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Press releases and reports
Socio-political moods of the population of Ukraine: results of a survey conducted on July 16-31, 2026
The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi,executive director of KIIS
During July 16-31, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted an all-Ukrainian public opinion survey. The survey was conducted using a mixed-mode method: half of the respondents were interviewed using computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI), and half were interviewed using face-to-face interviews using tablets. Telephone interviews were conducted using a database of randomly generated mobile numbers. Interviewers then called the mobile numbers and invited citizens to participate in the survey (if they were living in the territory controlled by Ukraine at the time of the interview and were 18 years old). No additional quotas were applied, and the final array was statistically weighted. Personal interviews were conducted on the basis of a stratified three-stage random sample with quota selection at the last stage. The sample was developed only for the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine. Initially, the sample was stratified by oblast and urban/rural area (the division into urban/rural area was carried out on the basis of the averaged share of citizens who reported living in a village based on the results of telephone surveys by KIIS in 2026 (based on a random sample). Then, at the first stage, polling stations were randomly selected within the stratum (a total of 90 polling stations in 54 different settlements were selected). In the second stage, the starting address was selected within the station, and in the third stage, citizens were selected according to the gender-age task. The final array was also weighted to be fully equivalent in these dimensions to the array of telephone interviews. In both surveys, the planned sample size was 900 respondents, of which 300 were from Kyiv city. For the analysis, the “weight” of Kyiv city was adjusted to the statistics during the statistical weighting of each of the arrays. In total, 1,808 interviews were conducted within the framework of the research, of which 905 were telephone interviews (including 305 with those currently living in Kyiv city), 903 were personal interviews (including 302 with those currently living in Kyiv city). Formally, for normal circumstances, the statistical error of the sample (with a probability of 0.95 and a design effect of 1.3 and taking into account the sample structure with additional interviews in Kyiv city) does not exceed 3.5% for a sample of 1,808 respondents (full sample) and 4.9% for a sample of about 900 respondents (separate telephone interviews and individual personal interviews). Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS. In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population. In the appendix you can find the results separately for telephone interviews and for personal interviews. We also note that the calculations in the press release are rounded to integer values. In some cases, the sum of % may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding (the same applies to the calculation of the balance of trust-distrust).
Who will win the warThe absolute majority of Ukrainians – 82% – believe that Ukraine will ultimately win the war, but of those who are completely convinced of this – 59% (the remaining 23% rather think that Ukraine will win.) Only 3% think that Russia will win, and another 16% could not decide on their opinion. In February 2024, according to the results of a KIIS survey, 89% believed in victory, and of those, 60% believed completely [1].
Graph 1. How do you feel, will Ukraine or Russia ultimately win the war?
In whose favour is the situation on the battlefieldOnly 7% believe that the situation on the battlefield is developing in Russia’s favour. Instead, 39% believe that Ukraine has the advantage. At the same time, more than half of Ukrainians either believe that neither side has an advantage (32%) or could not decide on their answer (22%). In February 2024, when we asked a similar question, 15% believed that the situation was developing in favour of Russia, 24% in favour of Ukraine. Another 47% said that neither side had an advantage (and 14% were undecided) [2].
Graph 2. And if to evaluate the current situation on the battlefield in these weeks, then in your opinion it is developing in favor of …
Expectations when might the war endOnly 22% of Ukrainians expect the war to end at least by the end of 2026. Another 13% say about the first half of 2027, and 39% believe the war will end in the second half of 2027 or later. In addition, a significant share (26%) were unable to answer the question (which adds to the fact that only a minority have expectations of the war ending in the near future).
Graph 3. In your opinion, when might the war end?
Level of optimism about the future of UkraineMost Ukrainians (63%) remain optimistic and believe that in 10 years Ukraine will be an EU member with a thriving economy. At the same time, almost one in four (23%) has pessimistic views and rather sees the country as destroyed. Another 14% have undecided views on this issue. The last time KIIS asked this question was in April 2026, and then 63% were optimists and 25% were pessimists [3].
Graph 4. And how do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years? During the survey, we read the names of ten public figures to respondents, as well as brief information about them. Below, graph 5 shows the results of how much they are trusted overall and how much they are not trusted. At the same time, the following graph provides a breakdown, showing the percentages of “completely” and “rather” trust / do not trust. So, the highest trust indicators have V. Zaluzhnyi (66% trust, 24% do not trust, balance – +42%), M. Fedorov (63% trust, 16% do not trust, balance – +46%)and K.Budanov (61% trust, 22% do not trust, balance – +39%). V. Zelenskyy is trusted by 56%, distrusted by 38%, balance – +18%. Next are I. Terekhov (47% trust, 19% do not trust, balance – +29%) and A. Biletskyi (37% trust, 13% do not trust, balance – +24%). Moreover, in both cases, many people do not know them (23% do not know I. Terekhov, and 40% do not know A. Biletskyi).
Graph 5. I will read their names, and you tell how much you trust them? Sorted by % trust Other figures have worse trust indicators and, in particular, their balance is negative (i.e. they are distrusted more than they are trusted) (S. Prytula, D. Razumkov, O. Honcharenko and P. Poroshenko). The relatively lowest trust in this list is for P. Poroshenko, who is trusted by 20%, distrusted by 76% (balance – -56%). The graph below shows trust broken down into “completely” and “rather” trust/do not trust. It is important to note that in the case of all top figures, about half (or even a minority) of those who trust them are those who “rather” trust, not “completely”. In this context, let us recall that, for example, those who “completely” trust V. Zelenskyy mostly want to see him as President after the war. But those who “rather” trust him mostly want to see someone else as President after the war [4].
Graph 6. I will read their names, and you tell me how much you trust them? (detailing) Sorted by % trust
The last time we asked question about trust in public figures (not only V. Zelenskyy, but also other people along with their “description”) was in May 2026 [5]. At the same time, the survey was conducted only by telephone interviews at that time. Given the peculiarities of the method’s influence (see Appendix 2, for example, among respondents surveyed by personal interviews, a higher share of those with an uncertain attitude towards public figures with a similar level of recognition), it is advisable to compare the results of May 2026 with the current results obtained by telephone interviews. If such a comparison is made, the only significant (in absolute terms) change is a significant increase in trust in M. Fedorov.
A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:
Despite all the challenges of today, Ukrainians remain optimistic and believe in a happy future for Ukraine in 10 years as a prosperous EU member state, and in victory in the war. At the same time, in the case of victory in the war, it is necessary to make a reservation that different people have different visions of what exactly is considered a victory. For some, this is the collapse of Russia, for others - the liberation of all occupied territories. At the same time, preserving sovereignty and independence with reliable security guarantees and prospects for socio-economic reconstruction for a significant part of Ukrainians will be a significant success (if not a victory). In any case, we now have a situation where, on the one hand, there is objectively psychological exhaustion of the population. Thus, in March 2026, in a survey by KIIS for NDI, 65% reported a deterioration in their mental health [6]. On the other hand, subjectively, Ukrainians retain the belief that in the end the course of the war will be in Ukraine’s favour. That is, society retains moral and psychological stability, which is very important for continuing resistance to the aggressor. At the same time, in matters of domestic policy, we see a demand for new leaders. There is currently a consensus that holding elections is impossible now and that elections should be held after the end of the war. However, an analysis of trust in public figures shows high trust (and, most likely, high expectations) in such new leaders as M. Fedorov, V. Zaluzhnyi, K. Budanov. In addition to them, I. Terekhov and A. Biletskyi have high indicators. V. Zelenskyy also maintains high levels of trust, but our other surveys show that the majority wants someone else to take over the presidency after the war. That is, he currently has enough trust to remain legitimate for the Ukrainian public as the head of state, but this does not cancel the desire for political elites to renew themselves in peacetime.
Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire and distribution by regions
How do you feel, will Ukraine or Russia ultimately win the war?
And if you evaluate the current situation on the battlefield in these weeks, then in your opinion it is developing in favor of …?
In your opinion, when might the war end?
And how do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?
Now we would like to know your attitude towards certain Ukrainian public figures. I will read their names, and you tell how much you trust them. To assess trust, use the scale “completely do not trust”, “rather do not trust”, “rather trust” or “completely trust”. If you don’t know him or her, say so.
1. Biletskyi Andrii – Commander of the Third Army Corps
2. Budanov Kyrylo – Head of the President’s Office, former Head of Intelligence
3. Honcharenko Oleksii – People's Deputy
4. Zaluzhnyi Valerii – Ambassador to the United Kingdom, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
5. Zelenskyy Volodymyr – President
6. Poroshenko Petro – former President
7. Prytula Serhii – public figure
8. Razumkov Dmytro – People's Deputy, former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada
9. Terekhov Ihor – Mayor of Kharkiv
10. Fedorov Mykhailo – Minister of Defense, previously – Minister of Digital Transformation and initiator of the Diia
Appendix 2. Comparison of results depending on the survey method used
How do you feel, will Ukraine or Russia ultimately win the war?
And if you evaluate the current situation on the battlefield in these weeks, then in your opinion it is developing in favor of …?
In your opinion, when might the war end?
And how do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?
Now we would like to know your attitude towards certain Ukrainian public figures. I will read their names, and you tell how much you trust them. To assess trust, use the scale “completely do not trust”, “rather do not trust”, “rather trust” or “completely trust”. If you don’t know him or her, say so.
1. Biletskyi Andrii – Commander of the Third Army Corps
2. Budanov Kyrylo – Head of the President’s Office, former Head of Intelligence
3. Honcharenko Oleksii – People's Deputy
4. Zaluzhnyi Valerii – Ambassador to the United Kingdom, former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
5. Zelenskyy Volodymyr – President
6. Poroshenko Petro – former President
7. Prytula Serhii – public figure
8. Razumkov Dmytro – People's Deputy, former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada
9. Terekhov Ihor – Mayor of Kharkiv
10. Fedorov Mykhailo – Minister of Defense, previously – Minister of Digital Transformation and initiator of the Diia
sadsdsd [1] Perceptions of the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine after nearly two years of large-scale invasion // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1372&page=1&fbclid=IwAR0K...UJNUVYOqw
10.8.2026
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