has changed, we can still see that the rate of people who state that they encounter any form of corruption at least once a year is rather close to the rate of people who reported corruption encounters over the preceding 12 months in the previous studies (Graph 4.3).

Indirect estimates show that the rate of people reporting corruption encounters (extortion



Graph 4.2. How Frequently do You Encounter any Form of Corruption?



or their voluntary offers of unofficial payment or services, or their use of personal contacts to settle a case in any of the twenty analyzed sectors over the past 12 months) is usually somewhat larger than that of positive answers to the general question about corruption experiences. Our research findings of 2011 show that 72.4% of respondents reported actual corruption experiences, while in 2015 corruption encounters in the researched sectors were reported by 70.7%. This is to say that the rate of people involved in corruption contacts has somewhat decreased over the past four years (the difference being statistically significant at the level of 1%).


This somewhat exaggerated involvement in corruption is explained by the fact that in three separate sectors (health care services, secondary education and the SAI) it was studied with the help of questions about particular actions. So, we can assume that not all the suggested actions could be taken as corruption instances by some individuals (for instance, collecting money to buy flowers or

gifts for teachers, or purchasing disposable instruments for a medical examination).

We have studied corruption experience in several dimensions, both as extortion and voluntary client-initiated bribery. Analysis of particular corruption forms shows that its small decrease has become possible only due to cut offers from the users of state services. Contributing to this cut could be both the crisis in the country leading to greater people's poverty and their growing public consciousness.

### EXTORTION, VOLUNTARY BRIBES AND USE OF PERSONAL CONNECTIONS (BY SECTOR)

A more detailed analysis of corruption experience by sectors demonstrates variability of our findings. Graph 4.4 shows data on extortion encounters in 20 sectors grouped in two sets depending on how bribery spread has changed there (its occurrence decreasing or increasing compared to 2011) – and within these sets, sectors are ranked



Q: Was a bribe (in the form of a gift, favor, service or money) requested of you or your family member?

**Graph 4.4. Bribes Extorted**  
(percent of respondents who had contacted respective state institutions)

by their actual bribery ratings of 2015 (from highest to lowest).

Overall, the rate of those who have faced extortion at least in one of the 20 researched sectors amounts to 56.8% remaining almost the same as in 2011 (57.1%). Similarly to our earlier findings, most frequently people are asked for unofficial payment when they turn to state-run health care institutions (69% of their actual users), in secondary schools (63.6%), when dealing with militsiya (50.7%), in higher educational institutions (48.7%), when getting permits from governmental institutions (44.1%), and when dealing with the SAI (42.7%).

Over the past four years, there has been a significant decrease in extortion in such sectors as customs – going through customs control or getting customs papers done (from 36.1% to 22.8%), connection to and repairs of public utilities (from 28.2% to 21.7%), contact with military enlistment authorities (from 26.0% to 15.5%), applying for or receiving social benefits (from 8.9% to 5.0%). In all these sectors, decrease in extortion is statistically significant at the level of  $p = 0.05$ .

At the same time in many sectors bribery occurrence has increased significantly since 2011. The biggest growth (by 14.8 p.p., from 6.7% to 21.5%) is seen in the rate of people who faced extortion when trying to get a loan from a state institution. Also statistically significant is increase in bribery occurrence in issues concerning land privatization, ownership and use (from 32.0% to 39.4%), when turning to the judicial system (from 26.3% to 32.9%) and state notaries (from 11.1% to 16.4%).

In most sectors (12 out of the 20 analyzed) – including such problematic ones (in terms of unofficial payment extortion being so common) as state-run health care institutions, schools, higher education institutions, militsiya, the SAI, institutions issuing permits and regulating business activity – the situation with bribery occurrence has remained virtually the same in the past four years.

It should be kept in mind that corruption is usually made possible by both parties. People may

sometimes provoke bribery if it can help them solve their own problems.

According to our survey findings, voluntary bribery is much less common than extortion – and this ratio has increased on average from 2.5 to 2.9 over the last four years.

In contrast to extortion figures, the rate of voluntary bribers continues to decrease: compared to 2011, it has become smaller by 5 p.p. going down from 40.5% in 2011 to 35.6% in 2015 (Graph 4.5).

The most significant decrease in bribe offers has been documented in the following sectors and services: applying for state housing (by 19 p.p., from 29.5% to 10.3%), dealing with representatives of higher education institutions (by 9 p.p., from 25.5% to 16.2%), or in contacts with tax services (by 8 p.p., from 14.0% to 5.6%), the SAI (by 7 p.p., from 30.4% to 23.0%) and militsiya (by 6 p.p., from 20.6% to 14.5%). Also decreased is the rate of voluntary bribes in state-run secondary schools, health care institutions, when getting a job with a state institution, when dealing with military enlistment authorities, in cases of connection to or repairs of public utilities, and when applying for or receiving social benefits.

Compared to 2011, bribe offers have shown a statistically significant increase only in getting loans from state institutions (from 2.2% to 7.9%). As far as the other sectors are concerned, the documented differences are statistically insignificant.


An additional aspect of corrupt behavior is using personal connections, nepotism, and protectionism (cronyism) to receive services. In all our studies, findings show that this form of corrupt actions is less frequent than bribing but is more common than offering a bribe. This is to say that before offering a bribe, people try to find a useful connection in the necessary sphere.

The total of people with a habit of using personal connections to settle their issues has somewhat decreased over the past four years (Graph 4.6). Compared to 2011, making use of personal connections has become much less com-



Q: Did you or your family member offer a bribe (gift, favor, service or money) to obtain the services?

**Graph 4.5. Bribes Given Voluntarily**  
(percent of respondents who had contacted respective state institutions)



mon in contacts with tax services (by 12.6 p.p., from 23.5% to 10.9), military enlistment authorities (by 9.5 p.p., from 22.5% to 13.0%), militsiya (by 7 p.p., from 25.2% to 18.0%), state institutions issuing permits (by 7 p.p., from 30.3% to 23.1%), and representatives of higher education institutions (by 5 p.p., from 20.5% to 15.4%). This indicator has not been studied for three sectors – these are the health care system, secondary education and the SAI.

## CITIZEN VICTIMIZATION BY CORRUPTION

Shown by the findings of our baseline research of 2007 and proved by the following study results (received in 2009, 2011 and 2015) is the fact that the most involved in corruption actions are people aged from 30 to 45 with higher levels of education and wellbeing, which ruins the stereotype of the most vulnerable groups being the most affected (Graphs 4.7–4.9).

The socio-demographic profile of those who have encountered corruption over the past 12 months mostly coincides with the earlier findings. Today, the largest numbers of corruption encounters are documented among middle-aged people (aged 30–44) and people who are better educated and better-off.

Representatives of the 30–44 age group invariably demonstrate the highest index of corruption involvement: our findings of 2015 show that 74.2% of people in this age group encounter corruption at least once a year, 49.2% have bribed someone and 7.9% have received bribe offers over the past 12 months. This is partly caused by the fact that representatives of this age group interact more actively with various state institutions, especially schools and universities: the average number of sectors they interact with amounts to 2.76 in this group, while for those aged 18–29 it is 2.09, among people aged 45–59 it reaches 2.10, and for those aged 60 and older it is 1.55. Nevertheless, even when the number of contacted sectors

is controlled, the relation between the age and the tendency to corruption remains significant, though it is weaker. This is to say that it is more probable for people of younger and middle age to get involved in corruption relations regardless of the number of contacted sectors.

A similar situation is seen in relation to education and welfare factors: when the number of contacted sectors is controlled, the relation between corruption encounters and education and welfare is weaker, but better-off and better-educated people will still have corruption contacts more often than others.


According to our research findings, somewhat more frequent are corruption encounters among urban residents compared to villagers, though the difference is not big: in towns / cities, 67.3% have encountered corruption, 41.1% have offered bribes and 6.4% have received them, while in villages 62.2% reported corruption encounters, 39.8% gave bribes, and 5.4% received bribe offers.

The relation between gender and corruption experience is not explicit. On one hand, men report that they have corruption encounters at least once a year somewhat more often than women: according to our respondents, 66.7% of men and 64.6% of women have had corruption experience. On the other hand, unofficial payments are more frequently given by women (42.0%) compared to men (39.1%).


By occupation, somewhat more often found in corruption situations are self-employed people (76% have experience of corruption contacts at least once a year, 49% have bribed someone and 8% have received bribe offers over the past 12 months) and this frequency is the lowest among pensioners (54% have experience of corruption contacts at least once a year, 32% have bribed someone and 3% have received bribe offers over the past 12 months). Offers of unofficial payment are most often received by workers of state institutions: our survey shows that 11% of state institution workers have been offered a bribe over the





## ▼ CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION




Graph 4.7. Experience with Corruption over Past 12 Month (by age)




Graph 4.8. Experience with Corruption over Past 12 Month (by education attainment)



## CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION



**Graph 4.11. Citizens' Corruption Perception and Experience Indices by Family Income Level**



**Graph 4.12. Citizens' Corruption Perception and Experience Indices by Education Level**

## ▼ CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE

past 12 months. However, corruption encounters generally have a weak relation to occupation – even if one does not get into work-related corruption situations, one may encounter corruption in other fields of their life.


To see the dynamics of perceived corruption and actual corruption encounters within these socio-demographic groups, we used the perceived corruption index and the indices characterizing people's corruption experiences through extortion ('bribe extortion'), on voluntary grounds ('voluntary bribing'), and by using personal connections, which are based on their answers about actual corruption encounters in 17 different sectors (excluding health care, school education and the SAI).

Compared to 2011, perceived corruption has increased in many sectors for representatives of all socio-demographic groups, though respondents' actual experience illustrates the opposite: almost in all the analyzed groups the proportion of corrupt sectors (where people faced bribe extor-


tion, bribed someone voluntarily or used personal connections to settle their issues) has decreased (Graphs 4.10–4.12).

### OVERALL CORRUPTION EXPERIENCE INDICES BY REGION


Based on the survey findings, we calculated the indices summarizing Ukrainians' corruption encounters in 17 state sectors / services. These indices are based on people's answers about actual corruption encounters in 17 various life sectors. First is the *extortion index (CEI-E)* illustrating the spread of bribery initiated by public officials, second is the *voluntary bribing index (CEI-V)* showing how widespread bribe offers made by people who turn to public officials are. Starting from 2009, we have also calculated the *personal connections index (CEI-C)* reflecting the use of personal connections, nepotism or cronyism in contacts with public officials. These indices may range from 0 to 100: the more sectors involved our respondent



Graph 4.13. Corruption Experience Index – Extortion



Graph 4.14. Corruption Experience Index – Voluntary Bribes



Graph 4.15. Corruption Experience Index – Use of Personal Connection

in corruption (as an extortion victim, a briber or a bribe-taker), the higher the index.

The median extortion index (CEI-E) has decreased from 25.3 to 19.5 since 2011 (Graph 4.13). This means that while four years ago every fourth contact with an official was connected with bribe extortion, now it is every fifth. On average, bribe extortion is somewhat less common in the Western region (18.1) compared to the Southern (21.7), the Central (23.7) and the Eastern (26.4). Viewed by oblasts, bribe extortion less frequently occurs in Chernihivska (4.9), Poltavska (6.9), Luhanska (7.2), Rivnenska (11.5), Ivano-Frankivska (11.8), Zaporizka (13.6), Ternopil'ska (13.8), Volyn'ska (16.0), and Lviv'ska (16.1) oblasts. The highest rates of extortion occurring in interaction with public officials are documented in Donetsk (46.1), Sumska (43.2), Kyiv'ska (34.4) and Zakarpatska oblasts (31.8).


Our findings of 2015 illustrate the ongoing trend of decreasing bribe offers (Graph 4.14). Compared to 2011, people have reduced voluntary offers of unofficial payment by half: the median voluntary bribing index (CEI-V) has dropped from 8.2 to 4.4. Viewed by regions, bribe offers are somewhat less frequent in Western (4.1) and Southern (4.1) regions than in the Eastern (9.2) and the Central (10.1) regions of Ukraine. Viewed by oblasts, over the past 12 months bribes have been offered least frequently in Kirovohradska (0.3), Zakarpatska (0.7), Poltav'ska (0.9), Mykolayiv'ska (1.0), Luhanska (1.7), Kherson'ska (2.3), Volyn'ska (2.4), Ivano-Frankiv'ska (2.5), and Zaporizka (2.5) oblasts. The highest occurrence of bribe offers from people themselves is documented in Sumska (32.4) and Donetsk (19.5) oblasts.

The third index calculated since 2009 is the *personal connections index (CEI-C)* reflecting the use of personal connections, nepotism or cronyism in contacts with public officials. This index has the same characteristics as the preceding ones. Its median value amounts to 12.3, which is somewhat lower than in 2011 (Graph 4.15). Similarly to

our earlier findings, this index values are somewhere between CEI-E and CEI-V, meaning that Ukrainians resort to personal connections more often than face extortion but less frequently than offer a bribe voluntarily. Viewed by regions, the personal connections index (CEI-C) is highest in the Western region of Ukraine (14.2), while it is somewhat lower in the Southern (13.3) and the Central (13.6) regions, being the lowest in the Eastern region (8.7). Viewed by oblasts, the top three are Sumska (37.9), Chernivetska (21.5) and Khmelnytska (19.9) oblasts.

The relation between CEI-E, CEI-V, CEI-C and some other figures discovered in the first baseline research of 2007 and supported by findings of our later studies remains in our survey results of 2015 (Graph 4.16):

- Despite some fluctuations, people always perceive corruption occurrence in state institutions as significantly higher than it is when they face it personally dealing with state services. This is to say that perceived corruption index is always higher than any corruption encounter index.
- The highest of all the corruption encounter indices in Ukraine is always the extortion index (CEI-E) and the lowest is the voluntary bribing index (CEI-V). And the personal connections index (CEI-C) is always between these two. Thus, most often a corruption instance is provoked by a public official – and when there is no direct extortion, Ukrainians try to find a useful connection before they directly offer a bribe.
- More encounters with all the three kinds of corruption are experienced by urban residents compared to villagers.
- People with higher CEI-E will more likely believe that government's anti-corruption actions are insufficient.
- The level of trust in the bodies of power is lower among people who faced extortion in state institutions (and have a higher CEI-E index).



- The highest CEI-V and CEI-C indices are among people justifying corruption for their own gain.

So, despite the perceived growth in corruption occurrence, the rate of people personally facing extortion has somewhat decreased compared to 2011. Voluntary bribing also continues to decrease. And in comparison with 2011, there are also fewer cases of using personal connections to settle issues with public officials. It is worth noting that voluntary bribe offers are the only form of corruption in the Ukrainian society that remains on the same level in all our studies. Even in 2009–2011, when we documented growth in the other two forms of corruption (extortion and the use of personal connections), bribe offers didn't occur more frequently.



## CORRUPTION WITHIN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM

According to our research findings, the state-run health care system has always led by the num-

ber of people seeking its services: its institutions are annually visited by over two thirds of adults or their family members. And over the years of our research, there has been no significant improvement in corruption practices there. Like it was before, over a half of respondents (59.8%) admit that they participated in some corruption acts when receiving healthcare services:

- Over a half (57.1%) of visitors to polyclinics and hospitals were made to buy medicines or medical instruments to receive the services. 22.4% of respondents did it by their own will (in 2011, these groups constituted 55.5% and 25.9% respectively).
- 55.1% of respondents were forced to make 'donations' for equipment purchase and 13.8% made them voluntarily (52.4% and 16.2% in 2011).
- 38.4% of respondents were demanded to compensate for medical services of the polyclinic / hospital with their free service or an unof-







ficial payment; 13.3% did it by their own will (35.1% and 13.5% in 2011).

Graphs 4.17–4.19 reflect the answers of respondents who have turned to state-run health care institutions over the 12 months preceding the interview ( $n$  (2007) = 7 270;  $n$  (2009) = 7 122;  $n$  (2011) = 7 036;  $n$  (2015) = 6 907).

Thus, these results show that extortion occurrence in state-run health care institutions has somewhat increased compared to 2011, while the number of people ready to pay voluntarily has decreased instead. But similarly to our earlier findings, only a small part of respondents resisted bribe extortion (under 4.5%). On the whole, our research findings including the latest one repeatedly proved the fact that corruption in state-run health care is widespread and deep-rooted. Paying extra money for services that are supposed to be provided by the state free of charge has long been a usual thing.

Compared to 2011, the preferences of state-run healthcare institution patients concerning





measures that should be taken to reduce corruption in this sector have started to change slightly. Though people still vote for a combination of stimulating and punishing actions, their inclination to punishment is growing now and their support for additional funding is decreasing. Thus, topping the list is increased responsibility of healthcare workers for corrupt actions including firing those found guilty of corruption (43.7%) and more severe administrative and criminal punishment for corruption (40.2%). Following these two is increased funding for health care, that is giving extra budget money to this sector (42.6%) and bigger salaries for healthcare workers (39.1%). This means that people feel less and less sympathy to those employed in health care and insist more and more often that healthcare employees should bear responsibility for corrupt actions.

Also, compared to the preceding years, the proportion of those who are ready to pay for medical services officially, 'at a pay desk', has grown larger (from 19.8% in 2011 to 27.4% in 2015).

And the proportion of those who believe that corruption can be overcome by improving doctors' professionalism has remained nearly the same over the years of our research – in 2015 it amounts to 29.5%.

Introduction of health insurance is still supported by less than a quarter of visitors to state-run healthcare institutions (23.5%).

## CORRUPTION IN SCHOOLS

Questions about corruption in institutions of secondary education were asked to respondents who have school-going children, that is about 22.5% of all our respondents. According to our survey findings, the most typical corruption practices related to receiving services from state-run secondary schools have remained unchanged over the whole monitoring period:

- contributing to a school / class fund: 56.1% faced extortion, 31.6% did this voluntarily;

- paying for classroom repair / remodeling (apart from the class fund): 56.3% faced extortion, 30.7% did this voluntarily;
- collecting money to buy flowers or gifts for teachers: 36.6% faced extortion, a 44.4% did this voluntarily.

Graphs 4.21–4.28 show the response of those who have school-going children ( $n$  (2007) = 2 497;  $n$  (2009) = 2 403;  $n$  (2011) = 2 355;  $n$  (2015) = 2 288).

The rate of parents who voluntarily or forcedly give money to have the classroom repaired or to the school fund in general (the so-called school and class funds) is not changing reaching numbers over 85%. People still practice collecting money to buy flowers or gifts for teachers but those are completely voluntary, not forced.


At the same time, compared to the preceding years, many corruption practices in school education tend to spread even more.

Since 2011, there has been an increase in the rate of parents who had to act dishonestly to have their child accepted to the school of their choice: the rate of parents who voluntarily paid to have their child admitted to school has risen from 3.9% to 5.9% and the rate of those who faced extortion at admission has grown from 13.8% to 15.6%.


In addition, larger rate of people agree to pay for better marks for their children and more parents are forced to buy tutor services right in school now. Like in our earlier studies, very rarely do parents resort to unofficial payments to ensure better examination marks for their children or distinction at graduation. To some extent, this may have been achieved with the Independent External Testing.

It should be noted that respondents themselves do not take most of such actions as examples of corruption because these are common and widespread things in the Ukrainian society seen as helping the school (and most are underfunded) or thanking the teachers.


What steps do parents see as the most effective to decrease the level of corruption in schools? Is this




Graph 4.21. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to pay unofficial fees for admission to educational institution of state and municipal property?




Graph 4.22. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to pay for positive state final examination?




Graph 4.23. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to pay for receiving golden or silver medal (medal redemption)?




Graph 4.24. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to deliver money into school or class funds?




Graph 4.25. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to pay for class repair (separately from school fund)?




Graph 4.26. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to pay for „better” marks for the child?



Graph 4.27. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to deliver money for flowers or gifts for teachers?



Graph 4.28. Did you or your family members face the necessity with past 12 months to pay for „forced tutoring”, which child’s marks are understated knowingly in order to induce attending extra classes?



**Graph 4.29. Steps to Reduce Corruption in Schools**

view changing? Similarly to the healthcare sector, most parents consider teacher's pay raise (54.2%) and improved funding for education (48.4%) as efficient means of overcoming corruption in secondary schools (Graph 4.29). And the fact that there are more people favoring direct payment to teachers and not the sector as a whole may also serve as a kind of indicator of corruption perception. But again, similarly to health care, since 2011 people have become more supportive of punishing corrupt educators: 44.3% of parents voted for more severe

administrative and criminal punishment for corruption (compared to 36.0% in 2011) and 43.8% of interviewed parents are for firing those found guilty of corruption with further ban on their professional activity (compared to 35.2% in 2011).

Besides, just like before, about one third of parents (33.8%) tend to think that corruption in education can be overcome by improving teachers' professional level. The least supported is such measure as introducing official payment for all services at a pay desk (19.4%).

## CORRUPTION WITHIN THE STATE AUTO INSPECTION (SAI) AGENCY

The rate of respondents who have had contacts with SAI representatives over the past 12 months is now below the level of 2007: in 2015, only 16.8% of the interviewed people contacted the SAI (while in 2007 it was 19.7%, in 2009 it amounted to 23.2% and in 2011 it reached 23.7%).

The rate of people who have encountered corruption in this sector has somewhat decreased compared to 2011 but is still significant: according to the data of 2015, 60.0% faced extortion or offered bribes voluntarily (in 2011 it was 67.2%). And this decrease in corruption encounters is not connected so much with the overall occurrence of extortion (45.1% in 2011, 42.7% in 2015, the difference being insignificant at the level of  $p = 0.05$ ) but has to do more with decreasing offers (from 30.4% in 2011 to 23.0% in 2015, the difference being significant at the level of  $p = 0.01$ ).

Like it was before, the most typical corruption practice with the SAI is unofficial payment to the contacted SAI worker after violating traffic rules. Over the past year, 43.4% have faced exaction of such unofficial payment (46.3% in 2011) and 36.8% paid the money (41.9% in 2011), while 6.6% refused to do so, though they were being forced (4.4% in 2011). The percentage of bribery-initiating users continues to decline reaching 18.9% in 2015 (in 2011 it was 20.5, in 2009 it amounted to 23.2%, and in 2007 it increased to 24.8%).

Compared to 2011, there has been a decrease in corruption occurrence (including both extortion and voluntary bribes) in situations with issuing driving licenses: the rate of bribe exacting cases has decreased from 20.2% to 17.2% and voluntary bribes have shrunk from 11.2% to 6.5%.

Also, when having technical inspection for their vehicles, people face less extortion, which has decreased from 28.8% to 19.8% and offer unofficial payment less frequently (decreased from 19.3% to 8.5%).


Other changes are insignificant. Similarly to our earlier findings, about 13% of automobile owners are forced to pay unofficially when registering their vehicle. Another 11% face demands to pay for fake accident examination results.

Though the rate of people who resist bribe demands is still small (6.6% at best), it is also growing.


Overall, despite certain positive changes, corruption in the SAI remains widespread and typical – and very often it is supported both by SAI workers and by drivers themselves.

Graphs 4.30–4.34 reflect the answers of our respondents who have had contact with SAI workers over the past 12 months preceding the interview ( $n$  (2007) = 2 087;  $n$  (2009) = 2 451;  $n$  (2011) = 2 522;  $n$  (2015) = 1 707).


Unlike such budget sectors as health care and education, people are not so sympathetic with SAI workers, so they suggest addressing the issue with punishing actions.









Graph 4.31. Within past 12 months did you or your family have to pay unofficially for passing technical examination of the car?




Graph 4.32. Within past 12 months did you or your family have to pay unofficially for registering (re-registering) car permission?



Graph 4.33. Within past 12 months did you or your family have to pay unofficially for conducting „correct” examination at the accident?



Graph 4.34. Within past 12 months did you or your family have to pay unofficially to SAI worker when you violated traffic rules?



Q: In your opinion, which steps should be taken in order to overcome corruption in the system of state auto inspection?

**Graph 4.35. Steps to Reduce Corruption at SAI**

Just like in the preceding studies, people see the main steps to overcome corruption in the SAI in such actions as firing those found guilty of corruption with further ban on professional activity (68.9%) and imposing more severe administrative and criminal responsibility for corruption (59.3%). Besides, drivers suggest paying more attention to

selection of candidates to SAI (48.3%). And, like in our earlier findings, the fewest respondents support introducing 100% official payment for all services at a pay desk (27.1%) and raising simple SAI worker salaries (25.3%). Overall, the hierarchy of the suggestions people support remains nearly the same (Graph 4.35).

# 5. CITIZEN RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION

## FILING COMPLAINTS AND STANDING UP FOR ONE'S RIGHTS

The rate of people complaining about official's corrupt behavior remains very insignificant, though it changes a little from year to year (Graph 5.1). Over the 12 months preceding our latest study, only 1.8% of people had tried to file a formal complaint against officials' actions. According to our earlier studies, the rate of people filing complaints ranged from 2.7% (2009) to 4.4% (2011). Thus, the practice of filing complaints about corruption to government or law enforcement institutions remains little spread. The reasons for non-complaining are also the same: most often respondents see it as a waste of time (34.6%) and another 17% do not consider it to be necessary. But compared to the preceding years, the rate of people who believe it is no use complaining has decreased by nearly 20 p.p. – instead, now there are more people who cannot explain why they did not complain.


Readiness to stand up for one's own rights when confronting officials is declared by one third of the adult population of Ukraine (36.7%). Compared to the preceding years, this figure remains nearly the same as in 2007–2011 the rate of people willing to counteract corruptors ranged from 33.2% to 35.9%. On the other hand, the rate of respondents who say they are certainly not ready to protect their rights has decreased from 33–34% in 2007–2011 to 22.8% in 2015. This means that something is changing in people's minds, though rather slowly.

The social portrait of a corruption fighter has not changed over the years of our research. Readiness to counteract corruptors is most often reported by men, younger people, those who have higher

education and better wealth. It should be reminded that these are the groups which usually demonstrate the highest indices of perceived corruption and corruption encounters. This verifies the conclusion of our earlier studies stating that the more one suffers from corruption, the better readiness to combat corruption one demonstrates.

Compared to the preceding years, there has been a significant increase in the number of people who are ready for certain actions if an official violates their rights in an outright manner (Graph 5.3). Thus, the rate of people who are ready to demand that the official do their duties at least has risen from 26.7% to 34.6%, the rate of those who are ready to complain about the official to their management has increased from 22.9% to 30.7%, the rate of those who are ready to turn to law enforcement institutions or take such cases to court has grown from 17.6% to 22.2%, and the rate of those who are ready to seek support from NGO's has increased from 6.6% to 10.4%. The rate of people who are not going to take any action when their rights are violated has shrunk from 32.9% to 19.2%. Also, the rate of people who are ready to 'settle the issue with the official' thus initiating corruption in such cases has decreased from 7.1% to 4.1%. So, compared to the preceding years, people demonstrate a higher level of conscious need to protect their rights and counteract officials' corruption.

The main reason for people not to act when facing corruption is still being unsure that they can succeed in these actions, though compared to the preceding years such moods are not so grave. Our data of 2015 shows that this opinion is supported




Q: What is the main reason why you did not complain for cases related to a corruption case?

**Graph 5.1. Reasons for not Complaining about Corruption Experience**

by about a half (50.3%) of those who are not ready to take any action to stand up for their rights, while in 2011 there were 67.2% of such people. Instead, the rate of people unprepared to take any action because it will involve additional costs (including transportation, telephone or postal services) has increased from 6.4% to 14.3%, and the rate

of those unwilling to spend their time on it has grown from 6.6% to 9.1%. The other reasons show nearly the same figures as back in 2011: about 8% are not ready to stand for their rights because they feel it is unpleasant or humiliating, 6% do not know where to take the case, 5% are afraid to be punished or blacklisted.




Graph 5.2. Citizens Believe They are Ready to Stand for Their Rights

## EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS

Our research shows that compared to 2011 people's awareness of anti-corruption actions taken by various organizations have somewhat increased (Graphs 5.4–5.5). Over the past 12 months, people have heard most often about the anti-corruption steps or campaigns run by mass media (these figures have increased from 30.2% in 2011 to 38.2% in 2015). As far as government institutions are concerned, the most noticeable is the anti-corruption activity of the Lustration Committee (32.0% have heard of some steps taken), the President (32.0%), Verkhovna Rada (27.3%), and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (25.3%). About

20% of people have heard of the anti-corruption activity of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Corruption Prevention Committee. And, compared to 2011, the rate of those who have heard of some anti-corruption steps or campaigns carried out by NGOs has increased twice (from 11.1% to 22.1%).

Thus, we can see growing informational activity in combating corruption. But most people still tend to consider this activity not very effective. People think that the most efficient are actions taken by mass media (in 2015, 27.2% rate them as effective, which is more than in 2011 by 12 p.p.) and NGOs (in 2015, 27.9% rate them as effective, which is 14 p.p. more than four years ago). The effectiveness rating





Q: In what way are you ready to act when state official rough violates your rights?

**Graph 5.3. Measures You Would Take to Stand for Your Rights**


of actions taken by other organizations remains the same ranging from 5.1% (the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) to 12.2% (the Lustration Committee).

People are convinced that parliamentary immunity is the cornerstone impeding effective anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine. The suggestion to eliminate this practice always tops the

rating of preconditions necessary to overcome corruption (Graph 5.6). Though the rate of the population believing in the efficiency of this step is somewhat decreasing, it is still dominating (27.4% of people say this is the first step to be taken and 51% of respondents name it among the top three measures).







Q: In your opinion, which of the following measures are likely to be most effective in fighting and preventing corruption?

**Graph 5.6. Measures that are Most Likely to be Effective in Fighting Corruption**

The order and frequency of other steps in the rating remain the same. After eliminating parliamentary immunity, people suggest introducing more severe punishment for corruptors, that is to strengthen criminal responsibility for corruption (17.5% mention it as the first step and 48.4% name it among the top three measures) and fire corruptors with further ban on professional activity in

public offices (13.5% mention it as the first step and 48.7% name it among the top three measures).

Thus, our survey findings show that lately Ukrainians have become more supportive of severe measures against corruptors – and this refers both to the methods of addressing corruption in particular life spheres and eliminating this shameful phenomenon in our society in general.